The Domestic Context of Russian Foreign Policy

In Russia there is no law. There is a pillar, and on that pillar sits the crown. Alexander Pushkin

It has become axiomatic that a country's conduct of international relations reflects the influence of domestic factors. Indeed, the link is so strong that one might turn to Carl von Clausewitz's famous maxim to argue that diplomacy is merely the continuation of domestic politics by other means. Yet such generalizations also invite misunderstanding and misrepresentation. They may reinforce crude national stereotypes, tendentious readings of history, and deterministic views of the future. And they are often misused to justify actions that are anything but pragmatic or logical.

These problems are especially evident in the case of Russia. Few countries have been subject to mythmaking on such an industrial scale. Many observers, foreign and Russian, surround it in a cloud of mysticism, in effect agreeing with the nineteenth-century poet Fyodor Tyutchev that "Russia cannot be understood by the mind alone ... in Russia, one can only believe." This has led to a host of trite simplifications and sometimes outright falsehoods — about the "Russian soul," the "strong leader," the alleged unreadiness and dislike of its people for democracy, and Russia's timeless identity as a great power. It has also encouraged a self-serving, relativistic attitude along the lines that since Russia is so very different, it cannot be expected to behave like a "normal" nation.

On the other hand, there are those who treat Russian foreign policy as if domestic influences and considerations were of little relevance. They proceed from a (Western) moralist perspective, talking up universal values, common threats and challenges, and shared interests, only to discover that Moscow's perspectives and priorities often differ substantially from their own. When reality hits home, disappointment leads to accusations of bad faith and double-dealing. The Obama administration's reset policy exemplified these failings (see chapter 6).

Before discussing Russia's interaction with the new world disorder, it is critical to understand the different elements that constitute the domestic context of its foreign policy. They amount to an amalgam of ideas, interests, and instincts, whose influence varies, not only from issue to issue, but also according to time and circumstance. Taken together, however, they are the foundation of a particular attitude toward the world and Russia's place in it.

The most immediate of these elements is policymaking — that is, the mechanics of who makes policy and how they develop and implement it. This, in turn, ties into the question of political culture. It is not enough to identify the decisionmakers; we also need to know where they are coming from. What influences lead them to think and act the way they do? It has become almost de rigueur to emphasize the connection between authoritarianism at home and an adversarial foreign policy. This chapter argues, however, that deeper structural factors, such as geography and history, are much more influential in shaping Russia's approach to the world.

At the same time, foreign policy is not just the product of long-term realities, but is buffeted by unforeseen events. There is a tendency to exaggerate the inexorability of larger trends. Yet if history teaches us anything, it is that nothing is inevitable. Putin's conduct of foreign policy reveals strong predispositional influences. But it is also the "accidental" and unstable result of contemporary political conditions, economic outcomes, and social pressures. These establish realities that may frequently be short-lived, yet exert a powerful influence on decisionmakers at critical moments.

Policymaking

Analysts have become so accustomed to using generic terms such as "Russia," "Moscow," and the "Putin regime/elite" that they tend to give little thought to what they mean by them. Partly this is an issue of practicality; some generalization is unavoidable in order to communicate information coherently. But it also tacitly acknowledges that in many cases it is impossible to delve much deeper. Trying to understand the inner workings of decisionmaking is a challenging enterprise even in relatively transparent political systems. It is especially so in an environment where there is such a strong culture of secrecy and informal networking, as in Putin's Russia.

In effect there are two broad policy milieus — the real and the virtual. The latter is what outsiders see. This is the world of public policy statements, such as the Foreign Policy Concept, the Concept of National Security, and the Military Doctrine. Such documents present sweeping visions of Russia's destiny, unequivocal expositions of basic principles, and upbeat assessments of important relationships. They can be important in highlighting trends in Russian foreign policy, but offer few clues as to how it is actually made. Indeed, they convey a misleading clarity and certainty of thought.

By contrast, the real policy world is exclusive and almost invisible. This is where the big decisions are made. The vast majority of the political class plays little role, and public input is minimal. A particular order comes from the Kremlin, but without exceptionally privileged access it is often impossible to know who influenced whom, what, and how. It is often a case of "those who know don't tell, and those who tell don't know."

There is consequently a substantial element of guesswork involved in trying to understand the mechanics of Russian foreign policy. The difficulties are compounded by the fact that decisions rarely, if ever, reflect an "objective" national interest (whatever that means), but are made by individuals with their own particular biases, prejudices, and vested interests. As the commentator Igor Torbakov has noted, "The line between what is generally understood as national interests and ... group interests is completely blurred in Russia."

The policy landscape

Nevertheless, there is much to learn even from a brief review of major actors and decisionmaking processes. One way of doing this is to distinguish between different policy functions: decisionmaking; ideational inspiration; implementation; and rationalization. Although there is considerable overlap between these functions, each represents a distinct dimension with its own exponents.

The most important function is decisionmaking, and this is reflected in the identity of those responsible for it. They include, most obviously, President Putin, but also other senior regime figures, such as the chairman of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, Prime Minister (and former president) Dmitry Medvedev, Head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Ivanov, and Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev....