Show and Tell: Distortion, Concealment, and WMD

The Introduction proposed that understanding how violence is depicted and defended requires the reconsideration of many common ways of thinking. For instance, concealment–disclosure and transparency–secrecy are not simply opposites. Instead they can coexist, fade into each other, and stem from each other. As a consequence, strives for greater openness can obscure as they divulge.

This chapter takes these initial points further. It does so in relation to one of the most contentious aspects of the 2003 Iraq invasion: claims made about 'weapons of mass destruction' (WMD). In the words of the former British Prime Minster Tony Blair, assessments of Iraqi WMD were part of the justification for why the threat from Saddam Hussein's regime was 'serious and current' and why he had 'to be stopped'. The failure after the invasion to find such weapons led to numerous recriminations against those governments that pressed for intervention.

This chapter charts how the restriction and the release of information associated with government portrayals of intelligence weaved together into a blindfold. The aim is not to voice yet another opinion about whether intelligence had really been 'spun', but to map the logic that defined and delimited political debate about spinning.

This is done by meditating on the question: 'What is before us?'. So much of the controversy about the representation of intelligence centered on what was in clear sight: the language of government statements. Yet, in many respects, the political disputes that played out neglected language. By considering how attention was and was not given to wording, it will be possible to consider the basis for the legitimacy.

Within the overall argument of this book, a purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the mental dexterity needed to delve into the practices of statecraft. It will set the basis for proactive interventions in later chapters.

LEGITIMACY AND PUBLICITY

A history of the role of intelligence in the Iraq invasion cannot be told without reference to hiding. The military campaign that began on March 20, 2003 had its origins in the intrigue of past Iraqi attempts to deny, disguise, and deceive – particularly in relation to its nuclear, chemical, and biological programs. Both before and after the 1991 Gulf War, governments and international observers underestimated or otherwise badly misjudged such capabilities. In the build up to the 2003 invasion, the specter was raised of an Iraq in possession of what were deemed 'weapons of mass destruction'. That the inspectors sent into Iraq in 2002 under a UN Security Council Resolution failed to find such weapons simply hardened the pre-war views of some that meticulous concealment was afoot.

A history of the role of intelligence in the invasion also cannot be told without reference to revelation. Leading politicians in the nations that would compose the multinational military force repeatedly sought to out Iraqi attempts to obtain WMD. In the autumn of 2002, for instance, the British government and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) published unclassified documents setting out what they knew about Iraq's WMD. Perhaps the most viewed instance of intelligence-made-public was the UN Security Council address by US Secretary of State Colin Powell on February 5, 2003. Powell put on global display communication intercepts, satellite images, and detainee statements that normally would have stayed tightly controlled.

Further, a history of the Iraq invasion cannot be told without reference to the contorted relation between revelation and hiding. As Gusterson noted, while Powell appeared to put novel information on the table for all, his presentation was full of rhetorical sleights that suggested things were not necessarily as they might appear. Satellite imaginary of alleged chemical munitions bunkers, for instance, were said to be 'sometimes hard for the average person to interpret, hard for me. The painstaking work of photo analysis takes experts with years and years of experience, poring for hours and hours over light tables'. Thus, although the photos were presented for all to see, their meaning had been deciphered by trained (American) specialists.

Attention to the 'not-as-it-would-seem' relation between the sender–message–receiver was evident elsewhere. For some, what was shown was not what was vital. So, the relatively poor quality of the evidence presented at the UN was taken as heightening the expectation of what the US really knew. This was so since it was assumed that the US would withhold its best material so as not to divulge its true surveillance capabilities.

With the failure to find WMD, the smooth confidences that characterized pre-invasion claims by politicians in the US, the UK, Australia, the Netherlands and elsewhere gradually gave way to stuttering defenses. One by one the major planks of the Iraqi WMD threat came under scrutiny through public reviews and media investigations. Plain facts – about mobile laboratories for biological weapons or Iraq's attempts to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes for its nuclear program – were declared as wanting. With this, the public face of pre-war government unanimity gave way to a picture of discord and infighting – as in the relation between the US Vice President's Office, the CIA, and the State Department. The suppression of contradictory evidence, planted news stories, and false human intelligence obtained under torture were cited to ask whether those who evoked the WMD threat – such as Colin Powell – were deceived by others, whether they deceived others, or whether they deceived themselves (again).

Predictably with the finger pointing that ensued, the relation between what intelligence agencies concluded and what political leaders stated became a locus for attention. Questions were asked regarding whether intelligence was being fixed around policy and whether public presentations acted to mask uncertainties.

This chapter focuses on these concerns about the accuracy of intelligence claims. It does so for the UK. Here, perhaps more than in any other country, concerns about the threats and legality of WMD were central to the government's case for war.

INTELLIGENCE HISTORIES

A history of the role of British intelligence in the Iraq invasion should not be told without acknowledging the disagreement evident about what should be included within any such history.

For instance, the previous section noted the production in September 2002 of a document entitled Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction – The Assessment of the British Government (commonly known as the 'September Dossier')....