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Networks of Democracy

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations................................................................................................xiiiIntroduction..............................................................................................................1Part I: The UN Mission in Kosovo as a Network Organization1 Democratizing Through Networks..........................................................................................112 Theoretical Background..................................................................................................28Part II: Two Municipalities in Kosovo3 Leadership in Networks..................................................................................................494 Formality, Social Embeddedness, and Accountability......................................................................72Part III: Information and Communication Technologies5 The Use and Misuse of Information and Communication Technologies........................................................936 Transactive Memory......................................................................................................115Part IV: Members of the Network7 The UN Civil Administration and KFOR....................................................................................1278 The OSCE, the International Police, and NGOs............................................................................149Conclusion: Implications for International Interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond ........................167Appendix: Background and Methods..........................................................................................181Notes.....................................................................................................................187References................................................................................................................199Index.....................................................................................................................215

Chapter One

A Tale of Two Municipalities: Banshik and Thezren

Kosovo in the fall is filled with fields of golden wheat and corn, blue skies, green pastures, and smoky blue hills. Banshik and Thezren are adjacent municipalities in this bucolic setting. They occupy either side of a range of hills and are of similar size (approx. 350 sq km). The overall population of each is between 80,000 and 100,000, and in each case, approximately 10,000 of the inhabitants live in the main town and the remainder in the agricultural hinterland. Each municipality has a postwar Serb population of less than 5 percent. Both had limited industrial bases before the war. They were two of the most heavily damaged municipalities of Kosovo, with just under half of all houses in each destroyed.

But Banshik and Thezren have fared differently since the end of the bombing in 1999. By the second half of 2001, they were following divergent paths. Banshik was a bustling, thriving market town. Interethnic tensions were still high, but the active hostility between the populations had been reduced to skirmishes over stolen cows. There were no ethnically motivated killings in Banshik during 2001. No families were living in tents as winter approached, reconstruction was progressing rapidly and in line with the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) requirements, and the schools had fuel for the winter. The five factories were working again, although at partial capacity (30-50 percent). Albanians and Serbs in the municipal administration and elected bodies worked uneasily with each other but well with the international civil administration. The elected Municipal Assembly had representatives of all ethnicities, who met and worked together. There was a weekly interorganizational meeting that was part of ongoing meetings and activity between the international organizations. A general feeling of normality prevailed, and there was a sense of hope about the future.

In Thezren in 2001, the town had the same abandoned feeling as in 1999, with no thriving weekly market or feeling of normality. There were high levels of active hostility between the Albanians and Serbs, with two ethnically motivated fatalities occurring while I was there in the fall of 2001. Potholes several feet deep scored the main road through the town. Water had been unavailable for most of the summer, the sewage system was not working, and reconstruction was far behind UNMIK guidelines. Hundreds of families were still in tents as winter bore down, and heating fuel had not been ordered for the schools. None of the three prewar factories were working, despite a $7 million donation in 2000 for their rehabilitation. Members of the local municipal administration consisted only of Kosovar Albanians, who walked around with pistols openly tucked into their jeans, uneasily sharing a building with the international UN administration. The shared governance occurred in a relationship characterized by distrust and frustration. The internationals had uneasy relationships with both Albanians and Serbs in this municipality. The elected Municipal Assembly had representatives of all ethnicities, but security issues regularly precluded ethnic minorities, including Serbs, from attending. The international actors met once a week at the "four-pillar meeting," but it was clear at these meetings that they did not work together actively the rest of the time.

In short, Thezren was like a negative image of Banshik. Why was this so? The two municipalities were adjacent and very similar socioeconomically, demographically, historically, and geographically, and had similar experiences during the war. The amount of money poured into both municipalities after the war was the same, and the same set of international actors were present: the UN civil administration (UNCA), European Union-funded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the international police (CivPol), and the militaries comprising the Kosovo Protection Force, or KFOR. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the political party of the former Kosovo Liberation Army, was more powerful in Thezren and this was often cited as the reason why there was such a puzzling discrepancy between Thezren and Banshik in 2001, but its power had increased since the arrival of the international mission, and the PDK had also attempted to dominate in the early days of the mission in Banshik. The response of the international actors to this political party and its backers in each municipality made a difference in the form ethnic relations took locally and was indicative of the problem-solving styles that were appropriate or otherwise for this situation.

Realizing that disgruntled armed factions are a lot less trouble within the fold than outside it, Banshik's UN civil administration gave the former KLA, also referred to as UCK or TMK (and henceforth referred to as UCK/TMK), and its political arm, the PDK, a real role, while making sure that it did not overreach itself. In Thezren, the PDK became much more powerful because, intimidated by its armed wing, the UCK/TMK, the UNCA did let it overreach its entitlement and acquiesced in the UCK/TMK's seizure of land and demands for money. This further strengthened its sense of entitlement, and in the crucial early days of the...