Establishing Ukraine's Fourth Republic: Reform after Revolution

PAUL D'ANIERI

The Ukrainian state is being founded anew. When Viktor Yanukovych fled Kyiv in February 2014, the constitutional order was disrupted and in important respects the state ceased to function. In Kyiv, the state did not control the monopoly on the legitimate use of force that is the sine qua non of the modern state. The state was also redefined territorially with the seizure of Crimea and parts of the Donbas by Russia. In important respects, then, we can think of the period since early 2014 as the founding of Ukraine's "fourth republic."

It is remarkable that Ukraine can already be on its fourth republic, but such is the case, if we consider the number of times since 1991 that a new constitutional order (not merely a new constitution) was adopted. In 1991, Ukraine's first republic formed with independence from the Soviet Union. In 1996, the second was formed when a new post-Soviet constitution was finally adopted. The third began in 2004, when street protests forced a major revision of the constitutional distribution of powers between the president and prime minister. That order was undermined by Viktor Yanukovych after 2010, and the collapse of his regime brought Ukraine again to a point of fundamental discontinuity. Fear for Ukraine's future mixes with hope that the country is finally going to build a "normal" "European" state, as envisioned by the protesters who pushed Yanukovych from power, and the possibility that Ukraine would succeed seems to have so worried Russia that it has done a great deal to undermine the chances of success.

Russia's intervention has raised the stakes for reform in Ukraine. At stake now is not only whether Ukraine will have democracy, a functioning state, and a market economy, but whether it will be independent and mostly whole, or whether it will be further dismembered. Ukraine's success in reforming itself to create a prosperous democracy tied to Europe is now seen as the best and perhaps the only defense against further predation by Russia.

For more than two decades, Ukraine has staggered forward without making the reforms that are widely viewed as necessary. Many of the same problems that have existed since 1991 remain, and the fact that Ukraine is on its fourth constitutional order in twenty-five years leads us to wonder if enduring change is possible. Once again, Ukraine faces both the opportunity to remake itself and the fear that somehow old patterns will persist. Can Ukraine reform?

This book, rather than lamenting Ukraine's past performance, seeks to glean from that experience lessons that can now be applied. Reform, in this context as in others, has two overlapping meanings. The broad meaning of reform is that of coherent policy change for the better. A narrower meaning is that of the elimination of some defect in institutions, policies, or outcomes. Both meanings apply here: corruption is a defect which many people in Ukraine and outside seek to eliminate. Democracy, rule of law, and economic growth are positive goods of which people seek more.

Therefore the chapters in this book focus on two questions: Why has there not been more reform in Ukraine? And what can be done to promote or facilitate reform? We approach these questions through a two-pronged approach. On each of the six issues addressed, a chapter that focuses primarily on Ukraine is paired with a chapter that examines Ukraine in light of comparative experience. Thus the questions are approached from two distinct vantage points, one "inside" and one "outside" Ukraine. Identifying which facets of the problem are unique to Ukraine and which are not helps to identify the kinds of strategies that might help overcome the barriers to reform. Ultimately the goal is to identify pathways to positive change.

At least on the surface, the problem with reform in Ukraine is not disagreement about goals. While political infighting in Ukraine is endemic, there is a great deal of consensus on many of the country's problems and objectives. Economic growth has been slow and volatile. After twenty-two years of transition, Ukrainian GDP was still smaller in 2013 than it had been in 1991. In 2009 Ukraine experienced a drop of 15 percent in GDP, and this indicator fell nearly 7 percent in 2014. Corruption is rampant, earning Ukraine a ranking of 142 out of 175 countries on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index in 2014. Life expectancy is low, and Ukraine scores poorly on a range of quality of life, public health, and comparative happiness measures. Moreover, Ukraine is not subject to the typical left-right cleavage. The leading political parties and politicians all present themselves as pragmatists and centrists; debate over the relative roles of government and market is largely absent. Nor is there significant disagreement that Ukraine should be a democratic country. Even corruption is not a partisan issue. Consensus on these goals makes the inability to accomplish them even more puzzling.

Of course, Ukraine's politicians are divided, Russia exerts influence as a powerful and interventionist neighbor, the legacies of the Soviet Union hamper the country today both socially and economically, and internal regional divisions color politics and impede the formation of a consensus. Pointing to those obvious problems, however, does not explain the lack of reform in two important senses. First, other countries have had the same challenges — or worse — and managed to address them. Second, analytically, this...