Cooperative Models in International Relations Michael D. Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher Cooperation problems in international relations research have been asso ciated with a variety of approaches. Game theoretical and rational-choice perspectives have been used extensively to analyze international conflict at a bilateral two-actor level. Problems of deterrence and conflict escalation and deterrence maintaining and conflict dilemma-solving strategies have been studied with a variety ofgame theoretical constructs. These range from two by-two games in normal form (Axelrod, 1984) to sequential games. It is obvi ous that the analysis of conflict-solving strategies and metastrategies deals implicitly and some times explicitly with cooperation. ! The emphasis on cooperation-promoting strategies plays therefore an important role within rational-choice analysis of two-actor problems. However, problems ofinternational cooperation have also been tradition ally associated with literary and qualitative approaches. This is especially true for studies carried out at a multilateral or systemic level ofanalysis. The association between cooperation problems at the international level and the study of international organizations influenced by the international legal tradition have certainly contributed to this state of affairs. The concept of international regime ofcooperation (Krasner, 1983), which derives itselffrom legal studies, has been developed entirely within the context of this literary 1 2 COOPERATIVE MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH conception. However, as such studies evolved, various authors tended to use more formal constructs to justify their conclusions and to refine their analy ses.
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Cooperative Models in International Relations Michael D. Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher Cooperation problems in international relations research have been asso ciated with a variety of approaches. Game theoretical and rational-choice perspectives have been used extensively to analyze international conflict at a bilateral two-actor level. Problems of deterrence and conflict escalation and deterrence maintaining and conflict dilemma-solving strategies have been studied with a variety ofgame theoretical constructs. These range from two by-two games in normal form (Axelrod, 1984) to sequential games. It is obvi ous that the analysis of conflict-solving strategies and metastrategies deals implicitly and some times explicitly with cooperation. ! The emphasis on cooperation-promoting strategies plays therefore an important role within rational-choice analysis of two-actor problems. However, problems ofinternational cooperation have also been tradition ally associated with literary and qualitative approaches. This is especially true for studies carried out at a multilateral or systemic level ofanalysis. The association between cooperation problems at the international level and the study of international organizations influenced by the international legal tradition have certainly contributed to this state of affairs. The concept of international regime ofcooperation (Krasner, 1983), which derives itselffrom legal studies, has been developed entirely within the context of this literary 1 2 COOPERATIVE MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH conception. However, as such studies evolved, various authors tended to use more formal constructs to justify their conclusions and to refine their analy ses.
This volume further explores the possibilities that rational choice and game theory have to offer for international relations research, using a variety of approaches. For instance, while paying due attention to the importance of bilateral representations of international situations in the form of two person games, it also covers cooperative problems in international relations at a multilateral level. In order to achieve this, it contains several pieces of work that are inspired by notions of coalition analysis and cooperative game theory.
In order to cover the various aspects of the formal treatment of international cooperation, the volume is divided into five parts: General Aspects, Specific Applications of Game Theory and Cooperation, Deterrence, Escalation and Crises, and finally Other Approaches to Modeling International Cooperation.
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Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Cooperative Models in International Relations Michael D. Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher Cooperation problems in international relations research have been asso ciated with a variety of approaches. Game theoretical and rational-choice perspectives have been used extensively to analyze international conflict at a bilateral two-actor level. Problems of deterrence and conflict escalation and deterrence maintaining and conflict dilemma-solving strategies have been studied with a variety ofgame theoretical constructs. These range from two by-two games in normal form (Axelrod, 1984) to sequential games. It is obvi ous that the analysis of conflict-solving strategies and metastrategies deals implicitly and some times explicitly with cooperation. ! The emphasis on cooperation-promoting strategies plays therefore an important role within rational-choice analysis of two-actor problems. However, problems ofinternational cooperation have also been tradition ally associated with literary and qualitative approaches. This is especially true for studies carried out at a multilateral or systemic level ofanalysis. The association between cooperation problems at the international level and the study of international organizations influenced by the international legal tradition have certainly contributed to this state of affairs. The concept of international regime ofcooperation (Krasner, 1983), which derives itselffrom legal studies, has been developed entirely within the context of this literary 1 2 COOPERATIVE MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH conception. However, as such studies evolved, various authors tended to use more formal constructs to justify their conclusions and to refine their analy ses. Artikel-Nr. 9780792393948
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