Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court - Softcover

Hammond, Thomas H.; Bonneau, Chris W.; Sheehan, Reginald S.

 
9780804751469: Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court
Softcover
ISBN 10: 0804751463 ISBN 13: 9780804751469
Verlag: Stanford University Press, 2005

Inhaltsangabe

Despite several decades of research on Supreme Court decision-making by specialists in judicial politics, there is no good answer to a key question: if each justice’s behavior on the Court were motivated solely by some kind of “liberal” or “conservative” ideology, what patterns should be expected in the Court’s decision-making practices and in the Court’s final decisions? It is only when these patterns are identified in advance that political scientists will be able to empirically evaluate theories which assert that the justices’ behavior is motivated by the pursuit of their personal policy preferences.

This book provides the first comprehensive and integrated model of how strategically rational Supreme Court justices should be expected to behave in all five stages of the Court's decision-making process. The authors’ primary focus is on how each justice’s wish to gain as desirable a final opinion as possible will affect his or her behavior at each stage of the decision-making process.

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Über die Autorinnen und Autoren

Thomas H. Hammond is Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. Reginald S. Sheehan is Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. Chris W. Bonneau is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh.


Thomas H. Hammond is Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. Reginald S. Sheehan is Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. Chris W. Bonneau is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh.

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Despite several decades of research on Supreme Court decision-making by specialists in judicial politics, there is no good answer to a key question: if each justice’s behavior on the Court were motivated solely by some kind of “liberal” or “conservative” ideology, what patterns should be expected in the Court’s decision-making practices and in the Court’s final decisions? It is only when these patterns are identified in advance that political scientists will be able to empirically evaluate theories which assert that the justices’ behavior is motivated by the pursuit of their personal policy preferences.
This book provides the first comprehensive and integrated model of how strategically rational Supreme Court justices should be expected to behave in all five stages of the Court's decision-making process. The authors’ primary focus is on how each justice’s wish to gain as desirable a final opinion as possible will affect his or her behavior at each stage of the decision-making process.

Aus dem Klappentext

Despite several decades of research on Supreme Court decision-making by specialists in judicial politics, there is no good answer to a key question: if each justice s behavior on the Court were motivated solely by some kind of liberal or conservative ideology, what patterns should be expected in the Court s decision-making practices and in the Court s final decisions? It is only when these patterns are identified in advance that political scientists will be able to empirically evaluate theories which assert that the justices behavior is motivated by the pursuit of their personal policy preferences.
This book provides the first comprehensive and integrated model of how strategically rational Supreme Court justices should be expected to behave in all five stages of the Court's decision-making process. The authors primary focus is on how each justice s wish to gain as desirable a final opinion as possible will affect his or her behavior at each stage of the decision-making process.

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Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court

By THOMAS H. HAMMOND CHRIS W. BONNEAU REGINALD S. SHEEHAN

Stanford University Press

Copyright © 2005 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-5146-9

Contents

List of Figures and Tables...........................................................................................xiPreface..............................................................................................................xvAcknowledgments......................................................................................................xixPART I: THEORIES OF SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING1 Introduction.......................................................................................................1Plan of the Book.....................................................................................................62 Seven Distinctions in the Literature...............................................................................8Distinction 1: A Psychological Metaphor vs. a Rational-Choice Metaphor...............................................8Distinction 2: Theories of Attitude Activation vs. Theories of Rational Choice.......................................11Distinction 3: Theories of Choice vs. Theories of Measurement........................................................14Distinction 4: Explaining Final Votes vs. Explaining What Final Opinion Is Adopted...................................15Distinction 5: Explaining Just the Final Vote vs. Explaining All Five Stages of Decision-Making......................17Distinction 6: Theories of "Sincere" Rational Choice vs. Theories of "Strategic" Rational Choice.....................19Distinction 7: A "Status Quo" Policy vs. No "Status Quo" Policy......................................................23Conclusion...........................................................................................................243 Assessing Previous Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making.......................................................26The Pioneers: Pritchett, Schubert, and Murphy........................................................................26Schubert's Attitude-Activation Model.................................................................................29The Attitudinal Model................................................................................................39Conceptual Problems with the Attitudinal Model.......................................................................41Other Issues Involving the Attitudinal Model.........................................................................52The Literature on Strategically Rational Justices....................................................................55Conclusion...........................................................................................................60PART II: A FORMAL MODEL OF SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING4 Why Formal Models?.................................................................................................65The Role of Theories and Models in Empirical Research................................................................66Potential Benefits from Formal Modeling..............................................................................68Potential Costs and Other Criticisms of Formal Modeling..............................................................73How Can We Be Sure that the Potential Benefits Exceed the Potential Costs?...........................................76Conclusion...........................................................................................................785 Definitions and Assumptions........................................................................................79Lines, Points, and Utility Functions.................................................................................80The Status Quo Policy................................................................................................83Preferred-to Sets and Win Sets.......................................................................................85The Number of Justices...............................................................................................89An Informational Assumption..........................................................................................90"Sincere" and "Strategic" Behavior...................................................................................91The Independence of Cases............................................................................................92Joining, Concurring, and Dissenting..................................................................................92Costless Opinion Writing.............................................................................................94Conclusion...........................................................................................................946 Coalition Formation and the Final Vote.............................................................................95When Can the Status Quo Policy Be Upset?.............................................................................97What Are the Constraints on the Set of Policies that Could Be Adopted?...............................................99What Policies Do Different Majority Coalitions Prefer to SQ?.........................................................102How Do Justices Behave When They Dislike the Majority Opinion?.......................................................108The Agenda-Control Version...........................................................................................110The Open-Bidding Version.............................................................................................125The Median-Holdout Version...........................................................................................129Comparison of the Agenda-Control, Open-Bidding, and Median-Holdout Versions..........................................134Is Agenda-Control Behavior Unstable?.................................................................................137Summary of Major Results.............................................................................................1387 Opinion Assignment.................................................................................................139Self-Assignment as an Opinion-Assignment Strategy....................................................................140Alternative Opinion-Assignment Strategies............................................................................142Opinion Assignment by a Justice Outside [W.sub.Jmed](SQ).............................................................143Opinion Assignment by a Justice Inside [W.sub.Jmed](SQ)..............................................................147Opinion Assignment by a Minority-Side Justice........................................................................156Would an Opinion Assigner Prefer Larger Coalitions?..................................................................158How Much Does Opinion Assignment Matter?.............................................................................161Summary of Major Results.............................................................................................1628 The Conference Vote................................................................................................163Different Kinds of Strategic Behavior from Different Kinds of Justices...............................................166Strategic Behavior by the Chief Justice 168Strategic Behavior by an Associate...

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Verlag
Stanford University Press
Erscheinungsdatum
2005
Sprache
Englisch
ISBN 10 
0804751463
ISBN 13 
9780804751469
Einband
Taschenbuch
Anzahl der Seiten
328
Kontakt zum Hersteller
Nicht verfügbar
Verantwortliche Person
preigu
mail@preigu.de

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Osnabrück
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Deutschland

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