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FIGHTING BACK

Stanford University Press

Contents

Preface................................................................................xiii1 Introduction Paul Shemella..........................................................12 Terrorism, Insurgency, and Organized Crime Thomas R. Mockaitis......................113 Terrorist Networks Phil Williams....................................................274 Terrorist Financing Phil Williams...................................................445 Cyber Terrorism Timothy J. Doorey...................................................646 Maritime Terrorism Peter Chalk......................................................797 Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism Edward E. Hoffer..........................998 Risk Assessment James Petroni.......................................................1179 Tools and Strategies for Combating Terrorism Paul Shemella..........................13110 Building Effective Counterterrorism Institutions Paul Shemella.....................14811 Interagency Decision Making Lawrence E. Cline......................................16212 Defusing Terrorist Ideology Paul Shemella..........................................17813 Intelligence and Combating Terrorism Lawrence E. Cline.............................19314 Consequence Management Edward E. Hoffer............................................20515 Ethics and Combating Terrorism Robert Schoultz.....................................22216 Measuring Effectiveness Paul Shemella..............................................24617 Somalia Lawrence E. Cline..........................................................26518 The Tokyo Subway Attack Edward E. Hoffer...........................................28219 The Madrid Train Bombings Phil Williams............................................29820 The Mumbai Attacks Thomas R. Mockaitis.............................................31721 The Irish Republican Army Thomas R. Mockaitis......................................33222 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Lawrence E. Cline................................35023 Conclusion Paul Shemella...........................................................369About the Authors......................................................................375Index..................................................................................379

Chapter One

THERE IS NO BETTER EXAMPLE OF CIVIL–MILITARY DECISION making than a government's response to the complex problem of terrorism. Preparing for the threat requires a mix of intelligence, investigative, and emergency-services capacity; the response may well involve the application of coercive force. Governments have a wide range of civilian and military tools with which to manage both. In this volume we will attempt to explain how governments can design more effective responses to terrorism, including ways to undermine the strength, appeal, and effectiveness of terrorist groups themselves.

Terrorism has been a problem for governments for a long time. In the modern context, David Rapoport has described four waves of terrorism, beginning with the anarchists of the late nineteenth century and manifesting in our time with the rise of militant Islam after 1979. In a real sense the anarchists are back, fueled by a far less discriminating ideology. There are currently two species of terrorists confronting governments, and distinguishing one from the other is a crucial factor in crafting wise responses. The first kind of terrorist uses violence as a means to a political end, usually overthrowing a government; the second kind uses violence as an end in itself, driven by overwhelming ideological zeal. Stated another way, the former wants to change the political system, and the latter wishes to destroy it, along with many of its citizens.

Both categories of terrorists use terror as a weapon, but, as Thomas Mockaitis explains in Chapter 2, so do threatened states, insurgents, and criminal gangs. How do we distinguish "terror" the weapon from "terrorism" the phenomenon? A universal definition of terrorism is elusive because most governments, influenced by local context, define it differently. Despite wide recognition of the value of a common definition, they have so far been unable to agree on one. However, there is a large body of international law proscribing activities related to terrorism that individual states frequently use as a basis for diplomacy and justice.

Terrorists live and metastasize where governments are least likely to find them, such as remote border areas and "ungoverned spaces" where state sovereignty is weak or nonexistent. This also includes those theaters of human activity that do not belong to any single government, the so-called "global commons." Scott Jasper and colleagues have described in detail the challenges of securing the global commons, which comprise the high seas beyond territorial control, aerospace, outer space, and cyberspace.

But the fight against terrorism must extend the battlefield even farther than that. We now live in a world where what is happening in the sovereign space of one country can pose a direct threat to all other countries. Terrorists have taken the global commons global. Unaffiliated with any nation, they ignore borders and often force governments to ignore them as well. How do we fight terrorists within the ungoverned spaces of other countries?

One way we do it is to cooperate much more than ever before. Terrorists have organized themselves horizontally, testing the vertical structure of individual governments with faster decision cycles and greater mobility. They have formed international networks, aided by cyberspace, that confound established institutions. Phil Williams discusses these networks in Chapter 3: why they are so powerful and how governments can attack them. In Chapter 4 Williams goes on to discuss terrorist financing as one application of networked operations, and one that has proved surprisingly difficult for governments to understand, much less shut down.

Tim Doorey takes on the special challenge of cyber terrorism in Chapter 5. This is an area of acute vulnerability where terrorists appear to be far ahead of most governments. As governments transfer more and more of their administrative and public services to online networks, they will become even more exposed to hacking and criminal activities. Modern critical infrastructure depends increasingly on cyber control, a reality that sets societies up for disruptive cascading effects. Cyberspace is so new that laws, regulations, and security architecture are themselves embryonic, constantly playing catch-up with the next breakthrough technology. Terrorists are taking advantage of those capacity gaps.

Peter Chalk deals with maritime threats in Chapter 6, warning that political violence may become more deadly as well as more frequent. The original global commons is also ridden with piracy and smuggling that could aid the logistical designs of terrorists who wish to exploit the maritime domain. Ed Hoffer goes on to explain in Chapter 7 that weapons of mass destruction are linked to terrorism in ways that are often misleading, creating widespread fear of the most unlikely scenarios, and thereby wasting scarce security resources on the wrong responses. Hoffer's piece is a long-overdue counter-narrative that serves to warn us that terrorists...