This analysis of legislative behavior shows how primary voters can obstruct political compromise and outlines potential reforms to remedy gridlock.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Sarah E. Anderson is an Associate Professor of environmental politics at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her research examines how legislature and bureaucracy shape policy. She has previously worked as a legislative assistant for a member of Congress.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Anbieter: Books From California, Simi Valley, CA, USA
paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Artikel-Nr. mon0004126570
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: World of Books (was SecondSale), Montgomery, IL, USA
Zustand: Very Good. Item in very good condition! Textbooks may not include supplemental items i.e. CDs, access codes etc. Artikel-Nr. 00078981969
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. In English. Artikel-Nr. ria9781108738279_new
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. 2021. Paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Artikel-Nr. V9781108738279
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: moluna, Greven, Deutschland
Kartoniert / Broschiert. Zustand: New. This investigation of national, state, and local legislators tackles a pressing problem: the gridlock arising from politicians rejecting compromise for fear of punishment from voters in primary elections. Examining legislative behavior and possible negotiat. Artikel-Nr. 414621780
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Legislative solutions to pressing problems like balancing the budget, climate change, and poverty usually require compromise. Yet national, state, and local legislators often reject compromise proposals that would move policy in their preferred direction. Why do legislators reject such agreements This engaging and relevant investigation into how politicians think reveals that legislators refuse compromise - and exacerbate gridlock - because they fear punishment from voters in primary elections. Prioritizing these electoral interests can lead lawmakers to act in ways that hurt their policy interests and also overlook the broader electorate's preferences by representing only a subset of voters with rigid positions. With their solution-oriented approach, Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge-Yong demonstrate that improving the likelihood of legislative compromise may require moving negotiations outside of the public spotlight. Highlighting key electoral motives underlying polarization, this book is an excellent resource for scholars and students studying Congress, American politics, public policy, and political behavior. Artikel-Nr. 9781108738279
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar