Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Judith A. Teichman is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto. Most recently, she is co-author of Social Democracy in the Global Periphery: Origins, Challenges, Prospects (2007).

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Social Forces and States

Stanford University Press

Contents

Figures and Tables.........................................................................................viiAcknowledgments............................................................................................ixAcronyms...................................................................................................xi1 Social Forces and History: Explaining Divergent Poverty and Distributional Outcomes.....................12 South Korea: The Historical Origins of Equitable Growth..................................................263 Chile: The Historical Origins of Inequality..............................................................494 Mexico: The Historical Origins of Poverty and Inequality................................................735 Social Forces, States, and Distributive Outcomes.........................................................976 The 1980s and 1990s: Economic and Social Outcomes Diverge................................................1187 Social Conditions and Welfare Regimes in the Twenty-First Century........................................1428 Conclusions..............................................................................................167Appendix...................................................................................................183Notes......................................................................................................199References.................................................................................................213Index......................................................................................................235

Chapter One

IN THE FACE OF REPEATED ECONOMIC CRISES, the failure of market liberalization to produce sustained economic growth in many countries of the global south has eroded the widely held presumption that state intervention was at the root of the economic problems faced by these countries. Numerous authors have recognized the importance of state leadership in the high rates of economic growth achieved by the Asian NICs (newly industrializing countries): South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (Evans 1995; Haggard 1990; Kohli 2004; Wade 1990). At the same time, backed by a rising chorus of criticism from civil society and labor organizations, scholarly and official circles have shown increasing concern about the perpetuation of widespread poverty and evidence of persisting or increasing levels of inequality. By the year 2000, poverty had become a major ethical, political, and economic issue. In that year, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Millennium Development Goals, which, among other things, included the objective of reducing absolute poverty by one-half by the year 2015. The impact of the recent global financial crisis on the fragile economies of the global south has generated even more interest in such issues.

Mounting unease about the economic and political impact of high levels of intracountry inequality has replaced the early assumption that inequality was inevitable in the early stages of development. Conventional wisdom accepted the Kuznetsian prediction that, while inequality would rise during the early phase of modernization, it would subsequently decline as the labor force in the industrial sector expanded and as industry absorbed labor. At that point, large numbers of people would benefit (Kuznets 1955). Although debate on the issue continues, a number of observers argue that the failure of inequality to diminish in many global south countries is likely an important factor inhibiting the economic growth that is essential for job creation and poverty reduction (Cornia, Addison, and Kiiski 2004, 26, 42–43; de Ferranti et al. 2004, 25; López 2004; Midgley 1987, 38). In addition to raising the risk of civil conflict, high levels of inequality also contribute to rent seeking and predatory and criminal behavior (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 1998; Nafziger and Avinen 2002; Wade 2004). Evidence that southern countries have generally higher levels of inequality than the industrialized nations and that inequality increased in many of them over the last quarter of the twentieth century is particularly worrisome (Betcherman 2002, 13; Cornia et al., 2004;). Understanding how inequality becomes established and entrenched is, therefore, of compelling importance.

Poverty, Inequality, and Social Forces

Unacceptable levels of poverty and inequality in many countries of the global south raise the question of why a few countries have been relatively more successful than others have been at reducing poverty and maintaining low levels of inequality. The ability of the Asian NICs to achieve sustained economic growth while eliminating poverty and maintaining relatively low levels of inequality stands in sharp contrast to the general Latin American pattern where stagnant economic growth rates and recurrent economic crises have occurred alongside higher levels of poverty and the failure to reduce preexisting high levels of inequality. Among Latin American countries, however, Chile stands out for its ability to achieve steady levels of economic growth and dramatic poverty reduction since the late 1980s.

