A theory of international courts that assumes member states can ignore international agreements and adverse rulings, and that the court does not have informational advantages.
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Clifford J. Carrubba is a Professor of Political Science, Chair of the Political Science Department, and Professor of Law, by courtesy, at Emory University, Atlanta. He also founded and is currently serving as the Director of the Institute for Quantitative Theory and Methods at Emory University. Carrubba has published in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, International Organizations, Political Analysis, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Comparative Political Studies, and the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.
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Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. reprint edition. 243 pages. 8.75x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock. Artikel-Nr. x-1107677262
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Zustand: New. 2017. Paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Artikel-Nr. V9781107677265
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Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Nations often turn to international courts to help with overcoming collective-action problems associated with international relations. However, these courts generally cannot enforce their rulings, which begs the question: how effective are international courts This book proposes a general theory of international courts that assumes a court has no direct power over national governments. Member states are free to ignore both the international agreement and the rulings by the court created to enforce that agreement. The theory demonstrates that such a court can, in fact, facilitate cooperation with international law, but only within important political constraints. The authors examine the theoretical argument in the context of the European Union. Using an original data set of rulings by the European Court of Justice, they find that the disposition of court rulings and government compliance with those rulings comport with the theory's predictions. Artikel-Nr. 9781107677265
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