Our ontology as well as our grammar are, as Quine affirms, ineliminable parts of our conceptual contribution to our theory of the world. It seems impossible to think of enti ties, individuals and events without specifying and constructing, in advance, a specific language that must be used in order to speak about these same entities. We really know only insofar as we regiment our system of the world in a consistent and adequate way. At the level of proper nouns and existence functions we have, for instance, a standard form of a regimented language whose complementary apparatus consists of predicates, variables, quantifiers and truth functions. If, for instance, the discoveries in the field of Quantum Mechanics should oblige us, in the future, to abandon the traditional logic of truth functions, the very notion of existence, as established until now, will be chal lenged. These considerations, as developed by Quine, introduce us to a conceptual perspective like the "internal realist" perspective advocated by Putnam whose principal aim is, for cer tain aspects, to link the philosophical approaches developed respectively by Quine and Wittgenstein. Actually, Putnam conservatively extends the approach to the problem of ref erence outlined by Quine: in his opinion, to talk of "facts" without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Our ontology as well as our grammar are, as Quine affirms, ineliminable parts of our conceptual contribution to our theory of the world. It seems impossible to think of enti ties, individuals and events without specifying and constructing, in advance, a specific language that must be used in order to speak about these same entities. We really know only insofar as we regiment our system of the world in a consistent and adequate way. At the level of proper nouns and existence functions we have, for instance, a standard form of a regimented language whose complementary apparatus consists of predicates, variables, quantifiers and truth functions. If, for instance, the discoveries in the field of Quantum Mechanics should oblige us, in the future, to abandon the traditional logic of truth functions, the very notion of existence, as established until now, will be chal lenged. These considerations, as developed by Quine, introduce us to a conceptual perspective like the "internal realist" perspective advocated by Putnam whose principal aim is, for cer tain aspects, to link the philosophical approaches developed respectively by Quine and Wittgenstein. Actually, Putnam conservatively extends the approach to the problem of ref erence outlined by Quine: in his opinion, to talk of "facts" without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing.
What function is played by concepts related to meaning and mereology in the cognitive sciences? How can one outline adequate simulation models for the continuous emergence of new categorization forms characterizing cognitive processes? To what extent is it possible to define new measures of meaningful complexity? How is it possible to describe synergetically the symbolic dynamics inherent in cognitive processes? What types of formal models should we use to describe the evolutionary aspects of cognition? These, the most difficult questions in cognitive science, are discussed here in 15 original essays written by distinguished scholars drawn from a variety of disciplines.
The first part presents an up-to-date account of some current trends in the functional modeling of cognitive activities, the synergetic models in particular are widely discussed. The second part focuses on recent advances in complexity theory, self-organizing networks, the theory of self- reference, and the theory of self organization. The third part focuses on some methods of formal analysis that can be used to delineate consistent simulation models of cognitive activities at the perceptual, linguistic and computational levels. The volume also highlights traditional philosophical concerns about realism, the cognitivism-connectionism debate, and the role of holistic assumptions.
Readership: psychologists, cognitive scientists, theorists working in complexity theory, self-organization theory, synergetics, semantics of natural language and mereology, philosophers, epistemologists.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
EUR 2,70 für den Versand innerhalb von/der Deutschland
Versandziele, Kosten & DauerGratis für den Versand innerhalb von/der Deutschland
Versandziele, Kosten & DauerAnbieter: Versandhandel Rosemarie Wassmann, Oyten, Deutschland
Zustand: Sehr gut. Auflage: 2000. 314 Seiten Hardcover ohne SU !! Sehr gutes Exemplar. F123 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 608 15,6 x 1,9 x 23,4 cm, , Hardcover/Pappeinband. Artikel-Nr. 157624
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Phatpocket Limited, Waltham Abbey, HERTS, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: Like New. Used - Like New. This is a brand new book! Your purchase helps support Sri Lankan Children's Charity 'The Rainbow Centre'. Our donations to The Rainbow Centre have helped provide an education and a safe haven to hundreds of children who live in appalling conditions. Artikel-Nr. Z1-C-020-01254
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Better World Books, Mishawaka, IN, USA
Zustand: Very Good. 2000th Edition. Former library book; may include library markings. Used book that is in excellent condition. May show signs of wear or have minor defects. Artikel-Nr. 41387283-6
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware -Our ontology as well as our grammar are, as Quine affirms, ineliminable parts of our conceptual contribution to our theory of the world. It seems impossible to think of enti ties, individuals and events without specifying and constructing, in advance, a specific language that must be used in order to speak about these same entities. We really know only insofar as we regiment our system of the world in a consistent and adequate way. At the level of proper nouns and existence functions we have, for instance, a standard form of a regimented language whose complementary apparatus consists of predicates, variables, quantifiers and truth functions. If, for instance, the discoveries in the field of Quantum Mechanics should oblige us, in the future, to abandon the traditional logic of truth functions, the very notion of existence, as established until now, will be chal lenged. These considerations, as developed by Quine, introduce us to a conceptual perspective like the 'internal realist' perspective advocated by Putnam whose principal aim is, for cer tain aspects, to link the philosophical approaches developed respectively by Quine and Wittgenstein. Actually, Putnam conservatively extends the approach to the problem of ref erence outlined by Quine: in his opinion, to talk of 'facts' without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 316 pp. Englisch. Artikel-Nr. 9780792360728
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Our ontology as well as our grammar are, as Quine affirms, ineliminable parts of our conceptual contribution to our theory of the world. It seems impossible to think of enti ties, individuals and events without specifying and constructing, in advance, a specific language that must be used in order to speak about these same entities. We really know only insofar as we regiment our system of the world in a consistent and adequate way. At the level of proper nouns and existence functions we have, for instance, a standard form of a regimented language whose complementary apparatus consists of predicates, variables, quantifiers and truth functions. If, for instance, the discoveries in the field of Quantum Mechanics should oblige us, in the future, to abandon the traditional logic of truth functions, the very notion of existence, as established until now, will be chal lenged. These considerations, as developed by Quine, introduce us to a conceptual perspective like the 'internal realist' perspective advocated by Putnam whose principal aim is, for cer tain aspects, to link the philosophical approaches developed respectively by Quine and Wittgenstein. Actually, Putnam conservatively extends the approach to the problem of ref erence outlined by Quine: in his opinion, to talk of 'facts' without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing. Artikel-Nr. 9780792360728
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. In. Artikel-Nr. ria9780792360728_new
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar