Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

"Daniel Drezner is a professor of international politics at Tufts University. His previous books inlcude All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton, 2007) and The Sanctions Paradox (Cambridge, 1999). He is also the author of a popular blog on politics and foreign policy (drezner.foreignpolicy.com)."

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AVOIDING TRIVIA

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS

Contents

Acknowledgments...........................................................................................................vii1 The Challenging Future of Strategic Planning in Foreign Policy Daniel W. Drezner.......................................32 Planning for Policy Planning Richard N. Haass..........................................................................233 A Road Map for American Leadership in a Changing World David F. Gordon and Daniel Twining..............................344 A "Return to Normalcy"? The Future of America's Internationalism Jeffrey W. Legro......................................525 An Integrative Executive Branch Strategy for Policy Planning Bruce W. Jentleson........................................696 Strengthening U.S. Strategic Planning Aaron L. Friedberg...............................................................847 A Strategic Planning Cell on National Security at the White House Peter Feaver and William Inboden.....................988 Why the Best Is Not Yet to Come in Policy Planning Amy B. Zegart.......................................................1139 Learning the Right Lessons from the 1940s Thomas Wright................................................................12510 Foreign Policy Planning through a Private Sector Lens Andrew P. N. Erdmann............................................13711 The Garbage Can Framework for Locating Policy Planning Stephen D. Krasner.............................................159About the Contributors....................................................................................................173Index.....................................................................................................................179

Chapter One

The Challenging Future of Strategic Planning in Foreign Policy

"Avoid trivia."

—Secretary of State George Marshall's advice to George Kennan, the first director of policy planning

Strategic planning for American foreign policy is dead, dying, or moribund. This, at least, has been the assessment of several commentators and policymakers in recent years. Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley observed in 2006, "For a country that continues to enjoy an unrivaled global position, it is both remarkable and disturbing that the United States has no truly effective strategic planning process for national security." At an academic conference in 2007, a former director of the State Department's policy planning staff complained that, "six years after 9/11, we still don't have a grand strategy." Aaron Friedberg, who was director of policy planning for Vice President Richard Cheney, writes in this volume, "The U.S. government has lost the capacity to conduct serious, sustained national strategic planning." Admiral William Fallon, the CENTCOM commander until the spring of 2008, told the New York Times that the United States would need to focus more on policy planning: "We need to have a well-thought-out game plan for engagement in the world that we adjust regularly and that has some system of checks and balances built into it." In this volume, Council on Foreign Relations president Richard Haass argues that the United States has "squandered" its post–cold war opportunity, concluding, "Historians will not judge the United States well for how it has used these twenty years."

These sorts of laments have become common in the past decade, in no small part because of the foreign policy planning of the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Members of the Clinton administration's foreign policy team prided themselves on their ad hoc approach to foreign policy problems. The Bush administration had ambitious policy goals, but failed to develop the plans and policies necessary to achieve them. The challenges facing President Barack Obama in 2009 are stark: a malaise in strategic planning has fed a nostalgia for the days of George Kennan and his founding of the State Department's policy planning staff.

What, exactly, is strategic planning? In his memoirs, Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided one useful definition: "to look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them." Acheson thought that policy planners should also "constantly reappraise" existing policies. That view matches how the contributors to this volume use the term. Strategic planning is not limited to grand strategy; it can apply to regional and crisis situations as well. It should also be noted that strategic or policy planning is not just about top-down implementation. It can also be about reinterpreting past and current actions through a new analytic lens, one that carries "heuristic punch," as Stephen Krasner phrases it in his chapter.

As the contributors to this volume suggest, there are three ways in which strategic planning affects foreign policy: through the plans, the planning, and the planners. If the policy plans are actually implemented, their effect on foreign affairs is self-evident. Even if they are not implemented, however, the process matters as well. Planning is not limited to plans; it is also about the patterns of thinking that best match resources and capabilities to achieving the desired policy ends. Similarly, if the planners are thought to be capable and strategically minded, then they will be more likely to influence responses to new and unanticipated events. Even when plans are OBE—overtaken by events—the process and the individuals are still important.

In foreign policy, the concept of strategic planning is synonymous with the State Department's policy planning staff—or "S/P" as it is called within the confines of Foggy Bottom. During its sixty-year history, the actual functions of the staff have varied widely, ranging from speech-writing duties to operational functions to acting as a liaison to the foreign policy community outside of the government. Its mission is highly unusual in twenty-first-century American government. According to its own website, the goal of S/P is "to take a longer term, strategic view of global trends and frame recommendations for the Secretary of State to advance U.S. interests and American values." This goes against the grain of a 24/7, real-time, rapid-reaction era in which policymakers define the long term as anything longer than a week. Part of the challenge of twenty-first-century foreign policy is to think about how this concept should be applied to all foreign policy agencies.

