Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Jeffrey W. Knopf is Senior Lecturer at the Naval Post Graduate School. He is the author of Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on U.S. Arms Control Policy.

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SECURITY ASSURANCES and NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Stanford University Press

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments................................................................................................................................viiiContributors...............................................................................................................................................xi1 Introduction Jeffrey W. Knopf..........................................................................................................................12 Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses Jeffrey W. Knopf................................................................................................133 The Psychology of Assurance: An Emotional Tale Janice Gross Stein.......................................................................................394 The Role of Security Assurances in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime John Simpson.....................................................................575 Libya, Nuclear Rollback, and the Role of Negative and Positive Security Assurances Wyn Q. Bowen.........................................................896 Security Assurances and Iran: Assessment and Re-conceptualization Jim Walsh.............................................................................1117 Maintaining Japan's Non-Nuclear Identity: The Role of U.S. Security Assurances Yuki Tatsumi.............................................................1378 Infusing Commitment with Credibility: The Role of Security Assurances in Cementing the U.S.-ROK Alliance Scott Snyder and Joyce Lee.....................1629 Assessing the Role of Security Assurances in Dealing with North Korea John S. Park......................................................................18910 The United States and Swedish Plans to Build the Bomb, 1945–68 Thomas Jonter.....................................................................21911 The "Model" of Ukrainian Denuclearization Sherman W. Garnett...........................................................................................24612 Conclusions James J. Wirtz.............................................................................................................................275Index......................................................................................................................................................291

Chapter One

Jeffrey W. Knopf

In the pursuit of national security, states often rely on the threat or use of military force to defend their interests and deter challenges. Yet threat-based strategies are not always the best option. In some cases, a state may be better off seeking to give others a greater sense of security, rather than by holding their security at risk. Efforts to alleviate insecurity can be important not only in dealing with potential adversaries, but in relations with allies as well. Despite their possible value, however, security assurances—which can be defined as promises to respect or ensure the security of others—have received much less attention from policymakers and scholars than have measures for defense or deterrence.

The most prominent use of security assurances in international politics has been in conjunction with efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly called the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), created two classes of states: nuclear weapon states and non–nuclear weapon states. Only the five states that had tested nuclear weapons before the treaty was opened for signature (the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France) could join as nuclear weapon states, while all other states were expected to join as non–nuclear weapon states. Those countries required to forswear nuclear weapons have sought to make sure that doing so would not jeopardize their security vis-à-vis nuclear-armed states. They have requested both negative security assurances, which involve a pledge by nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against non–nuclear weapon states, and positive security assurances, which involve a pledge to come to the aid of non–nuclear weapon states that are nevertheless subject to such a threat or attack. The nuclear weapon states have offered such pledges, but not always in forms as strong as most non–nuclear weapon states would like. In addition to assurances directly associated with the nonproliferation regime, some nuclear weapon states (especially the United States) have offered positive security assurances in a bilateral format. These generally rely on extended deterrence commitments, more colloquially referred to as a nuclear umbrella.

From time to time, policymakers rediscover security assurances as a potential nonproliferation tool. Commenting on Iran's progress toward a nuclear weapon capability, U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton suggested in July 2009 that the United States might respond by extending "a defense umbrella over the [Persian Gulf] region." The statement was widely interpreted as an attempt to signal to Iran's Arab neighbors that they would not need to react to an Iranian bomb with nuclear weapons development efforts of their own because, if they wanted U.S. assistance, the United States would help defend them against a possible Iranian threat. We have little knowledge, however, about whether such an assurance would be effective.

The goal of this volume is to investigate the potential utility of security assurances both as a nonproliferation tool and more generally. The first three essays in the volume identify and define different concepts of assurance, mine relevant bodies of theory to develop initial hypotheses about the impact of assurances, and summarize the history of assurances in the nonproliferation regime. The next seven chapters assess the role of security assurances in a number of cases of nuclear proliferation and restraint. These empirical chapters seek to evaluate the overall impact of assurances as well as to identify conditions under which security assurances are more or less likely to be effective. Based on the research findings, the concluding chapter offers practical pointers on how to make security assurances as effective as possible in preventing nuclear proliferation.

The focus on nuclear proliferation plays a dual role in this study. First, for the purpose of examining assurance strategies in general, decisions about nuclear acquisition or restraint are a useful empirical test bed. This is the only policy area in which security assurances have been widely used, creating a ready set of cases that can be selected for study. In addition, because decisions about whether or not to obtain nuclear weapons involve the highest possible national security stakes, they pose a hard test for a hypothesis that assurances can influence state behavior. If security assurances have some effectiveness in preventing nuclear proliferation, this will permit confidence in an inference that they could be effective more broadly.

Second, nuclear nonproliferation is a focus in this study due to its intrinsic importance. Efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons have long been intended to forestall the possibility that regional rivals could end up in a nuclear war. More recently, the potential that nonstate terrorist actors or...