1914–1916 Three Ambassadors for St. Petersburg

In the years of peace and into the years of war, up until April 1917, when the United States entered World War I as a belligerent, President Wilson did not give much time or thought to the subject of relations with the government of Russia. But even though he was not much interested in Russia, he had to appoint an ambassador. This did not prove to be an easy task. The will perhaps was there, but Wilson's mind is not easy to fathom. He may have been busy, although all accounts of the president's activity in his first term in the White House testify to a short workday. The president might not have believed that his country's relations with Russia justified much time and thought. He preferred to turn his attention elsewhere; he worked on reforming the mechanisms of the government. In foreign relations the problems of Mexico and, then, beginning in August 1914, those of the European war appeared more important. The latter had largely to do with American neutrality. His efforts failed to force the belligerents, Germany in particular, to respect American neutral commerce on the high seas.

The president's first order of business concerning Russia was to replace Republican ambassador Curtis Guild with a Democratic appointee. His leading candidate refused after much delay. His second choice immediately stepped down after his nomination due to unfavorable publicity. His third selection failed to live up to expectations after fifteen months of tenure. His fourth choice, David R. Francis, held the ambassadorship for the remainder of Wilson's presidency. Ambassador Francis got President Wilson to recognize the democratic Provisional Government in April 1917. This decision fit nicely into the president's declaration of war message that upheld democracy over autocracy. Afterwards, Wilson lost confidence in Francis and appointed committees to formulate his Russian policy. This dilution of decision making detracted from the Wilson administration's ability to create a strong and consistent policy. It left a vacuum in America's Russian policy that allowed ad hoc voices to spin alternative policies. This confused situation completely broke down with the increasing inability of the Provisional Government to rule successfully. At the moment of the ambassador's greatest triumph, the recognition of the Provisional Government, missions of experts superseded him.

With this virtual void of leadership in the making of Russian foreign policy, the State Department and ambassador might have been factors in bringing the United States into a better relationship with Russia. The department itself under President Wilson's first secretary of state, his political ally and the Democratic wheelhorse William Jennings Bryan, unfortunately did not prove very helpful.

Without presidential leadership in this area, at least while Bryan was secretary, the only possible source of change in relations would have been the St. Petersburg embassy. Everything came down to the talents of the American ambassadors in St. Petersburg. Guild could do little; Henry M. Pindell and George C. Marye, the first two selections of the State Department and President Wilson, were failures. Finally, the president settled as a final resort on David R. Francis, who took hold of the office. He was smart enough and more active, yet unprepared for Russia, and ignorant, more a spectator than a mover. There was more concern over a commercial treaty than over the bettering of relations to shore up a weak regime.

Francis, formerly the governor of Missouri, represented the heartland of the American Middle West. An individual with considerable political experience, which was essential for the Russian post, he lacked understanding of Russia. He was unaware of how perilous the situation was, especially after the European war broke out and Russia's weaknesses were exposed.

1.

Before the war's outbreak, upon the takeover of the government in Washington by the Wilsonians, Ambassador Guild wrote a friend that he would not fail to state matters as they stood. He wrote that as a former ambassador he would remain silent on relations with Russia except that "the misunderstanding in the United States of problems here is so serious and the conditions here so delicate." He thought it his duty to inform the president-elect; he was not looking for favors. He cited examples of American misunderstanding: negotiations for a treaty had been taking place in St. Petersburg when they were supposed to be in Washington; American Jews were not the only ones singled out for poor treatment but, rather, all foreign Jews were treated alike and every other nation acquiesced; Americans thought that Russia bought a trifling number of goods in the United States. He mentioned how painful the scene in St. Petersburg was over abrogation of the 1832 treaty. He had avoided a breach between America and Russia. Guild was able to appeal to the Council of Ministers for favorable treatment of American Jews on an individual basis and he put the embassy in order, started subscription to Russian newspapers, found an efficient chief clerk, hired a reliable translator, and came twice to Washington with information, stating, "I do wish to lay what I have learned here at the disposition of the new President before he takes any positive action."

Guild wrote a confidential report regarding what appeared as a change on the passport question. Premier Ivan Goremykin had said that a bill was being prepared to simplify passports. Guild recommended awaiting developments. In March 1913 he had saved the administration embarrassment by reminding Bryan to have the president send a cable recognizing the tercentenary of the Romanov dynasty. The promise of more consultations ended after Guild's return in mid-1913.

The president saw a report in the New York Times in August 1914 referring to an editorial by Guild in the Boston Commercial Bulletin. Guild had maintained that the president told friends he foresaw a boom for American business in selling to both sides during the war. The former ambassador labeled this a heartless utterance by a hardened cynic. "No, Mr. President, not even on the sordid lines of material and selfish gain are the awful facts of today's history to be viewed with exultation, still less with gaiety." The Boston Herald wrote that the president's secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, denied any reference by the president to prosperity as a result of the war. The Boston Globe reported a Tumulty telegram to Guild that the statement was "unqualifiedly false." Guild responded...