Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Brigadier General (retired) Feroz Khan is a lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. He served with the Pakistani Army for 30 years, most recently as Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, within the Strategic Plans Division, Joint Services Headquarters, and has represented Pakistan in several multilateral and bilateral arms control negotiations. General Khan has been a visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and has held fellowships at Stanford University's Center for International Studies and Cooperation, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and the Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratory. He has also taught as visiting faculty at the Department of the Defense and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.

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EATING GRASS

Stanford University Press

Contents

Preface...............................................................ixPakistan: Key Characters..............................................xvAbbreviations.........................................................xix1 Introduction........................................................12 Atoms for Peace at the Crossroads of History........................173 Ayub's Non-Decision and the Nuclear Bomb Option.....................324 Never Again.........................................................685 The Route to Nuclear Ambition.......................................956 Punishing Pakistan..................................................1247 Mastery of Uranium Enrichment.......................................1398 Procurement Network in the grey Market..............................1629 Building the Bomb...................................................17410 Mastery of Plutonium Production....................................19111 Military Crises and Nuclear Signaling..............................20712 Pakistan's Missile Quest...........................................23413 The grazing Horse in the Meadows...................................25214 The Nuclear Test Decision..........................................26915 The Dawn of a Nuclear Power........................................28716 A Shaky Beginning: Kargil and Its Aftermath........................30617 Establishment of Robust Command and Control........................32118 Testing the Deterrent..............................................33819 The Unraveling of the Khan Network.................................35920 Nuclear Pakistan and the world.....................................377Epilogue..............................................................393Notes.................................................................399Index.................................................................493

Chapter One

On May 28, 1998, Pakistan announced the test of five nuclear explosive devices in the Chagai Hills in the western province of Baluchistan. A mere seventeen days after neighboring India had shocked the world with its first nuclear tests since 1974, Pakistan's response came as a surprise to many observers. Some had doubted that Pakistan possessed the capability to construct a nuclear explosive. But even those who thought that Pakistan could test a weapon were astonished by the speed of the Pakistani reaction. Many observers wondered how a poor country recovering from catastrophic wars and national dismemberment— and struggling with national identity crises—could devote its limited state resources to acquiring such potentially destructive technology.

This book examines how and why Pakistan managed to overcome the wide array of obstacles that stood between it and nuclear weapons. It unravels the interplay of personalities and organizations involved in developing the bomb against a backdrop of political, security, and economic constraints, as well as opportunities. It contributes to the established tradition of academic work that examines the causes behind nuclear proliferation by telling the Pakistani nuclear story. While excellent academic accounts describe the origins of the other key nuclear weapons programs (for example, those of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Israel, and India), existing accounts of Pakistan's pursuit of the bomb either have been journalistic, have focused almost exclusively on the A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network, or have included Pakistan only in a broader discussion of nuclear weapons in South Asia.

Pakistan's nuclear program evolved under immensely complex and challenging security circumstances. Structural generalizations do not explain the complexities of its historical existence and evolution unless a holistic account is understood. This book examines that historical experience—a blend of cultural nuances, idiosyncrasies of personalities, and the multitudinous pulls of domestic politics, regional crises, and geographical compulsions, as well as technical challenges, global politics, and international barriers to nuclear materials and know-how. Nuclear technology is now nearing seven decades of development, but nuclear politics and technological determinism remain the quintessential factors in international relations, especially for developing states. Fascination in mastering the mystery of the atom is as much alive today as it was in the early fifties, when many of the developing world states broke free from the yoke of colonialism. Despite the many decades of the nuclear age exposing the dangers and blessings of nuclear energy, atomic weapons are considered a life-line for states like Pakistan and Israel, "orphan states" in the international system, outside the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In this sense, the story of nuclear Pakistan is sui generis among nuclear weapon–capable states in contemporary times. Although many of its compulsions and rationales are comparable to those of other nuclear powers that earlier decided to take the same path, what would cause Pakistan to fulfill almost literally its vow to "eat grass or go hungry" in its quest for the nuclear weapon? Why and how did Pakistan stand in defiance of the world to acquire a capability described by Bernard Brodie as the "absolute weapon"?

To understand the heart of the Pakistani quest, this study examines these and several related questions: what conditions sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program? How was the nuclear program organized? What role did outside powers play in Pakistan's nuclear decisions? How did Pakistan overcome the many technical hurdles encountered in the process of developing nuclear weapons?

Like the history of the Pakistan state, the story of Pakistan's nuclear program is one of unwavering resolve and dedication. Pakistani senior officials tapped into the genius of young scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre of weaponeers. Building on this reservoir of talent, the program outlasted perennial political crises and persisted despite poor civil-military relations. The young nation's leaders and scientists were united by their fascination with the new nuclear science and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. They were unwilling to allow India's strategic developments to go unanswered, and the more assiduously the program was opposed by India and the west, the more precious it became. It evolved into the most significant symbol of national determination and a central element of Pakistan's identity.

Pakistan's enduring rivalry and strategic competition with India turned bitter over subsequent decades after a series of wars and crises. The last major war in 1971 resulted in humiliating military defeat and dismemberment of Pakistan, which simply reinforced its belief that its adversaries were determined to destroy the very existence of the new state. This perception united the nation-state into a "never again" mind-set that found succor in the acquisition of a nuclear capability. However, as this book will show, there were twin causes for its national dismemberment in 1971—external aggression and internal instability. The development of a nuclear capability and robust command system might partially address one-half of...