This study seeks to explain the distinct poverty and inequality outcomes of three countries: South Korea, Mexico, and Chile. South Korea has had historically low levels of inequality and has been the most successful at reducing poverty. Chile has reduced poverty substantially since 1987 but continues to experience high levels of inequality. Mexico, where poverty has increased since 2006, has struggled with the highest levels of poverty of our three cases and has a high level of inequality (see Tables A-1 and A-2). In addition to these distinct outcomes, I chose these three countries due to their particular historical trajectories, which, on the surface, would seem to suggest outcomes different from those that actually occurred. Prior to 1970, for example, the Mexican economic model was widely regarded as successful. Hailed as the "Mexican miracle," steady annual per capita growth rates between 1950 and the mid-1960s made Mexico one of Latin America's most promising NICs. The country's foray into market liberalization during the late 1980s and early 1990s and the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) also earned it widespread international approval. Yet advancement in social well-being has been disappointing. Until the mid-1970s, Chile fared considerably better than Mexico in poverty and inequality indicators, despite having experienced intense political turmoil and one of the slowest economic growth rates in Latin America. Today, Chile has transformed into the "tiger" of the region with steady economic growth from the late 1980s (see Table A-5). South Korea has experienced ongoing success in maintaining both economic growth and comparatively low levels of inequality. This achievement has occurred despite the fact that its more recent political history has begun to reflect the strong popular activism characteristic of much of Latin American history: labor militancy and unrest, political protest demanding social justice, and a much-strengthened propertied class with considerable political clout. In the face of political developments with a potentially polarizing and disruptive impact, Korea has been able to maintain economic growth and comparatively low levels of inequality while expanding social programs.

This work falls within the tradition of comparative historical analysis. As such, it seeks to combine a historically grounded explanation of divergent social outcomes with a causal explanation that emphasizes processes over time and contextualized comparisons (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 6). The analysis starts from the premise that particular social structures give rise to social forces whose actions, politics, and ideologies shape institutional development. Institutions, in turn, mold social force strategies, alliances, and attitudes. Hence, whether or not strong, centralized, and efficacious state institutions develop depends on the strength or weakness and configuration of social forces. This is a premise that departs from much of the "new institutionalism" literature, a body of work, which, although admittedly extremely heterogeneous (Hall and Taylor 1996; Steinmo 2008; Thelen 1999), assumes that institutions, however defined, are the most important variable and the starting point in explaining outcome. Generally, those focusing on the role of institutions do not acknowledge institutions as manipulated by powerful social forces to serve their interests. Indeed, proponents of institutionalism view institutions as autonomous forces producing path-dependent sequences that shape action and therefore outcome. In addition, historical institutionalism generally fails to account for the origins of institutions and for institutional change, particularly rapid and momentous change (Pierson 2004, 103). While the analysis presented in this work recognizes the impact of institutions on outcome, it shifts the focuses to social forces, recognizing that powerful social forces may create, destroy, and reconstitute institutions, altering outcome in profound ways.

In many countries of the global south, including the Latin American cases dealt with here, state institutions are weak and fragmented. Strong social forces can and do create and manipulate institutions in their own interests with important implications for distributive outcomes. The actions of social forces may contribute to the fragmentation of state institutions because, in pursuit of their interests, they pull state ministries, departments, and agencies in contrary directions. The result is often policy incoherence (Migdal 1988)—a phenomenon with potentially important implications for economic growth and poverty reduction. At the same time, of course, institutions, once established, can powerfully shape the actions of social forces through a wide variety of measures that may contribute to their mobilization or quiescence. As we shall see, the Korean state proved enormously more resistant to social penetration than the Chilean and Mexican states and, for many years, was able to contain social force pressures, a feat that allowed it to pursue an employment-generating economic growth model. While the specific factors affecting poverty and inequality outcomes vary substantially from country to country, the general approach, which begins with a consideration of the relative strength of social forces and their relation to the state formation, may provide a useful starting point in explaining social outcomes in other contexts.

The term social forces refers to both broadly and narrowly constituted social groups that may have either formal or informal organizational features and that have shared interests. Social forces may be social classes in the classic understanding of the term, defined by their relationship to the means of production (peasants, workers, for example), fractions of social classes, groups claiming religious or ethnic identities, or social movements. The state bureaucracy, or factions within it, and the military may come to constitute a social force. All such groups, alone or in coalitions, are capable of acting in ways that can have a powerful impact on social outcomes. As has been recognized elsewhere (Migdal 1994, 19), the term social class may not be applicable in global south contexts because southern countries may not only lack sizeable working and business classes but may also display severe schisms within traditionally defined social classes. In two of the cases dealt with in this study (Mexico and South Korea), the working class is divided; in the Korean case, severely so. In Korea, this rift involves distinct social welfare visions. In all three cases, there is a sharp schism between small and medium-sized business on the one hand and big politically and economically powerful conglomerates on the other. In Mexico and Chile, profound divisions within the peasantry entailed very different rural development objectives. Hence, social class fragments can be all-important actors in distributive struggles. In addition, categories such as the military and the bureaucracy, although they may draw disproportionately from a particular social class, are not social classes. Social movements cannot be defined in terms of their relationship to the means of production and may draw support from a variety of social classes. In the case of Korea, social movements, acting as social forces, have had a particularly important impact on that country's social welfare regime since the 1990s.

