The Different Notions of History in Heidegger's Work

Ingo Farin

While it is uncontroversial that history plays a decisive role throughout Heidegger's work, there is no broad consensus concerning the exact determinations and important changes in Heidegger's conception of history. As so often with key concepts in Heidegger, it is much easier to identify what Heidegger opposes than to delineate the precise contours of what he argues for. To begin with the former, Heidegger consistently rejects a theoretical and objectivist approach to "the historical" insofar as this presupposes a supra-historical standpoint from which the historical realm is constituted or evaluated. According to Heidegger, this approach is bound to miss its subject matter from the start, because historical being is not understood on its own terms if it is subordinated to an extra-historical reality and comprehended through what is foreign to it. For this reason Heidegger holds that neither historicism nor objective historical studies provide genuine and authoritative accounts of the historical.

Being opposed to any objectification of the historical, it is no wonder that Heidegger empathically affirms that history is never without relation to human beings. Yet he also rejects conceptions that narrowly restrict the realm of the historical to res gestae (empirically occurring deeds or actions) only. In contrast to this common focus on great deeds and world-historical events of nations and peoples, Heidegger locates the preeminently historical site or the essence of history elsewhere. His concept of history has nothing to do with simply registered "change" in empirical annals or chronicles. Heidegger inquires into the essence of history, which is not itself something historical like a datable event.

Another constant feature in Heidegger's philosophical thought on history is his insistence that the historical is never something of "the past" only, as if it had nothing more to do with the present and the future. According to Heidegger, the past is always taken up and reinscribed in the future, just as the future lives off the memory of the past. Heidegger understands "history" as the encompassing whole of the interrelated three dimensions or "ex-stases" of temporality, that is, past, present, and future. There is no past "outside" the present and future, and vice versa. In other words, the past is never dead and "gone." Rather, it comes to life in the future; it does not approach the present from "behind," but from the "front." What is historical is always out-side itself, not self-enclosed in either the past, or present, or future. This understanding of the mutual dependence of historical time signifies the origin of Heidegger's hermeneutical orientation. It has its roots in this conception of temporality or history, that is, his view that the historical exists as this interpenetration of past, future, and present at once. There is no finality that can be achieved, as the future reinterprets the past and thus the present. History is hermeneutics in action.

Moreover, it is Heidegger's view that the historical is an inescapable and encompassing ultimate horizon, taking precedence over nature, as well as theoretical and metaphysical objectivity. Because history is this ultimate horizon, it is the philosophical subject matter par excellence. It is not reducible to empirical history in opposition to nature, as the historical encompasses both. Therefore, the early Heidegger states that "in principle the philosophical problematic is motivated by the historical."

History requires historical awareness and in Heidegger this comes with the recognition of Vergänglichkeit — that everything passes away, that time runs out, that we always live an endgame of sorts. As Heidegger states, "One says 'time passes,' but never 'time arises.'" If there is a mood that comes with the historical, it is the more somber feeling of finitude, transitoriness, and death. Feeling is not representational. Heidegger's critique of the predominance of representation is, in part, motivated by the concomitant suppression of the feeling of the passing of time if and when representation rules supreme. However, the sense of time's passing does not preclude, as we have seen already, an understanding of the future and the possibility of historically shaping the future. While Heidegger has a certain fascination for new departures, the "new" or "other beginning," he is always mindful that the condition of history lies in its coming to an end. History is "tragic," directed towards its ultimate end; or, as Heidegger also says, history is "eschatological," in a non-theological sense. The domination of time is absolute. The universality of hermeneutics has its ground in this.

If finitude is one key characteristic of the historical, then singularity is the other. It is far too seldom recognized that Heidegger holds that both Dasein and Being are finite and singular, einzig. This means that Heidegger defines his key subject matter through what is preeminently historical, and it also explains why Heidegger leans toward a hermeneutical approach, if understanding individuality and singularity are the key tasks of hermeneutics. Conversely, we can say that Heidegger's constant criticism of the impact of calculative reason, ordering, reification, theoretism, and so on are rooted in his attempt to do justice to the openness of the historical — "the open region" par excellence. It is on account of its historicity that Heidegger claims that "for being [Seyn] we never find a 'place [Ort]' (for instance as what is 'opposite' to, or 'above' human beings); never can it [i.e., being or Seyn] be integrated into an 'order.'" If there is anything that escapes human calculation, it is history.

