1914–1916 Three Ambassadors for St. Petersburg

In the years of peace and into the years of war, up until April 1917, when the United States entered World War I as a belligerent, President Wilson did not give much time or thought to the subject of relations with the government of Russia. But even though he was not much interested in Russia, he had to appoint an ambassador. This did not prove to be an easy task. The will perhaps was there, but Wilson's mind is not easy to fathom. He may have been busy, although all accounts of the president's activity in his first term in the White House testify to a short workday. The president might not have believed that his country's relations with Russia justified much time and thought. He preferred to turn his attention elsewhere; he worked on reforming the mechanisms of the government. In foreign relations the problems of Mexico and, then, beginning in August 1914, those of the European war appeared more important. The latter had largely to do with American neutrality. His efforts failed to force the belligerents, Germany in particular, to respect American neutral commerce on the high seas.

The president's first order of business concerning Russia was to replace Republican ambassador Curtis Guild with a Democratic appointee. His leading candidate refused after much delay. His second choice immediately stepped down after his nomination due to unfavorable publicity. His third selection failed to live up to expectations after fifteen months of tenure. His fourth choice, David R. Francis, held the ambassadorship for the remainder of Wilson's presidency. Ambassador Francis got President Wilson to recognize the democratic Provisional Government in April 1917. This decision fit nicely into the president's declaration of war message that upheld democracy over autocracy. Afterwards, Wilson lost confidence in Francis and appointed committees to formulate his Russian policy. This dilution of decision making detracted from the Wilson administration's ability to create a strong and consistent policy. It left a vacuum in America's Russian policy that allowed ad hoc voices to spin alternative policies. This confused situation completely broke down with the increasing inability of the Provisional Government to rule successfully. At the moment of the ambassador's greatest triumph, the recognition of the Provisional Government, missions of experts superseded him.

With this virtual void of leadership in the making of Russian foreign policy, the State Department and ambassador might have been factors in bringing the United States into a better relationship with Russia. The department itself under President Wilson's first secretary of state, his political ally and the Democratic wheelhorse William Jennings Bryan, unfortunately did not prove very helpful.

Without presidential leadership in this area, at least while Bryan was secretary, the only possible source of change in relations would have been the St. Petersburg embassy. Everything came down to the talents of the American ambassadors in St. Petersburg. Guild could do little; Henry M. Pindell and George C. Marye, the first two selections of the State Department and President Wilson, were failures. Finally, the president settled as a final resort on David R. Francis, who took hold of the office. He was smart enough and more active, yet unprepared for Russia, and ignorant, more a spectator than a mover. There was more concern over a commercial treaty than over the bettering of relations to shore up a weak regime.

Francis, formerly the governor of Missouri, represented the heartland of the American Middle West. An individual with considerable political experience, which was essential for the Russian post, he lacked understanding of Russia. He was unaware of how perilous the situation was, especially after the European war broke out and Russia's weaknesses were exposed.

1.

Before the war's outbreak, upon the takeover of the government in Washington by the Wilsonians, Ambassador Guild wrote a friend that he would not fail to state matters as they stood. He wrote that as a former ambassador he would remain silent on relations with Russia except that "the misunderstanding in the United States of problems here is so serious and the conditions here so delicate." He thought it his duty to inform the president-elect; he was not looking for favors. He cited examples of American misunderstanding: negotiations for a treaty had been taking place in St. Petersburg when they were supposed to be in Washington; American Jews were not the only ones singled out for poor treatment but, rather, all foreign Jews were treated alike and every other nation acquiesced; Americans thought that Russia bought a trifling number of goods in the United States. He mentioned how painful the scene in St. Petersburg was over abrogation of the 1832 treaty. He had avoided a breach between America and Russia. Guild was able to appeal to the Council of Ministers for favorable treatment of American Jews on an individual basis and he put the embassy in order, started subscription to Russian newspapers, found an efficient chief clerk, hired a reliable translator, and came twice to Washington with information, stating, "I do wish to lay what I have learned here at the disposition of the new President before he takes any positive action."

Guild wrote a confidential report regarding what appeared as a change on the passport question. Premier Ivan Goremykin had said that a bill was being prepared to simplify passports. Guild recommended awaiting developments. In March 1913 he had saved the administration embarrassment by reminding Bryan to have the president send a cable recognizing the tercentenary of the Romanov dynasty. The promise of more consultations ended after Guild's return in mid-1913.