Any statement regarding the relative strength of social forces depends heavily on one's interpretation of the particular historical, social, and political context. Often, a social force exercises power due to its control or ownership of substantial resources, whether land or other capital assets—such is the case for big business interests and big landowners. Business and landed interests, with a conscious understanding of their shared concerns, are likely to act aggressively and in highly organized ways. However, labor groups, peasantries, and social movements, although lacking the same level of resources, may also act in an organized and combative manner. Hence, a social force's effective "strength" (its ability to influence outcome) is very much shaped by the social and political context in which it operates and the condition (size, organizational capacities) of other social forces. The influence of the social force(s) with the most material resources may be mitigated by the militancy of opposing social forces (for example, an alliance of some combination of labor, the middle class, and social movements) or by state action, where the state resists or successfully dominates powerful social force(s). Often the state increases its leverage over powerful propertied interests by mobilizing support. Hence, a social force that is large in number of members, but politically quiescent, may nevertheless affect outcome because a sympathetic political leadership recruits its support (for example, at election time). Explaining why the state is sympathetic to some social forces and not to others is also an important question. The independence of the state may be reflective of the fact that the state itself is the locus of autonomous social forces (the military or the bureaucracy)—groups that have their own policy objectives. These intrastate social forces may have distinct histories and interests and, as a consequence, predispositions to support some social forces over others. Hence, the relationship that social forces have with states is very much a product of particular histories of state formation. States may succeed in subjugating social forces or incorporating them, or powerful social forces may thoroughly penetrate and manipulate the state (Migdal 1994, 25). When social forces penetrate the state, they may do so to different degrees and through different mechanisms. They may gain access to the state by means of a clientelistic relationship with a bureaucrat or politician, or they may secure direct representation within the state through membership in a government body. Differing degrees and modes of incorporation will have important implications for policy and distributional outcomes.

Social forces and the state are key actors in the creation and perpetuation of inequality, and inequality is, as noted, closely related to the prospects for economic growth and poverty reduction. If social forces become distinct social categories that are tightly interconnected, have shared awareness and consciousness, and interact with those outside of the group differently than with those from within, then the stage may be set for the emergence and perpetuation of a high degree of inequality. According to Tilly, whether inequality occurs and is perpetuated depends on whether repeated transactions across social categories regularly yield a disadvantage to a certain group or groups (2005, 21). Categorical inequality is based on one group's control of an important resource or resources; the most effective and enduring form of inequality occurs when one social category is able to dominate the state. The control of this all-important resource allows a social force, or a coalition of social forces, to institutionalize and therefore perpetuate inequality through building the unequal treatment of the "out" social categories into the operation of state structures. In this work, I refer to the creation of marked distinctions among social forces and the absence of deep knowledge within a group about those in other social groups as social compartmentalization. This phenomenon is particularly salient to this study because of the sharp categorical and social distinctions brought about by the colonial experience in Latin America. However, modernization also gives rise to new social forces and to new possibilities for social integration. In this context, the sequencing of events and pace of transformations are key ingredients in explaining divergent outcomes. The timing and pace of industrialization are particularly important in shaping the attitudes, the relative strength, and configuration of social forces and the prospects for societal integration and cohesion. The rapid pace of industrialization in the case of South Korea contributed to working- and middle-class concern for the maintenance of low levels of inequality, while its prolonged nature in the other two cases contributed to social compartmentalization.

The approach outlined here is rare in comparisons of the Latin American and East Asian experiences. Hence, the following section reflects selectively on some of the main points of comparison in the comparative literature on the two regions, pointing out the ways in which this study diverges from, and adds to, what we already know about the differences between the two regions.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from Social Forces and Statesby Judith A. Teichman Copyright © 2012 by Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Excerpted by permission of Stanford University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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