Heidegger's turn towards history is directed against the pervasive ahistorical conceptions of philosophy and truth in the Western tradition. In opposition to the flight to supra-historical truths, Heidegger opts for an ever-intensive immersion in the historical, be it "the situation," "historical life," "the event," or the Zeit — Raum (time-space) of the unfolding of "the truth of being," all of which are just names of "the historical." Understanding the world and our place in it depends on jumping into or seizing the historical dimension, either by actively engaging the historical moment or by keeping open the historical horizon for future change, for instance as "guardians" or custodians of the event of the truth of being. Consequently, Heidegger pays special attention to the phenomenona of critical repetition, radical change, transformation, turnaround, and the kairological moment, all of which designate key characteristics of the historical. However, in arguing for the proper acknowledgment of the inescapable historical dimension, Heidegger is keen to avoid what he considers the twin mistake of "radical surrender" to the historical, the mere following of historical trends, or what he calls "historical servitude,"and "historicism," the mindless historical curiosity that samples all things "historical" in order to settle in comfortably in the unquestioningly assumed "superiority" of one's own present time. Contrary to what is often said, Heidegger is not an advocate of historicism, but an outspoken opponent of it, calling it an "alienation" from the historical.

While it is thus clear that Heidegger's interest in history is philosophical through and through, it is again easier to demarcate his philosophical impetus by drawing out the contrast to philosophical strategies he disagrees with. In contradistinction to epistemological research strategies that focus on the necessary conditions for the possibility of historical knowledge, for instance Simmel or Rickert and Windelband, Heidegger pursues the question of what it means for something to be historical or to have a historical trajectory in the first place. In short, he investigates "the meaning of historical being." The term Geschichtlichkeit, "historicity," denotes this subject matter, even when in later works the emphasis shifts toward the history of being. It is close to what one may call Heidegger's lifelong theme; yet it does undergo significant changes and does fade into the background in his last writings.

Very schematically and by way of a rough overview one can specify three different approaches that Heidegger pursues in investigating this theme. First, in the early 1920s he examines the historicity of factical life which he uses synonymously with historical life; second, from 1923–24 until 1928 he anchors historicity in a fundamental ontology which itself is centered on the ontological analysis of Dasein, and, third, from the 1930s he focuses on the history of being or Seynsgeschichte. The "place" of history, we may say, changes. In his early work, Heidegger finds history first in factical life and then in Dasein. However, in his later work he sees the historical embodied in thinking — understood as the historical thinking of being in response to the "it gives" or what is sent as being.

The most significant but often neglected difference is, however, that before and after his magnum opus Heidegger approaches historicity without any recourse to an ontological framework, insisting on the absolute incompatibility of history and ontology or, rather, onto-theology. (The contemporary scholarly focus on Being and Time and its fundamental ontology tends to eclipse Heidegger's non-ontological conception of history in the early 1920s and 1930s.) Moreover, after Being and Time and after jettisoning the ontological cast of his thought, Heidegger delves deeper into the dimension of the historical than ever before, and he does not hesitate to distance himself from the insufficiently radical historical grasp in Being and Time. In a reflection from 1937–38 Heidegger claims that in the immediate years after Being and Time he pursued "a more historical path [mehr geschichtlichem Weg]." That is to say, after Being and Time Heidegger reconnects with but also radicalizes his non-ontological historical thought from the early 1920s. This renewed emphasis on history lasts throughout the 1930s at least and, arguably, even up to his last writings when Heidegger shifts toward a more topological ground, as has been shown by Jeff Malpas. Otto Pöggeler claims that Heidegger eventually "rejects historicity and history as guiding principles" after the 1930s altogether, and it is certainly true that Heidegger approaches being from the concept of Lichtung, "clearing." Yet it is important to recognize that this "openness" or "place" is one wherein "space" and "ecstatic temporality" are united. Thus, while I agree with Pöggeler that Heidegger's historical thinking reaches its zenith in the 1930s, I think that when the problematic of history recedes in the following decades, Heidegger never entirely gives it up, but rather rethinks and reconceptualizes it.

