CHAPTER 1

Thinking through Tradition

Elliott Oring

The word tradition is itself traditional in folklore studies. JohnAubrey used it in his Miscellanies in 1696. In 1777 John Brand identifiedtradition—indeed, oral tradition—as central in the preservation of the ritesand opinions of the common people (Dorson 1968a, 1:8). W. J. Thomsreferred to "local traditions" in his 1846 letter to the Athenaeum where heproposed his neologism "folklore" (Dorson 1968a, 1:53), and E. SydneyHartland, in the last years of that century, characterized folklore as the "scienceof tradition" (Dorson 1968a, 2:231). Tradition has remained central tomost definitions of folklore ever since (Brunvand 1998, 3). Indeed, it is consideredone of a few "keywords" in folklore studies (in addition to the termsart, text, group, performance, genre, context, and identity [Feintuch 2003]).But what is the status of tradition in folklore studies? What role does it playand what achievements can the field attribute to its deployment?

In his essay "The Seven Strands of Tradition," Dan Ben-Amos (1984)identified a variety of ways that folklorists have used tradition: as lore,canon, process, mass, culture, langue, and performance. Lore refers to pastknowledge of a society that has inadvertently survived but is in danger ofdying out (104). Canon refers to that body of literary and artistic culturethat has gained acceptance in a particular social group (106). Process refers tothe dynamics of cultural transmission over time (117). Mass refers to what istransmitted by tradition; it is not the result of superorganic process but ratheris changed by those who transmit it (118). Culture suggests that tradition issynonymous with the anthropological conception of thought and behaviorin social life (120–21). Langue refers to the concepts, categories, and rulesthat engender culture. As in Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistics, it refers tothe abstract system that underlies and generates speech and behavior (121).Performance refers to enactment, and although enactment is always in thepresent, tradition always exists in the minds and memories of people as apotential (122–23).

These differences in the uses of the term tradition are not alwayscrystal clear, but Ben-Amos was trying to sort out the usages of the termby folklorists from different periods and publications. His was an attemptto construct a descriptive history of the term. He found that folklorists didnot use tradition consistently, nor did they examine their usages critically.Curiously, Ben-Amos concludes that none of the uses of the term tradition aremore adequate or proper than any other. Tradition, he states, is a metaphorthat guides folklorists in dealing with "an inchoate world of experiences andideas" (Ben-Amos 1984, 124). Simon J. Bronner, writing a decade and ahalf later, was perhaps less forgiving. He characterizes the use of traditionin folklore as reflecting "multiple meanings" and betraying a "conceptualsoftness" (Bronner 1998, 10).

Can a "science of tradition" be based on a concept that is so scattered,inchoate, and soft? Ben-Amos's seeming unconcern with the ways folkloristsdeployed the term tradition probably stemmed from the fact that he hadno personal investment in the concept. He had eliminated tradition fromhis definition of folklore more than a decade before. For him, folklore was"artistic communication in small groups" (Ben-Amos 1972, 14). Traditionplayed no part. Ben-Amos nevertheless claimed that folklorists think withthe term tradition even if they did not think much about it. Do folkloriststhink with tradition? Is tradition an analytical concept that helps folkloriststo perceive, explore, and explain the world? These are some of the questionsaddressed below.

TRADITION AS PROCESS AND PRODUCT

The word tradition comes from the Latin roots trans + dare—literally,"to give across"—that is, to hand over, deliver, or transfer. Thus, traditioninvolves the notion of transferring or transmitting and has been appliedto the act of handing over or handing down as well as to those objects thatare handed over or handed down. Consequently, tradition refers to bothprocesses and products.

Although folklorists have consistently noted the duality of the term,they have focused almost exclusively on the products of tradition (see Ben-Amos1984, 116–19; Final Discussion 1983, 241; Gailey 1989, 144; Simsand Stephens 2005, 65; Vansina 1985, 3). They have been drawn to thefield by quilts, proverbs, remedies, legends, songs, and tales. The study offolklore has always been rooted in the study of particular traditions; and thestudy of those traditions only sometimes turned toward the question of themeans by which they were passed on. Folklore did not begin with a study ofprocess and then turn to the outcomes of that process. The process was usedto label objects of interest and set them apart. The process itself, however,has always remained somewhat opaque.

Dan Ben-Amos's survey of the uses of tradition noted that the term wasemployed to denote both process and product, but that distinction was obscuredas he listed all seven uses indiscriminately. Process is listed with six other usesthat refer to products of tradition—namely, lore, canon, mass, culture, langue,and performance (Ben-Amos 1984, 102–25). These products are the ideas,knowledge, objects, behaviors, or rules that are transferred and transmittedthrough time. Had Ben-Amos arranged the categories taxonomically, however,with the first distinction drawn between process and product, the fact that theother six categories were—or dealt with—product would have stood out moreclearly. Then the deficiency of attention to tradition as process would havebeen underscored, as process would have included no further categories.

