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Transforming Command

Stanford University Press

Contents

Acknowledgments.........................................................................ixForeword by H. R. McMaster, Brigadier General, U.S. Army................................xi1 Setting the Stage.....................................................................32 Command and Military Culture..........................................................83 The Origins of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik).......................................294 Inspired by Corporate Practices: American Army Command Traditions.....................575 Caught Between Extremes: British Army Command Traditions..............................676 Molded by Necessity: Command in the IDF...............................................827 Comparison............................................................................958 Adopting and Adapting Mission Command.................................................1019 Testing: Mission Command in Operations................................................13110 The Praxis Gap.......................................................................15711 Summary Remarks and Wider Implications...............................................19312 Final Verdict: Has Mission Command Been Adopted Successfully?........................201Notes...................................................................................207Index...................................................................................263

Chapter One

THE GERMAN CONCEPT of Auftragstaktik, translated here as "mission command," denotes decentralized leadership; it is a philosophy that requires and facilitates initiative on all levels of command directly involved with events on the battlefield. It encourages subordinates to exploit opportunities by empowering them to take the initiative and exercise judgment in pursuit of their mission; alignment is maintained through adherence to the commander's intent. The doctrine, firmly rooted in Prussian-German military culture and experience, presupposes the existence of trust in the subordinate's ability to act wisely and creatively without supervision when faced with unexpected situations. Essentially, it is a contract between commander and subordinate, wherein the latter is granted the freedom to choose unanticipated courses of action in order to accomplish the mission.

The primary objective of the current study is to explore the process through which mission command was adopted, adapted, and practiced in the U.S., British, and Israeli armies, since the concept's "rediscovery" in the 1980s. By so doing, the research also examines the broader issue of adoption and adaptation of foreign concepts into doctrine and practice.

While a number of works have investigated the adoption of mission command, this examination has usually been secondary to the study of broader themes, such as maneuver warfare or the operational level of war. In addition, earlier studies have focused on specific cases, such as the American reforms of the post-Vietnam era or the Bagnall reforms in Britain. However, the relevance of mission command is not restricted to any one doctrine or historical period. Indeed, modern militaries endeavor to apply it regardless of continuous and significant changes in the nature and character of war. A study of mission command, pursued independently from an examination of other general doctrines, can provide a comprehensive understanding of this approach. It may also reveal the process through which new ideas and approaches are developed, introduced, manipulated, and finally implemented. Consequently, the current study will focus on the tension between the introduction and implementation of new ideas through the prism of mission command.

An investigation of mission command poses a serious challenge, as the concept is quite elusive. The meaning accorded to Auftragstaktik in nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century Prussian-German writings was different than that accorded to it today. In a manner similar to Blitzkrieg, although mission command was practiced, the term itself was absent from official doctrinal publications. Nevertheless, its principles were incorporated into German military doctrine during the nineteenth century. Many historians believe that mission command had reached its highest form when practiced by the Prussian- German Army. Some have gone so far as to assert that the Wehrmacht owed its effectiveness and achievements to its reliance on Auftragstaktik. This concept was largely neglected by mainstream Western militaries until the second half of the Cold War. At that time the West began to seek means of offsetting the Red Army's quantitative superiority. The search led the Anglo-Americans to reexamine the fighting qualities of the Wehrmacht; they discovered the pivotal role played by mission command in securing Germany an edge over its rivals.

On a more practical level, the Anglo-Americans considered mission command crucial for the practice of maneuver warfare. Developed by Americans and the British and later adopted, maneuver warfare was the doctrinal response to the Soviet threat. Though the Cold War has receded into the pages of history, and despite a shift in the focus of military operations, mission command has demonstrated significant staying power. Some argue that it is the method of command best suited for unconventional warfare scenarios, such as low-intensity conflicts (LICs), peacekeeping operations, and counterinsurgency. Mission command is also believed to have retained its validity in the face of the new digital command and control (C2) technologies, which ostensibly increase micromanagement.

A somewhat more cynical outlook views mission command as just another technical or managerial concept, similar to a score of others examined and discarded, such as Management by Objectives (MBO), Total Quality Management (TQM), Reengineering, or Just in Time (JIT), all produced primarily by corporate America. However, in contrast to these business-oriented concepts, mission command is firmly rooted in military theory. This foundation may account for its enduring popularity and near mythical canonization. These accolades notwithstanding, evidence suggests that modern militaries have encountered difficulties in the implementation and practice of mission command. The gap between theory and practice may stem from internal organizational factors as well as from external factors. This disparity, too, will be explored in the current research.

AIMS AND ARGUMENTS

Using the Prussian-German historical experience as a point of reference, this study examines three modern armies that adopted mission command in the 1980s and 1990s: the American Army, the British Army, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). In each of these cases, the analysis revolves around three primary concepts: adoption, adaptation, and praxis. The first, adoption, represents an organizational decision to embrace a foreign concept; the second, adaptation, covers the process of integrating this concept into the organization; and the third, praxis, focuses on the factors that affect the organization's ability to implement the foreign concept in combat. This book therefore aims to answer the following questions:

• What were the American, British, and...