JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the "birth" of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash’s existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.
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JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the "birth" of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.
This book presents the first systematic exposition of the use of game-theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Rather than focusing on single concepts it covers all basic equivalence theorems -- core, bargaining set, Shapley and Harsanyi value, Nash equilibria -- including an axiomatic approach to them. It treats thoroughly the value of large games, and the new tools used in the strategic approach to general equilibrium.
The different chapters are written by leaders of their respective fields. The book is primarily addressed to researchers and advanced graduate students, but being largely self-contained, it can also be used as a text for a course.
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Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware -JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the 'birth' of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 276 pp. Englisch. Artikel-Nr. 9780792330110
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Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the 'birth' of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game. Artikel-Nr. 9780792330110
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Zustand: New. Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute, Long Island, NY, U.S.A., July 1--12, 1991 Editor(s): Mertens, Jean-Francois; Sorin, Sylvain. Series: NATO Science Series D:. Num Pages: 268 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KCH. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 297 x 210 x 17. Weight in Grams: 565. . 1994. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Artikel-Nr. V9780792330110
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