A Formal Framework and Fundamental Results for Social Analysis (Classic Reprint) - Softcover

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Excerpt from A Formal Framework and Fundamental Results for Social Analysis

A postscript is added, where the existence of static social contract is shown to be an extension and generalization of Nash' 3 result that a finite game has an equilibrium point. Implications are suggested toward further research.

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