The collapse of process and product into a simple list obscures the factthat process is not just another entry. It does not constitute a mere one-seventhof the meanings of tradition. It represents a fundamentally differentconceptualization of what constitutes tradition. Process is more fundamentalthan product. Traditions are traditions only by virtue of some process thatmakes them so. Process creates product. Without the process, traditionswould be indistinguishable from all other cultural ideas and practices.

What, then, is this process? The process of tradition, I contend, is theprocess of cultural reproduction. Cultural reproduction refers to the means bywhich culture is reproduced in transmission and repetition. It depends onthe assimilation of cultural ideas and the reenactment of cultural practices.Reproduction may be accomplished in an act of transmission from oneperson to another. Or it may be accomplished when individuals producesomething they have reproduced before, such as singing a song they have sungin the past (Bartlett 1932, 63, 118). My use of cultural reproduction refersto a much broader sphere of activity than that addressed by Pierre Bourdieuin his study of French educational institutions. The term should not berestricted to school learning or the learning of "high" or "official" culture. Astudy of cultural reproduction need not focus on the ways that it preservessocial stratifications (Bourdieu 1973; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). Indeed,folklorists should be more interested in how social organizations enablecultural reproduction than the reverse. In reality, cultural reproduction isachieved through a number of different processes. Cultural reproduction ismerely an umbrella term for these processes—the processes of tradition.

It is even possible to identify some of these processes within Ben-Amos'sessay. When he discusses the sense of tradition as canon, for example, hetalks about creativity and how folklorists view creativity as necessary to themaintenance of tradition. Creativity—or better, re-creation—would then beone of the processes of tradition. Canons are products, but canonization isa process, so it might be included as well. Beyond Ben-Amos's essay, otherprocesses spring immediately to mind: education, memorization, rehearsal,comparison, and traditionalization.

TRADITION AND CREATIVITY

Everything changes. What comes from the past mutates and is modified,transformed, or disappears. There are two possible approaches to the pastand change: take the past as given and describe and explain change; ortake change as given and describe and explain that which perseveres. Theattention of contemporary folklorists is unequally distributed with respectto these approaches. For the most part, folklorists take the past as given andaddress themselves to variation (Ben-Amos 1984, 114). Each instantiationof a tradition is regarded as a performance with its own peculiar variables.Rather than being something handed down, it is highlighted as somethingnew and unique. It has even been claimed that "tradition is change" (FinalDiscussion 1983, 236; Toelken 1996, 7).

Of late, the attention of folklorists has been directed to one type ofchange: change that is deliberate, crafted, and aesthetic. The terms for thistype of change are innovation, improvisation, and creativity. Folklorists holdthat it is creativity that keeps tradition alive by making an inheritance fromthe past relevant in the present (Ben-Amos 1984, 113; Glassie 1995, 395).However, there are several problems with this proposition.

There is a presumption that the changes that occur to past ideas,expressions, and behaviors are necessary ones. For example, "Folklore livesthrough a generally selective process that ensures ... that traditions willmaintain their viability, or change so they can, or die off" (Toelken 1996,43). "Only those forms are retained that hold a functional value for thegiven community" (Jakobson and Bogatyrev 1980 [1929], 6). "Creativestorytellers are the ones who modernize and renew the folktale tradition tomake it attractive for current consumption" (Dégh 1995, 44). "The creativeimpulse speaks to the fact that tradition is not and has never been somethingstatic, the most stable aspect of any tradition being its ability to changein response to changing needs" (Neulander 1998, 226). These claims,however, are merely assertions. Change and adaptation have not beenassessed independently but are defined in terms of one another. The changeof past forms is required for survival in the present; survival in the presentdemands change in forms from the past. However, without some empiricaldetermination of what constitutes necessary and incidental change, what hasbeen proposed is tautology: the changes that have occurred to an expressionfrom the past enable its survival; expressions from the past that have notsurvived did not change appropriately to suit current conditions. In otherwords, that which survives, survives; that which has not, has not.

Creativity is a term for a process that is applied to a product. Becausecreativity is a process, it is conflated with the process of tradition itself.But the process of tradition, whatever its particular characteristics, mustconceptually relate to a process of cultural reproduction, not innovation.Things from the past can be altered. Things from the past are altered.Things from the past are "creatively" or otherwise revised. But to callthis the process of tradition is to largely ignore continuity and stability.Continuity and stability depend on what people preserve—for good or ill,consciously or unconsciously—of the thought and behavior of the past. Tostudy tradition, folkloristics must come to understand the means by whichcultural reproduction is accomplished—to grasp the forces that direct thepresent through the conduit of past practice.

The notion of creativity as employed by folklorists is not the processof tradition but a process acting upon particular traditions (Bronson 1969,144–45). For example, would the creative refashioning of a ballad orfolktale constitute the operation of tradition or an operation performedon a traditional expression? The use of a single term to at once refer toboth a process and a product is probably the source of many problems withthe term tradition. Some statements that might be true about tradition asproduct (e.g., "traditions change") are ambiguous, meaningless, or falsewhen applied to tradition as process (e.g., "tradition is change" [FinalDiscussion 1983, 236; Toelken 1996, 7]). Some statements that might betrue about tradition as process (e.g., "tradition never dies") are ambiguous,meaningless, or false when applied to a product (e.g., "traditions never die").

