Über die Autorinnen und Autoren

Federiga Bindi holds the Jean Monnet Chair at the University of Rome Tor Vergata, and is a fellow at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Bindi has held several policy appointments in government, including serving as senior adviser to Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, and as fellow serving on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee under Sen. John Kerry's chairmanship. Bindi was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution from 2008 to 2010.

Irina Angelescu is a research fellow with the European Center of Excellence of the University of Rome Tor Vergata and a consultant for the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe.

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The Foreign Policy OF THE European Union

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS

Contents

Chapter One

In the words of Walter Hallstein, "One reason for creating the European Community [was] to enable Europe to play its full part in world affairs." [It is] vital for the Community to be able to speak with one voice and to act as one in economic relations with the rest of the world." However, the early European Community did not have a coherent foreign policy stricto senso. The European Economic Community (EEC) treaty did, however, contain important provisions in the field of external relations that evolved and became increasingly substantive as the years went by. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive view of the evolution of European foreign policy (EFP) in its various forms and stages. The chronological description presented here links the different actions and decisions taken by the EEC with the external and domestic events facing the member states at that time.

The European Defense Community

During the negotiations for the Schuman Plan (1950), on which the agreement to form the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is based, concerns emerged about a possible German rearmament. German disarmament after World War II had created a sort of power vacuum in the heart of Europe, which was dramatically emphasized after the Korean War. The United States suggested creating an integrated operational structure within the sphere of the Atlantic alliance within which a German army could participate under direct American control. This arrangement was to become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The French government rejected this proposal and offered as an alternative the so-called Pleven Plan (1950), named after French prime minister RenÃ(c) Pleven. The Pleven Plan called for the creation of a European army that would be placed under the control of a European ministry of defense. The soldiers were to come from the participating countries, including Germany. The plan, nevertheless, discriminated against Germany in that the future of the German army would have been entirely—not partially, as in the other countries—embedded within the European army.

The French proposal included all the members of the North Atlantic alliance, as well as Germany. However, only Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg, besides France, met in Paris on February 15, 1951, to start negotiating a possible new treaty. The Netherlands joined on October 8, while the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Norway, and Denmark sent observers. The outcome was the European Defense Community (EDC) agreement signed on May 27, 1952. As Jean Monnet's brainchild, the European Defense Community differed from the Pleven Plan and proposed a supranational structure along the lines of the ECSC. The EDC also implied a certain degree of economic integration, necessary considering that military integration in many ways called for a standardization of industrial-war capabilities.

Between 1953 and 1954, the EDC treaty was ratified by Germany and by the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). The treaty was approved by the competent parliamentary commission in Italy, but the parliament as such did not take a vote, waiting for France's lead instead. In the meantime, in Paris, Robert Schuman had been replaced by Georges Bidault as minister of foreign affairs in a new government led by Pierre Mendès-France that also included the Gaullists. Public opinion was divided between the cédistes (who favored ratification) and the anticédistes (opposed), and as a consequence the treaty failed to pass a vote in the National Assembly on August 30, 1954.

The problem of German rearmament remained open. A new initiative came this time from the English foreign secretary, Anthony Eden. This initiative benefited from U.S. support. Throughout 1954, a number of agreements were signed allowing for Germany's membership in NATO, Italian and German membership in the Brussels Pact, the creation of the Western European Union (WEU), Germany's assurance that it would not engage in the creation of atomic arms, and a British agreement to station two British divisions in Germany. The question of European defense thus became a transatlantic issue and a taboo in Europe for decades to come.

The European Economic Community

As a consequence of the EDC's failure, the Treaty of Rome did not deal with foreign policy. However, the treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) did foresee some degree of foreign competence in the EEC's external relations. These included: a common external trade tariff (as a complement to the customs union) and external trades; the possibility for other states to join the EEC; the establishment of a free trade area with the French, Belgian, Dutch, and Italian territories; and the creation of a European Fund for Development, as stipulated in article 131 of the treaty. Similarly, articles 110-16 dealt with commercial policy, in relation both to third states and to international organizations. The treaty affirmed in article 110 that, by establishing a customs union, the member states aimed to contribute "to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade, and the lowering of customs barriers." To that extent, they were to create a common commercial policy based "on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusions of tariff and trade agreements" The member states were "in respect of all matters of particular interest to the common market, [to] proceed within the framework of international organizations of an economic character only by common action."

The Commission was given a leading role in the field of commercial policy. Not only was the Commission entrusted with the power to submit proposals to the Council of Ministers for the implementation of the common commercial policy, it also had the ability to "make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorize the Commission to open the necessary negotiations" if agreements with third countries needed to be negotiated. For a member state facing economic difficulties, the Commission could authorize the Council to take the necessary protective measures as foreseen in article 115 TEEC. In article 228 the treaty also entrusts the Commission with the power to negotiate agreements between the EEC and one or more states or international organizations. Agreements such as those based on tariff negotiations with third countries regarding the common customs tariff were to be concluded by the Council, after consulting with the National Assembly where so required by the treaty.

Articles 131 to 136 of the treaty dealt with the associations of non-European countries and territories having special relations with the EEC countries. The possibility of enlarging the EEC was addressed in article 237, which established that "any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the Commission." Last but not least, article 210 TEEC established that the Community had legal "personality" or status. Even today, only the Community possesses such legal personality. As...