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The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

Foreword Ambassador Thomas Graham...................................................................................................................ixAcknowledgements.....................................................................................................................................xiiiAbbreviations and Acronyms...........................................................................................................................xvPreface..............................................................................................................................................xviiIntroduction.........................................................................................................................................11. Early Efforts to Limit Nuclear Testing............................................................................................................52. Negotiations, Part 1 | A Unique Historical Opportunity for the CTBT...............................................................................143. Negotiations, Part 2 | Challenges Emerge..........................................................................................................234. Negotiations, Part 3 | End Game-India Bolts.......................................................................................................385. Implementation, Part 1 | Ratifications and Establishing the PrepCom...............................................................................466. Implementation, Part 2 | Bumps in the Road........................................................................................................597. Implementation, Part 3 | Impact of Change in U.S. Policy..........................................................................................678. Implications of Alternative CTBT Futures for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime..................................................................759. Conclusion........................................................................................................................................79APPENDICESA. Chronology of Efforts to Ban the Testing of Nuclear Weapons.......................................................................................85B. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Text.................................................................................................87C. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) CTBT Resolution and Voting Record, September 10, 1996......................................................180D. Resolution Establishing the CTBT Preparatory Commission...........................................................................................182E. Some Lessons Learned from CTBT Negotiations and Implementation....................................................................................196F. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Text.............................................................................................................201G. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document.....................209H. Proliferation Security Initiative Fact Sheet......................................................................................................217I. UN Security Council Resolution 1540...............................................................................................................221Bibliography.........................................................................................................................................227Index................................................................................................................................................231About the Author.....................................................................................................................................233

Chapter One

As early Cold War confrontations intensified, the Soviet Union and United States began testing increasingly powerful weapons, and fears of a possible exchange of devastating nuclear strikes increased. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), those countries refusing to align themselves with either the West or the East during the Cold War, began calling for a halt to nuclear weapons testing. In the UN in 1954, Indian Prime Minister Nehru, an early leader of the NAM, made one of the earliest and most notable public calls for the cessation of all nuclear testing (Bunn 1992). However, the intensity of the Cold War prevented the nuclear weapon states for several more decades from heeding the call. Former President Eisenhower noted his disappointment that reaching a general disarmament accord, including a ban on nuclear testing, had not been possible during his presidency (Eisenhower 1965). The level of suspicion between the primary adversaries of the Cold War and the lack of means for acceptable verification made meaningful arms control agreements, including a ban on nuclear testing, unattainable at that time.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

As knowledge of the nature and effects of fallout from the atmospheric tests of the 1950s increased, international pressure grew to take some steps to reduce the potential environmental and health hazards associated with such testing. It became apparent that no region was untouched by radioactive contamination, and the issue of continued nuclear tests drew widened and intensified international attention.

Efforts to negotiate an international agreement to end nuclear tests began in the UN Disarmament Commission in May 1955, but verification and other issues prevented an agreement. In the early 1960s the negotiations switched venue to the newly formed Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The United Kingdom, United States, and USSR took the lead and finally were able to achieve agreement in 1963 on the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which bans all subsequent testing anywhere except underground. The three countries signed the Treaty and opened it to all states for signature. Over 100 countries have signed the Treaty (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1996).

Although a comprehensive ban proved to be out of reach, the LTBT prohibits a nuclear weapon test "or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It also prohibits such tests or explosions underground, if they cause "radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control" the explosions are conducted. This Treaty went a considerable distance toward relieving international concerns about hazards of nuclear testing. However, the Treaty had only a limited impact on the nuclear weapon states, which continued developing and expanding their nuclear weapon capabilities and arsenals through increased underground testing. Although the nuclear weapon states never matched their pre-LTBT single-year high of over 140 tests, annual testing maintained a high rate of over 50 tests after the LTBT was signed. This rate of testing subsided only in the late 1980s (Koplow 1990).

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

A decade later, in 1974, the Soviet Union and United States once again bowed to international pressure and negotiated the Threshold Test Ban...