Über die Autorinnen und Autoren

Auszug. © Genehmigter Nachdruck. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

Bazaar Politics

Stanford University Press

Contents

Preface............................................................................................ixA Rocky Road.......................................................................................11 Groups and Violence..............................................................................5Ethnography and Suspicion..........................................................................172 Social Organization in Istalif...................................................................22Making Pots........................................................................................323 How Making Pots Bound People Together............................................................34The Art of Finding a Bargain.......................................................................504 How Selling Pots Tore People Apart...............................................................53Telling Stories....................................................................................735 Leadership, Descent, and Marriage................................................................76Dinner.............................................................................................1036 Cultural Definitions of Power in Istalif.........................................................106Election Day.......................................................................................1427 Masterly Inactivity: The Politics of Stagnation..................................................145The Director of Intelligence.......................................................................1808 The Afghan State as a Useful Fiction.............................................................182Paktya-Eighteen Months Later.......................................................................2069 Thinking About Violence, Social Organization, and International Intervention.....................208Notes..............................................................................................225Bibliography.......................................................................................239Index..............................................................................................247

Chapter One

AFTER THE FALL OF THE TALIBAN IN ISTALIF, a small town west of the Shomali Plain, there was a high degree of political tension, as well as numerous disputes over land and water, a tendency toward factionalism and feuding, and a reluctance to cooperate. Simultaneously, local politics remained relatively peaceful and free of violence. What created this seemingly paradoxical situation?

It is inadequate to say that the low rate of violence was a consequence of government and international military intervention, because these forces had little presence in Istalif. Towns that were closer to urban centers, and thus more susceptible to intervention, experienced significant violence. At the same time, the region was deeply divided ethnically, and there was intense competition for limited resources, as well as a general disillusionment with the Afghan government and the international presence. An examination of why Istalif remained peaceful has implications not only for how local politics in Afghanistan have shifted in the post-Taliban period, but also, more generally, how group organization shapes the presence or absence of violence. In many ways, academics and policy makers have misunderstood the forces driving local disputes and insurgency in Afghanistan, and, as a result, these elements have not been addressed very effectively by either the Afghan government or the international community.

Political power in Istalif was fractured. It coalesced around groups and categories of authority, such as maliks (local elders), who led patrilineal descent groups, and commanders (warlords), who led former militias. Some of the men referred to as warlords committed countless crimes against humanity during the civil war and Taliban period, but others were instrumental in filling the void left by the lack of a central government, keeping schools open, and providing security. In fact, most "warlords" in Istalif who were active in town politics during my research fall into this second category.

All of these groups were produced, and reproduced, by social and economic processes. They were distinguished from one another and represented by symbols, ranging from the hats they wore to the language they used. I initially looked at several lineages of potters who formed a guild-like group that cooperated—politically and economically—using the idiom of kinship. Often, however, these ties broke apart, particularly when potters competed in the marketplace. Other sources of political power, job opportunities in Kabul, and economic resources offered by aid groups also caused young men to attempt to build personal, semi-covert networks of allies outside their group.

Although tribe–state relations were the central focus of many anthropological studies in Afghanistan during the 1960s and 1970s, my research shows that the next thirty years of war and reconstruction significantly complicated political relations. In attendance at the meeting with the engineers from the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development described in the interlude "A Rocky Road," for example, were the district governor representing the central government, traditional elders, a former warlord, and two wealthy businessmen. Others vying for power in town included the mullah (the town's chief religious leader), French forces that regularly patrolled the area, an assortment of mostly small-sized non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and a police chief. A more structural study of Istalif might focus on the differences between groups. However, by abandoning traditional categorical approaches that focus on kinship or political terms such as tribe, clan, or state, and by using a more Barthian model of social formation focusing on the maintenance of boundaries, it becomes apparent that these were flexible groups that created a coherent political system in which all struggled for power. The system, in fact, created a struggle of "all versus all" that led not to a Hobbesian war and violence, but to temporary peace and stability.

My analysis focuses on patrilineal descent groups (qaums), religious leaders, a newly wealthy merchant class, former militia groups, the district government, the police, and international groups, including the military and NGOs. The chapters examine these models of social organization and cultural definitions of power, and explore how they shaped violence and local stability.

TIME AND PLACE

Istalif sits in the western foothills of the Shomali Plain. In older accounts this area was often referred to as Koh-e Dahman, skirt of the mountains. Occasionally it is included in the region called Kohistan, which more accurately refers to the mountains further north of Istalif. Today most people simply refer to Istalif as part of the Shomali Plain that includes the northern districts of Kabul Province and Parwan Province north to the Hindu Kush. People in Kabul often refer to Istalifis simply as Shomalis.

Istalif 's green hills and cool breezes offer a respite from the dusty heat of the plains below. Its fertile orchards and...