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POLICE REFORM IN MEXICO

Stanford University Press

Contents

List of Illustrations..........................................................ixList of Acronyms...............................................................xiAcknowledgments................................................................xv1 Two Realities................................................................12 Troubled Reforms.............................................................363 A Problem of Municipal Governance............................................624 Organized Crime, the Police, and Accountability..............................955 Citizens and Their Police: Vicious Cycles....................................1406 Civil Society and the Police: Stopping the Vicious Cycle.....................1597 The Federal Government and Local Reform......................................1858 Looking Forward..............................................................209Appendix A.....................................................................235Appendix B.....................................................................239Appendix C.....................................................................241Notes..........................................................................243References.....................................................................253Index..........................................................................273

Chapter One

José Luis Montoya

In 1995, the National Action Party candidate (PAN—Partido Acción Nacional) won the mayorship of Mexicali, Baja California. It was the first time since Baja California became a state in 1953 that Mexicali would be governed by a party other than the traditionally dominant Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI—Partido Revolucionario Institutional). The new mayor, Eugenio Elorduy Walther, promised to usher in a period of reform, and the local police force was a major focus for the new administration. José Luis Montoya remembers it as an exciting time. In 1996, he graduated from the newly created municipal police academy as part of the first generation of cadets to receive formal police training in Mexicali. He remembers that they felt special: like they were going to be different from the police who had come before them. As the police force purchased new equipment and police cars and invested in training and education, there was a sense that the Mexicali police were on a path toward modernization and professionalism.

After seven years of ser vice, in 2003, José Luis Montoya was promoted to the position of supervisor, roughly the equivalent of a sergeant in many U.S. police forces, and given command over twenty men. He remembers his promotion fondly as his first opportunity to do policing the way that it was supposed to be done: working with citizens and doing honest police work. Recognizing that corruption was commonplace in the department, he told his men of his intentions and requested that anyone who was not in agreement ask to be removed from his command.

Montoya was assigned a dangerous low-income community with a history of drug dealing and consumption problems. Drug sales were technically federal crimes and not within his jurisdiction; however, the federal government did not have the capacity to enforce drug laws at the neighborhood level throughout the country. As a result, this major source of crime and violence went largely unaddressed. Moreover, it was common for municipal police to look the other way about drug dealing and accept a little money from dealers in exchange. Their technical lack of jurisdiction gave such deals political cover. In many respects, things had improved dramatically since Elorduy was elected mayor, but corruption was still a daily part of police work.

Montoya approached his supervisors and proposed attacking the drug dealing directly. He remembers arguing, "The federal and state police are not doing anything. You know that. At the end of the day, the community blames us for not fixing the problem. They don't care who is technically responsible." Today Montoya believes that his supervisors were complicit in the drug trade; at the time, however, they gave him the go-ahead. While wanting to go after local drug dealers seems like it should be part of the basic instincts of a police officer, Montoya's actions were somewhat revolutionary. Attacking drug dealers meant threatening agreements that had been made between the police and criminals. Even those police who shared Montoya's vision of an honest, professional police force were wary of the risks. His commanding officer warned him, "If the state police ever try to pull you over, don't stop. They are complicit and will plant drugs on you."

With at least tacit support, Montoya and his men began going after the several different drug-dealing groups in the community. One of the main gang leaders was a man by the name of Jazzan Manuel Torres García, known as "El Chango." He had connections to powerful drug traffickers and surrounded himself with strongmen. One of El Chango's muscle just happened to be a boyhood friend of Montoya's, and Montoya persuaded him to serve as an informant—another revolutionary break from standard municipal police practice in Mexico.

Using his friend and other informants, Montoya and his men busted several drug-dealing establishments. When the dealers would try to move locations, Montoya and his team, acting on reliable intelligence, were always one step ahead. The work was not easy, however. He caught some of his men accepting bribes, and several attempts were made to threaten and/or bribe him into accepting the status quo. In his own personal account, Montoya recounts one dealer stating, "You don't know for whom I work for. If you arrest me, they are going to kill you. You don't know how many people are behind me; here we have always been 'arreglados' [colluding with the police] for years, and you are not going to come here and tell us what to do" (Montoya 2005). At one point a corrupt superior officer acting on behalf of the dealers ordered him to desist; however, according to Montoya, the officer was unwilling to put the order in writing, and Montoya persisted.

One day, El Chango came to Montoya's house in search of a deal. Theoretically, El Chango should not have known where Montoya lived, but the dealer informed him that fellow police supervisors had given El Chango the young officer's address. The dealer offered Montoya $2,000 a week, a surprising sum that was more than several months of his official police salary. The money was not just to look the other way. El Chango also promised to provide Montoya with intelligence so that he could arrest rival groups in the community. The deal would benefit everyone: El Chango would obtain a monopoly over selling in the community and Montoya would still get to make arrests. However, the young police supervisor rejected the deal, and two days later at 5 am his men arrested El Chango.

The persistent Montoya stayed with the suspect for all of the arrest process to make sure that El Chango did not threaten or bribe his way to freedom. Montoya returned to his house later that morning and lay down to sleep. Minutes later his sister rushed into the room in a panic: their house had been set on fire. The flames were extinguished, but this was not...