Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Andreas Wenger is Professor of International Security Policy and Director of the Center for Security Studies at the ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology), Switzerland.Alexander Wilner is Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH Zurich, Switzerland.

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Deterring Terrorism

Stanford University Press

Contents

Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling.............................................................................................................viiAcknowledgments.............................................................................................................................ixNotes on Contributors.......................................................................................................................xiLinking Deterrence to Terrorism: Promises and Pitfalls Alex Wilner and Andreas Wenger......................................................31 Terrorism and the Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research Jeffrey W. Knopf....................................................................212 Deterring Terrorism, Not Terrorists Janice Gross Stein...................................................................................463 Toward an Analytic Basis for Influence Strategy in Counterterrorism Paul K. Davis........................................................674 Counter-Coercion, the Power of Failure, and the Practical Limits of Deterring Terrorism Frank Harvey and Alex Wilner.....................955 The Terrorist Perception of Nuclear Weapons and Its Implications for Deterrence Brian Michael Jenkins....................................1176 Will Threats Deter Nuclear Terrorism? Martha Crenshaw....................................................................................1367 Strategic Analysis, WMD Terrorism, and Deterrence by Denial James M. Smith...............................................................1598 Preventing Radiological Terrorism: Is There a Role for Deterrence? Wyn Q. Bowen and Jasper Pandza........................................1809 Deterrence of Palestinian Terrorism: The Israeli Experience Shmuel Bar...................................................................20510 Turkish and Iranian Efforts to Deter Kurdish Insurgent Attacks David Romano.............................................................22811 Mission Impossible? Influencing Iranian and Libyan Sponsorship of Terrorism Michael D. Cohen............................................25112 A Toxic Cloud of Mystery: Lessons from Iraq for Deterring CBRN Terrorism Fred Wehling...................................................273Deterring Terrorism: Moving Forward Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner.........................................................................301Index.......................................................................................................................................325

Chapter One

Jeffrey W. Knopf

Prior to 9/11, there was little research on deterring terrorism. Some terrorism specialists expressed skepticism about using a deterrence framework to combat terrorism, but most terrorism researchers did not examine this strategy in detail. Deterrence researchers in the field of security studies, meanwhile, focused on the strategy's uses in relation to interstate conflict, especially at the nuclear level, and generally ignored terrorism by non-state actors.

This changed after the September 11 attacks. A conventional wisdom quickly emerged that deterrence would prove irrelevant against groups like al Qaeda. Skeptics expressed doubt that deterrent threats would sway either individual terrorists, who are willing to commit suicide for their cause, or terrorist organizations, who "lack a return address" against which to retaliate. Ironically, as the prospects for deterring terrorism started to appear more daunting, scholars began seeking to adapt deterrence to meet the new challenge. The result has been a sizable body of new research on deterring terrorism.

Elsewhere, building on earlier work by Robert Jervis that identified three waves in deterrence research, I have described the recent research on deterring terrorism as being part of a broader fourth wave in deterrence research. The fourth wave includes reflections on the appropriate role of deterrence in general after the Cold War and research on the prospects for deterring rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Research on deterring terrorism, however, constitutes the largest and most original part of the fourth wave, and it will be the focus of this chapter. The goal of this chapter is to provide a classic literature review. It summarizes the key developments in the literature, identifies the main points of consensus and remaining disagreement, and draws attention to the most important gaps and problems in the recent research.

The most important point on which there is a near consensus in the literature is that deterrence remains relevant in dealing with terrorism. But given the many challenges involved, scholars also agree that the strategy is unlikely to be 100 percent effective. Current research on deterring terrorism therefore focuses on improving results at the margins, not on achieving perfection.

Three approaches to deterring terrorism have received the most supportive commentary. The first approach involves deterrence that is indirect in nature, intended to pressure third parties who facilitate terrorism rather than terrorist operatives themselves. The second approach reflects a return to Glenn Snyder's old concept of "deterrence by denial." The third approach, consistent with a general trend in the fourth wave toward broadening the concept of deterrence, explores sources of deterrence that are nonmilitary in nature, such as "deterrence by delegitimization." The area of greatest debate concerns traditional notions of deterrence by punishment, in particular the efficacy of threatening retaliation against the communities that terrorists claim to represent. Because there is considerable disagreement about the likely effects of seeking to deter terrorism through threats of societal punishment, classic punishment approaches have not been endorsed and elaborated in the literature as widely as the other three approaches listed above.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: It first reviews literature that focuses on conventional terrorism. This section summarizes indirect, denial, and punishment approaches. The chapter then reviews literature that focuses explicitly on WMD terrorism. This discussion summarizes the most innovative of the nonmilitary approaches, which involves seeking to delegitimize and thereby ensure a public backlash against WMD terrorism; this section also highlights dilemmas involved in trying to hold states accountable as potential sources of nuclear materials. The chapter concludes by identifying a need for more empirical research and calling attention to possible trade-offs involved in the various proposals for deterring terrorism.

DETERRING CONVENTIONAL TERRORISM

The suggestions in the fourth wave for deterring conventional (that is, non-WMD) terrorism are organized below into indirect, denial, and punishment approaches, respectively. Delegitimization approaches are not addressed here because they have been proposed mainly in connection with threats of nuclear terrorism. Suggestions for deterring WMD terrorism are dealt with separately in the next section.

Indirect Deterrence

Most of the core ideas for how to apply deterrence to terrorism appeared fairly soon after 9/11. A short book published in 2002 by Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins of RAND was especially influential. Their key insight involved...