Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. In English. Artikel-Nr. ria9780804758802_new
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. 2008. Hardcover. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Artikel-Nr. V9780804758802
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
Hardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 344 pages. 9.25x6.50x1.50 inches. In Stock. Artikel-Nr. x-0804758808
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Anbieter: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. pp. xxiv + 366. Artikel-Nr. 7990092
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: moluna, Greven, Deutschland
Zustand: New. Why did the Soviet Union spark war in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states by falsely informing Syria and Egypt that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border? Based on archival sources, this work argues that Moscow had absolutely no intention of st. Artikel-Nr. 595015524
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Why did the Soviet Union spark war in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states by falsely informing Syria and Egypt that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border Based on newly available archival sources, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War answers this controversial question more fully than ever before. Directly opposing the thesis of the recently published Foxbats over Dimona by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, the contributors to this volume argue that Moscow had absolutely no intention of starting a war. The Soviet Union's reason for involvement in the region had more to do with enhancing its own status as a Cold War power than any desire for particular outcomes for Syria and Egypt. In addition to assessing Soviet involvement in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, this book covers the USSR's relations with Syria and Egypt, Soviet aims, U.S. and Israeli perceptions of Soviet involvement, Soviet intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition (1969-70), and the impact of the conflicts on Soviet-Jewish attitudes. This book as a whole demonstrates how the Soviet Union's actions gave little consideration to the long- or mid-term consequences of their policy, and how firing the first shot compelled them to react to events. Artikel-Nr. 9780804758802
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar