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ASIAN RIVALRIES

Stanford University Press

Contents

List of Contributors...............................................................................................................vii1 Conflict Propensities in Asian Rivalries Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson..................................................12 China and Taiwan: Balance of Rivalry with Weapons of Mass Democratization Andrew Scobell.......................................263 Domestic Politics and the U.S.-China Rivalry Lyle J. Goldstein..................................................................444 Peace and Conflict in the Indo-Pakistani Rivalry: Domestic and Strategic Causes S. Paul Kapur...................................615 Instability in Tibet and the Sino-Indian Strategic Rivalry: Do Domestic Politics Matter? Manjeet S. Pardesi.....................796 The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership: The End of Rivalry? Lowell Dittmer......................................................1187 The Rivalry Between the Two Koreas Samuel S. Kim................................................................................1458 Asymmetric Rivals: China and Vietnam Brantly Womack.............................................................................1769 Two-level Games in Asian Rivalries Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson........................................................195Notes..............................................................................................................................211Index..............................................................................................................................247

Chapter One

It is possible to argue that the past decade has focused attention disproportionately on Middle Eastern international relations. This observation is not meant to slight the significance of Middle Eastern politics but only to note that we tend to focus mightily on the regions in which the most lethal activity is prominent. Middle Eastern international relations, without doubt, have been active and prominent. Other regions, therefore, have tended to receive less attention even though, ultimately, they may prove to be more significant to the fate of the twenty-first century. For instance, an easy case can be made that Asia will prove to be relatively more important than most other regions in this century. Compared to other regions, Asia contains more population and is becoming increasingly more central to the world economy. It also possesses the highest potential for conflict over regional hegemony and global leadership of any region. Wars between major powers may well be a thing of the past, but if they have any potential to take place at all, Asia is a most likely venue. Hence, if for no other reason, Asian international relations should have a strong claim on our attention.

But Asian international relations represent a rather broad set of phenomena—too broad to provide a good focus. We concentrate in this book on interstate rivalries—relationships between two states in which the antagonistic decision-makers perceive each other as competitors who see their adversaries as threatening enemies. Rivalries provide a good focus because they are one of the main vehicles for interstate conflict. That is, most states do not conflict with one another; rivals do and do so repeatedly as serial disputants. They certainly are responsible for much more than their proportional share of discord in world politics. If we are interested in the interstate conflict potential of Asia, then rivalries are the processes to watch. They are not exactly the canaries in the mineshaft; rather, they are the mineshaft.

This book brings together seven treatments of rivalry in Asia. We are certainly not the first to write about Asian rivalries, but we may be among the first to write about Asian rivalry processes in general—as opposed to the many studies of various aspects of specific, individual rivalries. One of our main goals in bringing together these essays is to make a pitch for more explicit study of Asian rivalries as rivalries—and not as simply long-term conflicts or disputes, each of which is entirely different. We do not argue that all Asian conflict is precisely the same. Far from it. But many Asian conflicts are framed by interstate rivalries, and it is the rivalry relationship per se that carries some potential for generalization. Yet that type of generalization can only come about if we recognize that some types of disputes are rivalries and treat them as representatives of a more general category. Greater sensitivity to the utility of explicit rivalry analysis should serve us well in deciphering the nature and implications of Asian conflict.

Analysts of Asian international politics engage in implicit rivalry analysis all the time. Making such analysis more explicit involves recognizing that some (but not all) interstate relationships qualify as rivalries and that rivalries are characterized by processes that bear some potential for generalization, as opposed to dealing with each pair of antagonists as a unique set of adversaries. In other words, the premise is that we should not be dependent solely on area expertise in decoding what hostile states are up to. If we improve our understanding of how rivalries work in general, then the possibility of marrying area expertise with rivalry theory should enhance our ability to understand and cope with dangerous situations.

Our second motivation for bringing together these essays is to address a particular question about international politics in general and Asian rivalries in particular. The most typical treatment of international relations is to conceive it as a tennis match between two states. Beijing did X to Washington and Washington responded with Y. This imagery reflects a conceptualization involving two mythical, unitary decision-makers volleying back and forth. Sometimes, the conceptualization reflects a shorthand way of focusing on who is doing what to whom, but all too often people (journalists, analysts, decision-makers, and the proverbial man/woman-in-the-street) actually perceive international relations between two states operating along these lines. We know better. We know that interstate relations are often at least two-level games in which decision-makers operate in competitive domestic and international environments. Action X by a state may represent a signal to another state, it may be oriented toward domestic political consumption, or both at the same time. The problem is that elites compete for control of governments and governmental policies while at the same time they devise strategies for competing with other states.

Which type of competition is more important in understanding interstate actions? Do we need to integrate both levels to make sense of international relations? Or, does this "need" vary by place, time, or issue area? Are some regions less susceptible to two-level games than others? Have two-level games become more likely than they were in the past due to democratization or the increased availability of information? Are all types of international politics equally susceptible to two-level gaming? For example, it may be one thing to threaten trade protectionism with a domestic audience...