The president saw a report in the New York Times in August 1914 referring to an editorial by Guild in the Boston Commercial Bulletin. Guild had maintained that the president told friends he foresaw a boom for American business in selling to both sides during the war. The former ambassador labeled this a heartless utterance by a hardened cynic. "No, Mr. President, not even on the sordid lines of material and selfish gain are the awful facts of today's history to be viewed with exultation, still less with gaiety." The Boston Herald wrote that the president's secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, denied any reference by the president to prosperity as a result of the war. The Boston Globe reported a Tumulty telegram to Guild that the statement was "unqualifiedly false." Guild responded that he had quoted from a dispatch in the Boston Herald and was glad the president repudiated it. He tried to straighten out the affair by telling Tumulty he had only quoted the Herald. He had not made the statement himself, he said, and they were both "victims of some very yellow journalism."

By this time there was no possibility of Guild's return. Wilson offered Charles R. Crane the ambassadorship and soon the president was begging the Chicago plumbing magnate not to decline: "I simply cannot adjust my mind to giving up the idea of having you represent us at the Court of Russia." Crane's father, who had built the family business, had died in 1912. The family expected its eldest son to attend to the business. Crane had displayed an interest in Russia and often traveled there.

Meanwhile, Ambassador George P. Bakhmetev called at the State Department to say the tsar believed America and Russia ought to have a commercial treaty and that an American ambassador would facilitate negotiation. "I suppose there is no hurry about it," Bryan remarked. The president replied that he would rather argue with the Russians over the rights of Jews "when we have got some of our pressing business off our hands."

Crane was the only appropriate candidate. For months neither the president nor the secretary considered anyone else. Intermediaries gave the impression that Crane might take the post in a year or so. Bryan suggested the idea of a temporary appointment. At this point the name of a newspaper publisher in Peoria, Henry M. Pindell, arose. Senator J. Hamilton Lewis of Illinois put forward Pindell's name. Because Pindell had been a Wilson supporter in the recent election, Lewis promised him a soft berth in St. Petersburg until Crane was ready. Bryan reminded the president that Pindell, an original Wilson man, would "enable us to recognize Illinois again when his successor is ready to be appointed." Wilson sent Pindell's name to the Senate in November 1913 in an effort to accommodate "Ham" Lewis. Watching from the Department of State, Counselor John Bassett Moore saw a risky game in which the president hoped to dupe the Senate. The Senate gave its consent to Pindell's ambassadorship early in 1914. Pindell declined.

By this time Wilson was sixteen months into his term. Bryan had once considered William G. Sharp of Ohio, but as a former member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sharp had recommended abrogation of the commercial treaty. He was persona non grata in St. Petersburg, according to Bakhmetev, although he became ambassador to France. Wilson now gave the name of a California banker, George C. Marye, to the Senate. Marye was confirmed on July 9.

The first secretary of the embassy in Berlin, Joseph C. Grew, joked that Marye must have exclaimed, "Ambassador, Ambassador!" before a mirror in amazement over his appointment. From the time of Guild's resignation until the appointment of Marye, the embassy was under the guidance of its first secretary, Charles Wilson. When Marye took his post the administration's aims in Russia were still limited to a trade treaty that would resolve the passport issue. There was little other concern about the relations between the two countries.

Marye corresponded with Guild as well as with Guild's predecessor, Charlemagne Tower, to find out about his tasks. Guild, he confessed, had been "one of the most popular men in official life in the Russian capital." No doubt he read Guild's article in the Yale Review that stated how Americans had many "erroneous ideas of Russia."

On July 3, 1914, the New York Times reported Marye's selection under the heading, "Hope for Russian Treaty: Administration Expects Marye to Reopen Negotiations." The article noted that when the White House announced Marye's appointment, it suggested that he "might take up that subject."

Colonel House's account of Marye's appointment displayed the shallowness of the administration's policy: "It was thought he would make a campaign contribution and [Thomas J.] Pence, [Joseph P.] Tumulty and several Senators were led to urge his appointment on that account. Marye's secretary was filling them full of what Marye would do for the party, and then Marye left without giving the campaign committee a dollar."

Marye did not reach St. Petersburg, now renamed Petrograd to give it a Slavic sound, until October 1914, a delay of four months. By then, World War I had begun and Russia had lost the battle of Tannenberg in late August.

At this time the president asked the embassy to make known his wish to mediate the great conflict. The United States was a signatory of the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907. Wilson would welcome an opportunity to act in the interest of peace under one of the conventions of that conference. The tsar responded by thanking Wilson but noting that the war was imposed on Russia. It was, he continued, "premature to contemplate the possibility of peace."