Demand for cogent strategic planning has not been matched by scholarly interest in the subject. In one respect, this is not surprising. The glamour of grand strategy will always trump debates about the processes that enable or retard policy planning. Certainly in the academic study of international relations, grand theory is accorded greater respect than foreign policy analysis. Simply put, everyone likes debating the content of the plans themselves more than the bureaucratic plumbing behind the plans. In another respect, however, previous decades saw at least some scholarly interest in this topic. In recent years, however, there has been very little research on this subject. This volume hopes to address this gap.

With a new presidential administration comes a hope that strategic planning—within and outside the State Department—will play an elevated role. At a time when the United States faces a rising number of foreign policy challenges, the need for planning would appear to be greater than ever. Are strategic planners housed in the Pentagon, State Department, Treasury Department, National Security Council, and National Intelligence Council capable of rising to the challenge? Indeed, is strategic planning a viable concept in the twenty-first century?

These are the questions that animate this volume. Future policymakers need to comprehend the utility and the limits of policy planning. This introduction sets the stage by discussing the external, internal, and historical challenges that policy principals face in adapting the strategic planning process to meet the challenges of the here and now. Externally, the United States faces a plethora of complex and overlapping challenges that would seem to require an even greater emphasis on strategic planning. Internally, the wars of this century have contributed to an unbalanced mix of foreign policy resources—a material fact that hampers coordination of the policy planning process. Historically, the imposing—and inflated—legacy of George Kennan has cast a formidable shadow over his successors. This complicates an already challenging task: balancing the inherent tension between strategic planning and operational authority in the crafting of foreign policy.

External Challenges

With the passing of the George W. Bush presidency, there is a demand for new concepts and plans to organize American foreign policy. Containment is dead and gone. The Bush doctrine was unpopular at home and abroad. Isolationism is simply not a viable option. Both policymakers and scholars need a better grasp of how to craft viable, long-term strategies for the twenty-first century.

To describe the current international environment as complex would be an understatement. To appreciate the depth of the external challenges, consider the Princeton Project on National Security, a multiyear, multipronged effort to develop a twenty-first-century doctrine that could achieve what containment accomplished during the cold war. The effort to create a "Kennan by committee" involved hundreds of foreign policy analysts. But after dozens of meetings, the final report concluded, "It became clear that such an organizing principle—such as containment, enlargement, balancing or democracy promotion—would not be forthcoming. Indeed, no overarching concept fit because no one danger facing the United States is the overarching threat." If today's leading foreign policy analysts cannot agree on a single heuristic to anchor U.S. foreign policy, policy planning becomes that much more difficult (though not impossible, as Tom Wright discusses in his chapter).

It is easy to list the external challenges facing the United States. From a conventional, state-centric perspective, the greatest one is coping with the rise of developing country great powers. In 2006 the National Journal ran a cover story resuscitating Paul Kennedy's thesis of America's "imperial overstretch," articulated most prominently in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Kennedy's assessment of the current situation was stark: "There are now more players on the globe who can screw us rather more effectively than we can screw them." Today the trend lines only reinforce that assessment, even among America's allies. In 2007 the French foreign minister declared that "the magic is over" for America's image, and the German finance minister declared that the United States would soon lose its status as a financial superpower. The global financial crisis has, if anything, brought these subterranean pressures into the foreground.

Power is a relative measure, and the United States is in relative decline because of the astonishing growth rates and capital surpluses of the developing world. Among the rising powers, China and India stand out. China possesses two trillion dollars in hard-currency reserves, and is starting to use its financial muscle to achieve foreign policy objectives. India's high-tech sector is growing by leaps and bounds. Both countries are nuclear powers that aspire to have blue-water navies. To date their ascent has been impressive, but the future is what grabs everyone's attention. By 2020 the National Intelligence Council projects that China and India will have the world's second and fourth largest economies. Simple extrapolations from the recent past can be misleading. Nevertheless, economic and demographic trends suggest that the growth of India and China will push world politics into a new multipolar era.

