Democracy and War: Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict - Hardcover

Rousseau, David L.

 
9780804750813: Democracy and War: Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict

Inhaltsangabe

Conventional wisdom in international relations maintains that democracies are only peaceful when encountering other democracies. Using a variety of social scientific methods of investigation ranging from statistical studies and laboratory experiments to case studies and computer simulations, Rousseau challenges this conventional wisdom by demonstrating that democracies are less likely to initiate violence at early stages of a dispute. Using multiple methods allows Rousseau to demonstrate that institutional constraints, rather than peaceful norms of conflict resolution, are responsible for inhibiting the quick resort to violence in democratic polities. Rousseau finds that conflicts evolve through successive stages and that the constraining power of participatory institutions can vary across these stages. Finally, he demonstrates how constraint within states encourages the rise of clusters of democratic states that resemble "zones of peace" within the anarchic international structure.

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Über die Autorinnen und Autoren

David L. Rousseau is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.


David L. Rousseau is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.

Von der hinteren Coverseite

“David Rousseau's Democracy and War advances substantially the scholarship on the democratic peace. Rousseau demonstrates, using both advanced statistical and sophisticated qualitative methods, that institutional constraints, rather than normative conditions, mitigate the initiation of conflicts by states, and democracies have these institutional constraints in particularly great abundance. Rousseau also develops new measures of domestic constraints on national leaders, thus helpfully supplementing the range of measures that scholars now can employ in quantitative studies of conflict and other elements of international affairs.” —Joseph Grieco,Department of Political Science, Duke University

Aus dem Klappentext

Conventional wisdom in international relations maintains that democracies are only peaceful when encountering other democracies. Using a variety of social scientific methods of investigation ranging from statistical studies and laboratory experiments to case studies and computer simulations, Rousseau challenges this conventional wisdom by demonstrating that democracies are less likely to initiate violence at early stages of a dispute. Using multiple methods allows Rousseau to demonstrate that institutional constraints, rather than peaceful norms of conflict resolution, are responsible for inhibiting the quick resort to violence in democratic polities. Rousseau finds that conflicts evolve through successive stages and that the constraining power of participatory institutions can vary across these stages. Finally, he demonstrates how constraint within states encourages the rise of clusters of democratic states that resemble "zones of peace" within the anarchic international structure.

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Democracy and War

Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International ConflictBy DAVID L. ROUSSEAU

Stanford University Press

Copyright © 2005 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All right reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-8047-5081-3

Contents

List of Tables and Figures...................................................................................................xiiiAcknowledgments..............................................................................................................xvii1. Introduction: Domestic Institutions, Political Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict.........................1Central Questions............................................................................................................4Methodology..................................................................................................................11Overview of the Book.........................................................................................................13Significance of the Project..................................................................................................14Notes........................................................................................................................152. The Impact of Institutions and Norms in International Crises..............................................................18Structural Explanations of the Democratic Peace..............................................................................20Normative Explanations of the Democratic Peace...............................................................................27Testing the Arguments........................................................................................................29Case Studies.................................................................................................................48Conclusions..................................................................................................................79Appendix 2.1: Dropping the Aggressive Leader Assumption......................................................................80Appendix 2.2: Crisis Data Set: 337 Conflict Dyads in 301 International Crises................................................83Appendix 2.3: Crises from the ICB Data Set That Have Been Deleted or Merged..................................................89Appendix 2.4: Sensitivity Analysis...........................................................................................91Notes........................................................................................................................923. International Disputes and the Evolution of Conflict......................................................................100The Dispute Data Set.........................................................................................................103Hypotheses and Analysis......................................................................................................105Case Studies.................................................................................................................116Conclusions..................................................................................................................129Appendix 3.1: Dispute Data Set-223 International Conflicts...................................................................130Appendix 3.2: Sensitivity Analysis Displaying Results with the Inclusion of Additional Control Variables.....................133Notes........................................................................................................................1334. Institutional Constraint Versus Regime Type...............................................................................139The Institutional Constraint Model...........................................................................................140Case Studies.................................................................................................................157Conclusions..................................................................................................................191Appendix 4.1: Nested Versus Nonnested Models of the Democratic Peace.........................................................193Notes........................................................................................................................1945. Political Norms Versus Institutional Structures...........................................................................201A Typology of Norms..........................................................................................................206Test 1: New Political Norms Variables for the Statistical Model..............................................................208Test 2: Testing Political Norms with a Logit Model...........................................................................214Test 3: A Laboratory Experiment..............................................................................................219Case Studies.................................................................................................................232Conclusions..................................................................................................................256Appendix 5.1: Scenario Wording by Dimension..................................................................................257Appendix 5.2: Experimental Survey Instrument.................................................................................259Notes........................................................................................................................2606. Democratization and International Conflict................................................................................268Mansfield and Snyder's Theoretical Argument..................................................................................268Regime Change, Norms, and Structures.........................................................................................272Conceptualizing Regime Change................................................................................................274Case Studies.................................................................................................................281Conclusions..................................................................................................................300Notes........................................................................................................................3017. The Evolution of Conflicts, Institutions, and Norms: An Agent-Based Simulation............................................306Strengths and Weaknesses of Agent-Based Computer Simulations.................................................................307Cederman's Agent-Based Model.................................................................................................309Conclusions..................................................................................................................326Appendix 7.1: DomGeoSim Parameter Dictionary and Comparison of Parameters with GeoSim........................................328Notes........................................................................................................................3378. Conclusions...............................................................................................................339Synthesizing Across Cases: The Breakdown of Structural and Normative Constraints.............................................341Future...

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