CHAPTER 1

THE ART OF PRESENCE

THE ARAB SPRING NOTWITHSTANDING, powerful views, whether regional or international,suggest that the Middle East has fallen into disarray. We continueto read how the personal income of Arabs is among the lowest in the world,despite their massive oil revenues. With declining productivity, poor scientificresearch, decreasing school enrollment, and high illiteracy, and with healthconditions lagging behind comparable nations, Arab countries seem to be"richer than they are developed." The unfortunate state of social developmentin the region is coupled with poor political governance. Authoritarian regimesranging from Iran, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco to the sheikhdoms ofthe Persian Gulf and chiefly Saudi Arabia (incidentally, most with close ties tothe West) have continued to frustrate demands for democracy and the rule oflaw, prompting (religious) opposition movements that espouse equally undemocratic,exclusive, and often violent measures. These conditions have at timescaused much fear in the West about the international destabilizing ramificationsof this seemingly social and political turmoil.

Thus, never before has the region witnessed such a cry for change as itdid in the late 2000s. The idea that "everywhere the world has changed exceptfor the Middle East" assumed a renewed prominence, with different domesticand international constituencies expressing different expectations as to howto instigate change in this region. Small (Marxist and militant Islamist) circleshope for a revolutionary transformation through a sudden upsurge of popularenergy to overturn the unjust structures of power and usher in developmentand democracy. If the Iranian Revolution, not so long ago, could sweep aside along-standing monarchy in less than two years, why couldn't such movementbe forged in the region today? This indeed did happen. The Arab world witnesseda most momentous wave of revolutions in 2011. Yet, as usual, these revolutionscame as a surprise. It is doubtful that revolutions can ever be planned.Even though revolutionaries do engage in plotting and preparing, revolutionsdo not necessarily result from prior schemes. Rather, they often follow theirown intriguing logic, subject to a highly complex mix of structural, international,coincidental, and psychological factors. We often analyze revolutionsin retrospect, rarely engaging in ones that are expected or desired, for revolutionsare never predictable. On the other hand, most people do not particularlywish to be involved in violent revolutionary movements. People often expressdoubt about engaging in revolution, whose outcome they cannot foresee.They often prefer to remain "free riders," wanting others to carry out revolutionson their behalf. Furthermore, are revolutions necessarily desirable?Those who have experienced them usually identify violent revolutions withmassive disruption, destruction, violence, and uncertainty. After all, nothingguarantees that a just social order will result from a revolutionary changeunless revolutions turn into a prolonged process of social struggle to achieveoriginal goals. Finally, even assuming that revolutions are desirable and canbe planned, what are people under authoritarian rule to do in the meantime?

Given these constraints and the uncertain futures of revolutions, an alternativeview would postulate that change should be instigated by committingstates to undertaking sustained social and political reforms. Such a nonviolentstrategy of reform requires powerful social forces—social movements (ofworkers, the poor, women, youth, students, and broader democracy movements)or genuine political parties—to challenge political authorities and hegemonizetheir claims. Indeed, many activists and NGOs in the Middle Easthave already engaged in forging movements to alter the current state of affairs.However, while this may serve as a genuinely endogenous strategy for change,effective movements need political opportunities to grow and operate. It ishoped that postrevolutionary states in Egypt, Tunisia, or Yemen may offersuch opportunity. However, indications already point to certain intoleranceby these new regimes, most of which are likely to assume electoral democracyof an illiberal type. How are social and political movements to keep up whenauthoritarian polity exhibits a great intolerance toward organized activism,when the repression of civil-society organizations has been a hallmark ofmost Middle Eastern states? In addition, what is the subaltern to do whenthe states, even if respecting electoral democracy (as in Turkey or Indonesia),fall short of providing an effective mechanism to respond to economicdeprivation, social exclusion, gender imbalance, or violation of individualrights?

It should not, therefore, come as a surprise that until recently growing segmentsof people, frustrated by the political stalemate, lamented that althoughmost people in the Middle East suffered under the status quo, they remainedrepressed, atomized, and passive. Popular activism, if any, went little beyondoccasional, albeit angry,...