Contemporary folklorists have been trapped by tradition. Like Ben-Amos(1972), they have moved away from the concept. Unlike Ben-Amos,they did not consciously or precipitously abandon it. Almost alchemically,they transformed it. The continuity of the past was regarded as a given.The focus was on change, particularly creative change, which became thetouchstone of tradition: "Tradition ... is an innovative adaptation of theold" (Glassie 1995, 395); "The artist's own unique talents of inventivenesswithin the tradition ... are expected to operate strongly" (Toelken 1996,37); "The pattern of creative activity within the forms of one's own societyis valid not only in such folk arts as pottery or storytelling, but equally inthe most extreme forms of self-expression in modern European painting"(Crowley 1966, 136); "The linking of creativity and tradition ... succeedsthe Romantic notion of art as the domain of exceptional and cultivatedminds" (Bronner 1992, 2). Tradition was thus made to exhibit the qualitythat defines art in our culture—it was dynamic, innovative, original, andcreative. In other words, "creativity" was the means by which folkloristsrecuperated tradition as art. Tradition, consequently, has been somethingof a "survival" in contemporary folkloristics. It has lost much of its originalmeaning and has made its way into "a new state of society different fromthat in which ... [it] had ... [its] original home" (Tylor 1871, 1:16).Yet the older sense of the term haunts the discipline like an unlaid ghost,and it indexes, ironically, the influence of tradition in the operation ofcontemporary folklore scholarship.

TRADITION: ETIC AND EMIC

Where an etic and superorganic notion of tradition dominated folklorescholarship in the past—under theories of evolution, diffusion, function,and structure—an emic sense of tradition is privileged today. RichardHandler and Jocelyn Linnekin dismiss the idea that tradition might referto a core of culture traits inherited from the past and regard it solely asa symbolic construction—an interpretation of the past enacted in thepresent (Handler and Linnekin 1984, 273). The traditional is what peopleclaim their traditions to be. Whether those claims can be substantiated byempirical evidence is another matter entirely. Barry M. McDonald, writingin response to Henry Glassie's (1995) essay on tradition, is more forgiving.He feels that practitioners and folklorists need to negotiate "some mutuallyintelligible core meanings for the concept" (McDonald 1997, 52). Themeaning of the term, he feels, should not be determined by the folklorist'scritical viewpoint alone.

Both propositions seem problematic. Handler and Linnekin basetheir claim for an interpretive concept of tradition on their independentinvestigations of particular cases in Quebec and Hawaii. However, thecases only evidence that tradition can be constructed and deployed forsymbolic purposes—for purposes of cultural identity. Identity formationand maintenance are important uses made of the past and the perceivedpast—or what might be called "the rhetorical past." They hardly seem toexhaust the possible roles that past ideas, objects, and practices might playin contemporary affairs, nor do they engage at all with tradition as process.

What would happen to the field of folklore were it restricted only tothose practices deemed traditional by their practitioners? Many peopletell jokes, cure illnesses, dance, sing, and make quilts simply to engage inthose activities. Tradition may have nothing to do with the reasons for theperformance. That the joke is a funny one, the remedy an effective one, thesong a moving one, the dance a sensual one, and the quilt a warm one isoften more than sufficient justification for the endeavor. People may knowthat the joke, the remedy, the song, the dance, and the quilt pattern havebeen around for a while, but it may have little to do with why they joke, heal,sing, dance, and stitch. In fact, it is often the folklorist who raises questionsabout the past and introduces traditionality into folk consciousness anddiscourse. In any event, much of what folklorists consider to be folklorewould evaporate overnight were folklore defined simply as tradition andtradition defined in terms of people's claims about what constituted thepractices of their ancestors.

And what might be achieved by McDonald's notion of a negotiatedconcept of tradition? It is quite possible—indeed likely—that scholars and thepeople they study will have different, sometimes radically different, notionsof the past. The scholar certainly needs to be aware of these differences.It may be that etic and emic concepts illuminate one another or talk pastone another, but what exactly is to be negotiated? How would the outcomeof such a negotiation be decided? Why should etic and emic concepts ofanything agree? What would be gained from such agreements and, moreimportantly perhaps, what would be lost? It is precisely in the disparitiesbetween the assessments of scholars and practitioners that some of the mostfruitful questions about human thought and behavior are engendered.

Traditions can be unconscious. Ideas, knowledge, and behaviors can bereceived and acted upon without the recipient's awareness of their nature, origin,or consequences. Some hold the idea of unconscious tradition as "theoretically'deficient' and potentially offensive to its practitioners" (McDonald 1997, 58).Wherein lies the deficiency and offense? Is all knowledge consciously acquiredand accessible to consciousness? If so, why is it that native speakers usuallycannot describe the rules that govern their language production? They clearlyfollow rules but often have a hazy grasp, if any grasp at all, of what those rulesare. People—ourselves included—often do not know exactly what they aredoing, how they do it, or how they acquired the means do it.