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Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

Preface...................................................ix1 Introduction............................................12 Theories of Proliferation...............................133 Case 1: The Early Cold War..............................274 Case 2: The United States and China.....................565 Case 3: The Soviet Union and China......................766 Case 4: China and India.................................967 Case 5: Israel and Iraq.................................1128 Contemporary Cases: The 1990s...........................1289 Conclusion..............................................14310 Epilogue: The Bush Doctrine............................164Notes.....................................................185Bibliography..............................................243Index.....................................................263

Chapter One

Are weapons of mass destruction (WMD) a great equalizer that, even in small quantities, can deter the projection of U.S. power? The ongoing crises with both North Korea and Iran, not to mention the WMD issues surrounding the 2003 Iraq War, underline the importance of this quandary.

This book investigates the question of whether small WMD arsenals are stabilizing or destabilizing for world order. This question has been debated extensively in the field of political science, at least since publication of Kenneth Waltz's provocative Adelphi Paper in 1981, and with increasing vigor following the end of the Cold War. Waltz's contention that small WMD arsenals are stabilizing has won wide adherence in the field. This book represents the only systematic, comparative historical examination of preventive attack and weapons of mass destruction. Relying on the new post-Cold War historiography, supplemented by field research in Russia, China, and Israel, my ambition is to present a comprehensive empirical survey of asymmetric WMD rivalry. In addition to challenging Waltz and the so-called proliferation optimists, the results offer significant insights into the dynamics of conflict between the United States and small states that are armed or arming with WMD.

WMD AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Since the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of WMD has ranked at the top of the national security agenda. After the September 11 attacks, despite calls to reorient America's defense strategy toward threats posed by nonstate actors, the focus on state-sponsored WMD proliferation has been rigidly maintained. Given the tenuous connections linking the "axis of evil" states to the September 11 attacks, this rigidity has struck many Americans as bizarre. But, as one commentator put it, the essential doctrine to emerge from President Bush's January 2002 State of the Union speech was that "the war on terrorism has now also become a war on [the spread of] weapons of mass destruction."

Even before the recent intensification of crises with Iraq and North Korea, a new level of WMD-related posturing was evident in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Early in Operation Enduring Freedom, there was considerable concern that Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan might have a nuclear weapon ready to deploy against American forces. U.S. troops operating on the ground in Afghanistan subsequently discovered materials suggesting Al Qaeda's WMD ambitions. Meanwhile, as operations were proceeding in Afghanistan, instability in Pakistan precipitated calls for American forces to be prepared "should ... Islamabad ... lose control over its nuclear arsenal."

In his State of the Union address to the nation on 29 January 2002, Bush made it clear that the next phase of the War on Terror would focus on rogue state proliferators of WMD. Describing the new "axis of evil" doctrine, Bush left little doubt about the primary criterion for membership: "By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.... They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States." The new strategy was further elaborated at a speech to West Point cadets in June. Warning against a world where "even weak states ... could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations," Bush argued that preemption was imperative: "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.... Americans [must] ... be ready for preemptive action when necessary." These ideas were subsequently codified in major strategy documents produced by the Pentagon in September and December 2002.

The first test case of the Bush administration's signature doctrine has plainly been Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Iraq's efforts to acquire WMD figured prominently in building the case for war. Despite the evidence for a plethora of banned WMD-related activities, detailed in the October 2003 Kay Report, the Bush administration has suffered embarassment from the fact that the Iraq Survey Group was unable to find any actual WMD. Many critics have taken issue with the administration's doctrine of preemption, both in the abstract and in the particular case of Iraq. The very title of this book reflects a widespread critique that the Bush doctrine is one of preventive war rather than "preemption." It has been argued that the doctrine is contrary to American ideals, that it violates both the Constitution and international law, that it will cause the wars it intends to prevent, that it will encourage other states to undertake aggressive acts, and that it will undermine international goodwill toward the United States, weakening alliances and threatening U.S. interests worldwide. Numerous analysts objected to war against Iraq, arguing that the risks of a devastating Iraqi counterattack using biological weapons were too great. Administration hawks, for example deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz, said they were cognizant of this possibility and ready to face it. In December 2002, Wolfowitz wrote, "Saddam Hussein might actually use his most terrible weapons.... War is risky, brutal and unpredictable; anyone who does not understand that should not be involved in military planning."

As the Bush administration went about amassing domestic and international support for its Iraq policy, and amid new and grave tensions in the Middle East generally, WMD threats became commonplace. In February 2002, a senior Iraqi official seemed to allude to Iraqi WMD capabilities when he suggested that the United States "would face `dreadful consequences'-worse than those of September 11-if it continued to `trample whole nations.'" Perhaps in response to the Iraqi assertion, the British defense secretary announced in mid-March that Britain "would be ready to make a nuclear strike against states such as Iraq if they used weapons of mass destruction against British forces." Before beginning the war to remove Saddam, Washington announced that it would respond "with all our options" if WMD were used against its troops. However, recent WMD threats have not been restricted to the current Iraq crisis. "Iran warned Israel ... not to consider attacking its nuclear power plant, saying it would retaliate in ways `unimaginable.'" Tehran is reported to be reinforcing the air defenses around its nuclear facilities.

As the Iraq crisis neared a climax, and perhaps buoyed by favorable developments in South...