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Implications of the Reykjavik Summit on Its Twentieth Anniversary: Conference Report : Conference held October 11 - 12, 2006 at the Hoover INstitution, Stanford University - Softcover

Buch 46 von 174: Hoover Institution Press Publication

Drell, Sidney D.

 
9780817948429: Implications of the Reykjavik Summit on Its Twentieth Anniversary: Conference Report : Conference held October 11 - 12, 2006 at the Hoover INstitution, Stanford University

Inhaltsangabe

Drawn from presentations at the Hoover Institution's conference on the twentieth anniversary of the Reykjavik summit, this collection of essays examines the legacy of that historic meeting between President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. The contributors discuss the new nuclear era and what the lessons of Reykjavik can mean for today's nuclear arms control efforts.

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Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Sidney D. Drell is a senior fellow, by courtesy, at the Hoover Institution and professor of theoretical physics (emeritus) at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center. He coauthored The Gravest Danger: Nuclear Weapons with James Goodby. George P. Shultz, the Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow at the Hoover Institution, served as U.S. secretary of state under Ronald Reagan.

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Implications of the Reykjavik Summit on Its Twentieth Anniversary

Conference Report

By Sidney D. Drell, George P. Shultz

Hoover Institution Press

Copyright © 2007 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8179-4842-9

Contents

Preface George P. Shultz and Sidney D. Drell,
Related Newspaper Articles,
A World Free of Nuclear Weapons George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn,
The Nuclear Threat Mikhail Gorbachev,
Papers Prepared for the Conference,
President Reagan's Nuclear Legacy James E. Goodby,
Nuclear Weapons Elimination: A Process Thomas Graham Jr.,
The Legacy of Reykjavik: Preserving a Security Option for Dealing with Madmen, Missiles, and Missile Defense Thomas H. Henriksen,
The Soviet Preparation for Reykjavik: Four Documents David Holloway,
Zero Nuclear Weapons Max M. Kampelman,
The Legacy of Reykjavik: Outline of Remarks Jack F. Matlock Jr.,
When Reagan and Gorbachev Reached for the Stars Don Oberdorfer,
The Legacy of Reykjavik: Remarks Rozanne L. Ridgway,
A Legacy of Reykjavik: Negotiating with Enemies Abraham D. Sofaer,
Six-Country Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel James P. Timbie,
Appendix One: Memorandum of Conversation (Transcript of the discussions of President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze),
Appendix Two: Conference Agenda and Participants,
Related Pre-conference Publications,
Index,


CHAPTER 1

Related Newspaper Articles


A World Free of Nuclear Weapons

George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn


NUCLEAR WEAPONS TODAY present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage — to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.

Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.

North Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich uranium — potentially to weapons grade — highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that nonstate terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges.

Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies worldwide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments, or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War, by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?

LEADERS ADDRESSED THIS issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged America's "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma — to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said, "The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution."

Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, "Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet Earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness."

Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on Earth and civilization." Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents.

Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles.

What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a worldwide consensus be forged that defines a series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address the challenge posed by these two questions.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of both parties since Richard Nixon has reaffirmed these treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers.

Strong non-proliferation efforts are under way. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that provide powerful new tools for detecting activities that violate the NPT and endanger world security. They deserve full implementation. The negotiations on proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, involving all the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and Japan, are crucially important. They must be energetically pursued.

But by themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the danger. Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev aspired to accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik 20 years ago — the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Their vision shocked experts in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but galvanized the hopes of people around the world. The leaders of the two countries with the largest...

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