Initial operations in Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003, seemed to validate claims for the decisive impact of American airpower in modern war. However, the messy insurgencies that followed demonstrated that even primitive foes with adept communication skills could use information campaigns to limit the effectiveness of superior technology and create significant problems in diplomacy and public relations. In some ways, we are our own worst enemy in that regard, having created some unrealistic expectations for the capabilities of technology that our enemies can exploit. Airpower remains America’s greatest asymmetric advantage on the battlefield, and in this Letort Paper, Dr. Conrad Crane suggests some ways strategic communications can be improved to enhance its effectiveness. He traces the course of the U.S. Air Force’s pursuit of true precision capabilities, and how expectations always seem to get ahead of reality. The greatest challenge for current military leaders may not be in educating their civilian bosses about all the things the military instrument of power can accomplish, but instead explaining what it cannot. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this Letort Paper as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject as our nation continues to grapple with the use of airpower around the world. With the continuing American reluctance to get involved in any extended ground deployments, airpower will probably remain the initial tool of choice for political leaders wanting to employ coercive military viii force. This Letort Paper provides some important insights on how to do that better and smarter
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