Equilibrium Existence Results for Simple Economies and Dynamic Games (Classic Reprint) - Softcover

Kleindorfer, Paul R.

9781332259717: Equilibrium Existence Results for Simple Economies and Dynamic Games (Classic Reprint)

Softcover

ISBN 10: 1332259715 ISBN 13: 9781332259717

Verlag: Forgotten Books, 2019

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Excerpt from Equilibrium Existence Results for Simple Economies and Dynamic Games

An excellent bibliography of previous work on dynamic games can be compiled through the references cited within.

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Excerpt from Equilibrium Existence Results for Simple Economies and Dynamic Games

The purpose of this paper is to bring some simplicity and generality to the investigation of equilibrium existence in certain "simple" dynamic games. The way we deal with these objects is, essentially, by reducing them to what we term "simple economies", these latter being, from the viewpoint of equilibrium existence results, at once more general and less cumbersome. In �1, we exhibit some topological facts about a certain rather general class of simple economies, including, the fact (1.7, Main Theorem) that they each possess a non-empty and compact set of equilibria. Then, in �2, we define the simple dynamic games of interest, immediately reducing them (2.5, Reduction Lemma) to the simple economies studied. In �3, we show (3.0) that the simple dynamic games in question have non-empty and compact sets of equilibria, using the fact (1.7) that the simple economies to which they reduce have such sets of equilibria. We then illustrate by example (3.3) that a general class of discrete-time, deterministic games with convex performance criteria is covered by the equilibrium existence results just described. This class includes dynamic games for which certain non-linearities in the next-state map are allowed, and for which controls are restricted to compact regions, these regions themselves varying as a function of state.

About the Publisher

Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com

This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

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