Inhaltsangabe
The UAE's relatively open borders and economy have won praise from advocates of expanded
freedoms in the Middle East while producing financial excesses, social ills such as human
trafficking, and relatively lax controls on sensitive technologies acquired from the West.
Moreover, the social and economic freedoms have not translated into significant political
opening; the UAE government remains under the control of a small circle of leaders, even as it
allows informal citizen participation and traditional consensus-building. Members of the elite (the
ruling families of the seven emirates and clans allied with them) also routinely obtain favored
treatment in court cases and lucrative business opportunities. However, economic wealth-
coupled with some government moves against political activists-have enabled the UAE to avoid
widescale popular unrest that have erupted elsewhere in the Middle East since early 2011.
Political reform has been limited, both before and since the Arab uprisings began in the region.
Lacking popular pressure for elections, the UAE long refrained from following other Gulf states'
institution of electoral processes. It altered that position in December 2006 when it instituted a
selection process for half the membership of its consultative body, the Federal National Council
(FNC). Possibly to try to ward off the unrest sweeping the region, the government significantly
expanded the electorate for the September 24, 2011, FNC election process. However, turnout was
only about 25%, suggesting that the clamor for democracy in UAE remains limited or that the
citizenry perceived the election as unlikely to produce change. And, the government has not
announced a major expansion of the FNC's powers, which many intellectuals and activists seek.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Reseña del editor
The UAE's relatively open borders and economy have won praise from advocates of expanded
freedoms in the Middle East while producing financial excesses, social ills such as human
trafficking, and relatively lax controls on sensitive technologies acquired from the West.
Moreover, the social and economic freedoms have not translated into significant political
opening; the UAE government remains under the control of a small circle of leaders, even as it
allows informal citizen participation and traditional consensus-building. Members of the elite (the
ruling families of the seven emirates and clans allied with them) also routinely obtain favored
treatment in court cases and lucrative business opportunities. However, economic wealth-
coupled with some government moves against political activists-have enabled the UAE to avoid
widescale popular unrest that have erupted elsewhere in the Middle East since early 2011.
Political reform has been limited, both before and since the Arab uprisings began in the region.
Lacking popular pressure for elections, the UAE long refrained from following other Gulf states'
institution of electoral processes. It altered that position in December 2006 when it instituted a
selection process for half the membership of its consultative body, the Federal National Council
(FNC). Possibly to try to ward off the unrest sweeping the region, the government significantly
expanded the electorate for the September 24, 2011, FNC election process. However, turnout was
only about 25%, suggesting that the clamor for democracy in UAE remains limited or that the
citizenry perceived the election as unlikely to produce change. And, the government has not
announced a major expansion of the FNC's powers, which many intellectuals and activists seek.
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