In what follows I focus primarily on Heidegger's writings on the historical in the early 1920s up to and including Being and Time, touching on Seinsgeschichte only at the end of the chapter, leaving a full and detailed account for another occasion. In particular, I argue that between 1919 and 1924 Heidegger develops not one, but three different, mutually incompatible conceptions of the "the historical" (part I). I then turn to the ontological account of history in Being and Time (part II). In a brief concluding section (part III) I sketch out how Heidegger leaves behind the ontological approach and embraces the history of being or Seinsgeschichte in the 1930s, effectively radicalizing his earlier historical thinking in the 1920s. I conclude by arguing that Heidegger's antimetaphysical and anti-subjectivist orientation may have been the reason for his backing away from taking "the historical" as the royal road to philosophy in his last writings.

Early Heidegger's Different Conceptions of History

The early Heidegger's lecture courses and writings between 1919 and 1924 are predominantly occupied with the problem of historical existence, historical life, and historicity, and the relation of historical reality to philosophy and systematic thought, as well as the critique of the prevalent, ahistorical self-understanding of traditional philosophy. However, in pursuit of this thematic, Heidegger develops different and ultimately inconsistent conceptions of the historical. More specifically, in the wake of Dilthey and Yorck von Wartenburg, Heidegger fully embraces and radicalizes the historical worldview and he develops the idea of a historical method for philosophy. Yet during this same time Heidegger also engages Husserl's phenomenology as a research project and he attempts to forge a new phenomenological conception of intentionality, arguing that the historical, intentional self is the locus of original or originary history. He thus inserts history into the very heart of phenomenology in order to correct what he considers Husserl's neglect of history. Finally, along a third axis Heidegger also draws on the early Christian experience as an exemplary form of living historically, in particular as attested in Paul's letters. While each of the three conceptions is coherent in itself, there is no comprehensive synthesis which could integrate these different conceptions within an encompassing unity, although this is what Heidegger attempts to do in Being and Time, as we shall see. But before we can discuss this last point in detail, we need to present the different conceptions of history as developed by early Heidegger.

In the Wake of Dilthey and Yorck: The Early Heidegger's Historical Worldview

Heidegger scholarship has always recognized the importance of Dilthey for Heidegger. I am here interested in providing a more fine-grained sketch that does justice to the great intellectual stimulus Heidegger received from Dilthey, as well as Heidegger's trenchant criticism of him. In addition, I focus on the astonishing degree of convergence in Heidegger's and Yorck's view on what they consider the weaknesses in Dilthey's position.

In his 1924 review essay "The Concept of Time," Heidegger notes that his interest in "historicity" (Geschichtlichkeit) has nothing to do with observing history or world-history. Instead, his aim is "to render historicity intelligible." At this stage Heidegger considers an outright ontological approach to this subject matter. He writes:

Historicity is a characteristic of being [Seinscharakter]. But of which being? The human Dasein. The task, therefore, is to lay bare this entity itself, in order to define it in terms of its being. The basic constitution of Dasein's being, from which we can read off historicity ontologically, is temporality. If we are to understand historicity, we must therefore provide a phenomenological explication of time.

This is already the ontological program of Being and Time. Yet it is important to note that Heidegger himself understands his investigation into historicity as a continuation of the pioneering work of Dilthey and Yorck von Wartenburg. In the just quoted 1924 essay Heidegger goes out of his way to maintain that his own work is meant "to enable contemporary researchers to engage productively with the legacy of Dilthey and Yorck" and thus "to cultivate the spirit of Count Yorck in the present, and contribute to the work of Dilthey." This is by no means a fleeting idea in 1924, as Heidegger inserts it again three years later in the central section 77 of Being and Time, which is devoted to showing the connection of his research with Dilthey's and Yorck's project. For Theodore Kisiel, this prominent insertion of Heidegger's continued commitment to Dilthey and Yorck von Wartenburg amounts to a veritable "'dedication' of the entire work [of Being and Time] to Dilthey and Yorck, and not just Husserl." In the same vein, Fynsk holds that Heidegger's remarkable tribute to Dilthey and Yorck amounts to setting up "a monument of some kind." But what exactly did Heidegger find in Dilthey and Yorck? It is certainly not the ontological interpretation of history in Being and Time, as neither Dilthey nor Yorck went in that direction.