The growth of these states is a challenge unto itself, but it also highlights a related problem. The tectonic shift in world politics further weakens the international institutions that were previously thought to "matter." The United States helped establish a bevy of global governance structures between 1945 and 1955: the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and others. As long as the United States and its allies were the most important actors in the world, these institutions served the twin purpose of coordinating and legitimizing the global rules of the game. As the distribution of power in the world shifts, however, the United States needs to think about how to revamp these institutions in order to maintain their relevance. To its credit, the Bush administration recognized this problem, but its efforts at addressing it were fitful. A decade of global governance reform efforts has yielded little in the way of concrete results. Key institutions—like the G-8 and the World Trade Organization (WTO)—are in danger of becoming overwhelmed by a spaghetti bowl of newer arrangements. A 2008 Foreign Affairs essay recommended that the United States and its Western allies simply get out of the way and let the developing world have its turn at global governance.

Handling a power transition is tricky, but handling it while simultaneously coping with a rise in systemic threats is even trickier. Concerns about terrorism and weapons of mass destruction will, for obvious reasons, remain near the top of the list. Of related concern is the growth of nonstate actors, like Hamas and Hezbollah, that appear to be more powerful than the territorial governments in which they are based. Just as the balance of power is shifting away from the United States, power is also shifting from states to nonstate actors. Richard Haass warns about the rise in "nonpolarity"—the ebbing of power from governments to more amorphous, networked actors; Niall Ferguson makes a similar claim when he talks about "apolarity." Others have observed the rise of superempowered individuals who have amassed influence in world politics. The U.S. government will need to figure out how best to interface with these new kinds of foreign policy actors.

The most novel threats, however, are even more nontraditional in nature. In the 2008 calendar year, global markets in financial assets, food, and energy were buffeted by a series of shocks, and none of them functioned terribly well in response. In all three sectors, national governments responded with greater intervention. It is far from clear, however, whether these interventions will be welfare-enhancing on any level. Beyond the failures of global markets, there are additional concerns. Global warming will increasingly insert itself into the international policy agenda. The specter of a global disease pandemic remains ever-present.

It would be dangerous to exaggerate the challenges posed to the United States. As David Gordon and Daniel Twining observe in their contribution to this volume, American primacy has yet to disappear. By many metrics, American power remains unparalleled. Despite claims of global anti-Americanism, surveys demonstrate that the United States possesses large reservoirs of soft power in the Pacific Rim. The relative decline of the United States is not likely to be as dramatic as, say, the decline and fall of the British empire.

America's external adversaries have their own problems and policy reversals. As of this writing, it is abundantly clear that Al Qaeda is facing even greater challenges. It is suffering from strong ideological rejection and pushback in the Middle East—even among those sympathetic to the idea of jihad. Intelligence analysis reveals that the terrorist group, like the sovereign governments it battles, suffers from bureaucratic sclerosis and petty infighting. Following a raft of books hailing China as the challenger to American hegemony, Beijing in 2008 suffered an annus horribilis of health and safety scares, foreign policy blowback in Africa, erratic and unstable allies on its border, ecological catastrophe, natural disasters, and a dramatic economic downturn.

Despite these caveats, the trend line is disturbing. The distribution of power is shifting away from the United States, as is the distribution of preferences. The Washington Consensus is now a dead letter, and American values seem less enticing than they did a decade ago. Simply put, at the end of 2008 the United States generated less respect, less influence, less goodwill, less standing, and less relative power in world politics than it did at any time during the post–cold war era.

Internal Challenges

Dissatisfaction with the status quo does not guarantee that there will be a change of tack. There are several internal constraints that make it difficult to improve strategic planning. Part of the problem rests with the incomplete search for new strategic ideas. As Jeffrey Legro points out in his chapter, a lot is required to revamp American foreign policy. There needs to be a viable alternative around which others can rally—one that can generate immediately attractive solutions to current problems. During George W. Bush's second term, a number of scholars and ex-policymakers tried to devise new and attractive grand strategies. The result was a pulling and hauling in different directions. These ideas have different labels—progressive realism, realistic Wilsonianism, ethical realism, liberal realism—and their creators hoped to earn fame, fortune, or perhaps a spot on the Obama administration's foreign policy team. Until the foreign policy machinery of an administration develops a consensus choice for a new alternative, existing policy will remain in effect.

There are other internal reasons for the malaise in policy planning, however. Persistent pathologies in American foreign policy make strategic planning difficult. As Richard Haass recounts in his chapter, bureaucratic politics can make rational planning a difficult process. Haass's policy planning staff developed the original draft of the 2002 National Security Strategy, but then lost control over the drafting process to the National Security Council (NSC). In their chapter, Peter Feaver and William Inboden hint that rising levels of partisan rancor have made it more difficult to engage in dispassionate strategic planning.

(Continues...)

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