Bakhmetev had told Marye in Washington that it was too dangerous for him to proceed to Petrograd. The Russian ambassador pointed out that the position of American ambassador had been vacant for two years. Marye had to represent German and Austrian interests since they had requested and received American protection of their embassies, prisoners of war, and all other matters. Would it not look as if the United States was hurrying for the sake of the Central Powers? Official circles in Petrograd, Bakhmetev continued, had been hostile to the United States since abrogation of the treaty. Anyway, the war would be over in a few months, and then it would be safe for Marye to set forth.

Bryan informed Wilson of Bakhmetev's opinions and stressed his feeling that a bad impression would be made if, after a two-year delay, an ambassador appeared just as the Germans and Austrians asked the United States to represent their interests. "With regard to Marye," Wilson replied, "I think the course you propose is the right one to pursue. I think I would, through Wilson, the Chargé, obtain the views of the Russian Government." Marye spoke to Tumulty, to Senator Ollie M. James of Kentucky, twice with Bryan, and again to Bakhmetev. A cable from Chargé Wilson confirmed that although the tsar believed that Marye's presence was not necessary, he would cordially receive him. That changed Bakhmetev's mind, and Marye departed for his new post. Before leaving, he had conversations with the president, Schiff, Marshall, and Herman Bernstein. He arrived in London, then proceeded to Petrograd via Berlin.

Parenthetically, Count Sergei Witte of Treaty of Portsmouth fame had met with Chargé Wilson and "in strictest confidence" told him that the Russian government wanted Witte to go to America and help to arrange a large loan. He said that he would not go unless Russia revised its passport restrictions. He assured the chargé that the loan would be spent for American goods. The State Department deemed this information so important that its counselor, Robert Lansing, sent it to the president with the comment, "It would be most gratifying if a treaty such as is proposed could be negotiated ... as it would be accomplishing the seemingly impossible." The response was that the first of Witte's conditions was essential if he were to be a special envoy. Lansing cautioned as to the second, that the United States could not take any part in loans to belligerents. It should be noted that Lansing had become counselor in 1914 and was appointed secretary of state in 1915 with Bryan's resignation in the midst of the German sinking of the Lusitania and the resulting diplomatic crisis.

Meanwhile Bakhmetev proposed a system of promissory notes to pay for supplies purchased in the United States. Lansing believed that this was different from a war loan. The ambassador suggested short-term obligations where amounts and interest were to be determined by the American government. The initial amount desired was $5 million.

Shortly after his arrival, Marye visited the embassy at 34 Furshtatskaya, off Liteiny Prospekt. The following day he saw Foreign Minister Sazonov, who arranged for the tsar to receive him and accept his letters of credence. Marye was impressed by the tsar and, after a series of conversations with Sazonov, prepared a report on commercial relations. The New York Herald wondered at the delay of the treaty and maintained that Russia was eager to increase its imports tenfold. On reading this report, Lansing concluded that Russia would "discuss that passport question because of the desire manifested by Count Witte and by M. Sazonoff ... to negotiate a commercial treaty." Unfortunately, Witte died before he could undertake the mission.

The tardiness of Marye's negotiation of a treaty led House to tell the president he, the colonel, would be willing to go to Petrograd and make the treaty. Wilson responded, according to House, that "He hated to ask me to go to Russia in winter, but he thought it would be of great advantage, and he expressed a lack of confidence in the ability of Marye to do such work." House was more emphatic about Marye and in a letter to the president wrote: "I do not believe that Marye is equal to the job. I do not hear good things of him."

Chargé Wilson had cautioned the secretary of state against accepting the German and Austrian request to look after their interests. He pointed out that America had done service for Japan during the RussoJapanese War, with a most unfortunate effect. The German Foreign Ministry approached the American ambassador in Berlin, James W. Gerard, with the request: "Formally asked by Foreign Minister if United States will take over German embassies in France and Russia and any other countries with which Germany may be at war." On August 3, 1914, the State Department granted permission to the embassy to act for Germany and Austria-Hungary.

At this point the plight of German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners (POWs) in Russia then reached such extremes that the Austrian ambassador in Washington, Constantin Dumba, asked the president to make a personal appeal to the tsar. Charles B. Smith, a congressman from Buffalo and member of the committee on foreign affairs, offered to go to Petrograd to help with prisoners and assist with the commercial treaty. The president declined the offer, fearing to confuse American interests. The German government cabled the principles to be followed for prisoners, which included inspection of camps, freedom to converse, ascertaining needs, and sending of mail and food. The American YMCA and Red Cross would also play important roles in prisoner relief.