THE MAKING OF THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE

Today, at this place, I clearly say to you all that this will be the last political speech where I ask you to vote for me as president.Park Chung Hee, campaign promise, April 25, 1971

A recent flurry of scholarship has taken stock of Park Chung Hee and the "Park Chung Hee era" (Lee 2012; Kim and Vogel 2011; Kim and Sorensen 2011; Lee 2006). Contemporary evaluations of Park Chung Hee's tenure as South Korea's leader tend to focus on two main themes: economic development and dictatorship. Studies of development, for the most part, paint Park Chung Hee as orchestrator of the economic "miracle on the Han" (see among others, Lee 2006; Kim 2004), while scholarship on Korean politics identifies him as first in a line of military dictators who established a harsh autocracy that lasted until democratic transition in 1987 (Park 2011; Kim J. H. 2011). Both emphases in the literature are critical to understanding the trajectory of South Korea's modernization in the postliberation period, and it is fitting that Park's legacy has motivated the application of new terms, including the apt "developmental dictator" (Lee 2006). This chapter sets the stage for the analysis of South Korea's democracy movement by highlighting the transformation of Park's government as repression became an increasingly essential feature of his ruling strategy.

There were in fact three distinct phases of Park Chung Hee's rule. He first ruled South Korea under the banner of a military government, from 1961 to 1963, before transitioning to a period of "democratic interlude" or "soft authoritarianism," when the legitimacy of his presidency was based on democratically held elections in 1963 and 1967 (Im 2011: 234). In the third phase, Park reverted back to formal authoritarianism after unilaterally promulgating dramatic constitutional revisions that suspended direct presidential elections and ensured his lifelong rule. After the promulgation of the Yusin Constitution in 1972, however, Park increasingly relied on repressive measures in direct response to the growing voices of dissent that challenged his leadership. Indeed, the core components of Park Chung Hee's authoritarianism "were continually evolving entities" (Kim B. K. 2011a: 4) that developed over the eighteen years of his rule. Understanding these transformations requires a temporal assessment of the historical events that culminated in the Yusin regime.

THE "DEMOCRATIC INTERLUDE" (1963–1971)

In April 1960, the First Republic of South Korea came to an end when Syngman Rhee abdicated the presidency following the April 19, or "4.19," student revolution. The subsequent government under Chang Myon and Yun Poson proved to be ephemeral, and on May 16, 1961, a "second-tier leader," two-star Major General Park Chung Hee, successfully executed a coup d'état and established the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (Kukka Chaegon Ch'oego Hoeui) in place of the government (Han 2011: 35). Partly because Park Chung Hee's coup restored order and stability at a time when the nation seemed to be plunging into social chaos amid growing political demonstrations, hyperinflation, and spikes in the crime rate (Kim 2004: 45), student activists and the greater part of society initially maintained a "wait and see" attitude. In addition, after a short deliberation about the advantages and disadvantages that Park Chung Hee represented to American interests in Korea and East Asia, "the United States accepted the coup as a fait accompli" and did not interfere with Park's power grab (Kim and Baik 2011; see also Brazinsky 2007).

Park Chung Hee, for his part, attempted to garner public support by claiming that the "5.16 Military Administration"—marking the day of the coup—was merely a temporary government and promising to reinstitute democratic procedures in due time. Responding to the increasing demand from both the Korean people and the United States to follow through on his promise, Park Chung Hee announced the reestablishment of civilian rule by means of a presidential election scheduled for October 15, 1963. Park promptly retired from the military and ran successfully, thus becoming the president of South Korea's Third Republic.

At this early stage, it was still important for Park Chung Hee to build legitimacy for his government and win the support of the Korean people. Park was acutely aware of the powerful potential of student mobilization to facilitate social change, and he argued that his own "May Revolution" was a continuation of the 4.19 student revolution. In his inaugural address on December 17, 1963, Park Chung Hee presented a narrative that linked his May 1961 coup d'état with the 4.19 revolution:

Our fiery democratic convictions overthrew dictatorship in the April Revolution. This was succeeded by the May Revolution, which rejected corruption and injustice, restored the national spirit, and made possible the construction of the new republic which comes into existence today. Our unavoidable historical task in this decade, as initiated in the course of the April and May Revolutions, is the modernization of the fatherland in all fields—political, economic, social and culture.... On this meaningful occasion, I therefore propose a great reform movement to materialize our national ideals as demonstrated by the April 19 and May 16 Revolutions.... (Park 1970: 286)

Ignoring students who insisted that "the 4.19 and 5.16 Revolutions cannot coexist," Park Chung Hee was able, as he began his first term, to establish social stability and restore some faith in a democratic Korea. The reinstitution of the democratic process, evidenced in the 1963 presidential election, contributed to the feeling that Park would uphold the democratic system. This feeling was also engendered by several speeches Park gave in the 1960s on the importance of further consolidating democracy in Korea. On May 27, 1965, for example, upon returning from a visit to the United States, he exhorted the Korean people to become better democratic citizens:

The flower of democracy does not bloom, if there is no attempt to realize it. Before one preaches democracy, one should first be a good democratic citizen. We Koreans should recognize again what democracy is and discipline ourselves to...