CHAPTER 1

Special Relationships and Special Reasons

How Relationships Make a Difference

imagine that you are watching television, and your show is interruptedby a news bulletin. There has been a fire, and several peoplehave lost their homes. How would you respond? you mighttake no notice. You might feel a twinge of sympathy. If the storyhas an especially strong effect on you, you might donate somemoney to help the victims rebuild their lives.

Now imagine that as you watch the news bulletin, you recognizeone of the houses that have burned down, and you recognizethe owners. They are your parents. Now, how would you respond?You would feel much more than a twinge of sympathy, andyou would be willing to do much more than donate some money.You would get to the scene as quickly as possible and offer all thesupport you could. It makes a difference that these people areyour parents.

If a friend asks you to help him move house, you might happilyagree, even though you would never do the same thing for astranger. If your sister is having trouble paying her bills, youmight give her some money, even though you would not help paythe bills of just anyone. If your son needs a new jacket, you mightbuy it for him, even though you would not buy a jacket for justany child who needs one.

We give special treatment to those with whom we share certainrelationships. You treat a person differently if she is your friend ora member of your family. You may also treat a person differently ifshe is your colleague, your neighbor, your employee, or yourcompatriot. You may also favor your own country over othercountries, your own team over other teams, or your alma materover other schools. This is partiality.

Not only do we give special treatment to those with whom weshare special relationships; we appear to do so for good reasons.We do not do special things for our friends and family membersjust because we feel like it. Showing a special preference for yourfriends and family members is not just like preferring chocolateice cream to strawberry. If you did not treat your own friends andfamily differently from how you treat strangers, then there wouldbe something wrong with you. When you rush off to be with yourparents after hearing of the fire, you will probably take yourself tobe doing something you ought to do. Even if you do not especiallyfeel like going to comfort your parents—perhaps you havehad a long day and would like to watch the rest of your televisionshow—you might go anyway, because you think you should. Theyare your parents, after all.

Norms of Partiality and Reasons of Partiality

The existence of a special relationship can make a difference towhat you are required to do; perhaps you have a duty to providefor your own children, but not for all children. The existence of aspecial relationship can make a difference to what you are allowedto do; perhaps you are permitted to break an appointment to lookAfter your sick husband, but not to look after just any sick person.and, the existence of a special relationship can make a differenceto what it makes sense for you to do, without making a differenceto what you are required to do or allowed to do; if your friend isrenovating his house, you may have a special reason to invite himto live with you for a few weeks, even though you do not have theduty to issue the invitation, and even though you are permitted toissue it to anyone you like.

In all these ways, and perhaps others too, your special relationshipsare "normatively significant" or make a difference to your"normative situation." Putting it another way, your special relationshipsmake a difference to the standards of assessment towhich your acts are answerable. An act that would otherwise beoptional can be made compulsory; an act that would otherwise beforbidden can be made permissible; an act that would otherwisemake no sense can be made perfectly sensible; and so on. Thestandards to which our acts are answerable can be called "norms,"and the special standards to which our acts are answerable becauseof our special relationships can be called "norms of partiality."

Sometimes, a special relationship changes your normative situationby giving you reasons to perform some acts rather than others.A reason to perform an act is a consideration that counts infavor of the act, in one way or another. A reason to act, that is tosay, is a consideration that really counts in favor of the act, not onethat merely seems to count in its favor, or that someone merelythinks to count in its favor. (On this way of talking, all reasons aregood reasons; a "bad reason" is no reason at all.) A "reason of partiality"is a reason that is generated by a special relationship, orthat you have because you are in some special relationship. Perhapsone consideration that counts in favor of your rushing toyour parents' side after hearing of the fire is that it will bringcomfort to your parents. If so, then that is a reason for you to rushto your parents' side. If it is a reason you have because these peopleare your parents, then it is a reason of partiality.

In other cases, a special relationship may make a difference toyour normative situation without generating reasons. The fact thatyou are in a certain special relationship may give you permissionto do something without giving you any reason to do it. Perhapsyou are allowed to send your own child to piano lessons, but not tosend just any child to piano lessons, but whether you have a goodreason to send your child to piano lessons is a separate question.

(This case might be explained as one in which your special relationshiptakes away a reason that would otherwise be there. Perhapsyou have a reason not to make other children go to pianolessons, but you do not have the same reason when it comes toyour own child; perhaps that is what it is for you to have a specialpermission to make your child go to piano lessons. So perhaps thedifference made by your special relationship here can be explainedas a difference made to your reasons. But this is neither obviousnor, for present purposes, important.)

Reasons and Motives

The considerations counting in favor of our acts are not necessarilythe considerations by which we are moved to act. Our reasonscan be different from our motives. When you rush off to be withyour parents after hearing of the fire, you might be moved by thethought that your parents are in distress and would benefit fromyour presence, or by the thought that it is your duty to be withyour parents in their time of need, or by the thought that peoplewill think badly of...