Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

G. A. Cohen (1941–2009) was the Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at All Souls College, University of Oxford, from 1985 to 2008. At the time of his death, he held the Quain Chair in Jurisprudence at University College London. His books include Karl Marx's Theory of History and Why Not Socialism? (both Princeton). Michael Otsuka is professor of philosophy at University College London.

Von der hinteren Coverseite

"For those who never had the good fortune to know Jerry Cohen, these essays supply unparalleled insight into his wider moral and political commitments and cultural sensibilities. And for those of us who did have that good fortune, this volume provides cherished reminders of the singular value of his friendship, of the profound contribution that he made to our understanding of what matters, and of just how damn funny he so often was. The debt owed to Michael Otsuka for his editorial labors continues to grow."--Hillel Steiner, professor emeritus, University of Manchester

"As well as being an amazingly gifted political philosopher, Jerry Cohen had an extraordinary sense of humor and humanity. This wide-ranging volume combines brilliant philosophical analysis with memorable personal reflection on a host of subjects, including poverty in India, Israel today, and even the origins of French bullshit. Finding Oneself in the Other casts unprecedented light on why Cohen was not just widely admired but loved."--Andrew Williams, ICREA and Universitat Pompeu Fabra

"This is an unusually personal collection of philosophical essays, full of perceptive observation and sharp reasoning intermingled with irresistible humor and contagious tenderness. Anyone reading these pages will understand why both Jerry Cohen's philosophy and his radiant personality have meant and will keep meaning so much to so many people."--Philippe Van Parijs, Université de Louvain and Nuffield College, University of Oxford

"These often informal reminisces and reflections display Cohen's fine analytical skill applied to matters of everyday life. The depictions of some famous philosophers and philosophical types had me laughing to the point of tears. Never have philosophy and humor been so wonderfully united. The collection also includes topics of utmost seriousness, treated with Cohen's trademark clarity and novelty."--John Roemer, Yale University

"These essays show the existential urgency that was central to Jerry Cohen's aura, generating instant friendships with total strangers and giving his writing a lifelong intensity."--Marshall Berman, City College of New York

Auszug. © Genehmigter Nachdruck. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

FINDING ONESELF IN THE OTHER

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

Editor's Preface............................................................................................................................viiAcknowledgments.............................................................................................................................xiiiChapter 1 Isaiah's Marx, and Mine..........................................................................................................1Chapter 2 Prague Preamble to "Why Not Socialism?"..........................................................................................16Chapter 3 A Black and White Issue..........................................................................................................20Chapter 4 Two Weeks in India...............................................................................................................26Chapter 5 Complete Bullshit................................................................................................................94Chapter 6 Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can't, Condemn the Terrorists?.........................................................115Chapter 7 Ways of Silencing Critics........................................................................................................134Chapter 8 Rescuing Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value (All Souls version)...........................................................143Chapter 9 Valedictory Lecture: My Philosophical Development (and impressions of philosophers whom I met along the way).....................175Chapter 10 Notes on Regarding People as Equals.............................................................................................193Chapter 11 One Kind of Spirituality: Come Back, Feuerbach, All Is Forgiven!................................................................201Works Cited.................................................................................................................................209Index.......................................................................................................................................213

Chapter One

1. Isaiah says that nothing is historically inevitable. Maybe he is wrong to think that nothing is, but it is surely true that many things are not. If, for example, I had not happened to attend—I was not required to be there—the seminar on "Identity and Individuation" given by David Wiggins and Michael Woods in New College, Oxford, on October 9, 1961, then I might never have come to know Isaiah Berlin. Although he was not at the seminar himself, my presence there was the first link in a loose causal chain that led to our friendship.

I had arrived in Oxford on September 14 of that year, having boarded ship eight days earlier in my native Montreal, in fresh possession of a McGill University Bachelor of Arts degree in Philosophy and Political Science. At McGill I was educated well in the history of European political theory, and in parts of the history of European philosophy, but I had not learned how to handle philosophical issues in their own right. I could expound, quite effectively, what Descartes and Hobbes and Hume said, but I was not well placed to comment on whether what they said was true. I was, moreover, almost entirely untouched by the philosophy then current in Oxford, a philosophy which my McGill teacher Raymond Klibansky had described, without derision, as "talk about talk." I was not arrogant. Although I had satisfied my teachers at McGill, I did not expect to shine at Oxford, nor did I feel any need to do so. But I was also not terrified at the prospect of having to master something quite new. I expected to get by, and to come away with a B.Phil. The seminar meeting on "Identity and Individuation" dissolved that expectation.

At the time, I hardly knew what identity and individuation were, and I was going to the seminar to learn about them, and also to learn about Oxford seminars, since this was to be my first one, on the first day of my first Oxford term. At the head of the table sat Wiggins and Woods, and Woods proceeded to read a paper to the meeting. He began by saying that he would call a criterion of identity a "CI" and a principle of individuation a "PI." He then said that his purpose was to investigate how CIs and PIs were related to one another.

This was not a good beginning, as far as I was concerned. Since I did not really know what identity and individuation were, reflection about the relationship between the criterion of the first and the principle of the second was, for me, premature, I did not understand what Woods went on to say. I could not construe particular sentences, nor did I get the general drift. Woods was and is a lucid expositor, but he reasonably took himself to be addressing graduates who were accustomed to high-powered argument, and that did not include me.

In the discussion following Woods's paper, things got worse. A young man began to examine Woods's claims, using (what I would learn was) the touchstone of Oxford philosophy, a particular example. The young man was Willie Charlton, who went on to become a professional philosopher. The particular example concerned a character called a "pursuivant" The word sounded French, and, for a Montrealer, that was, initially, reassuring. I thought it must mean something that follows, and, although I had not followed Woods's paper, I had noticed that whether or not this followed from that seemed in these parts to be an important issue. But if we had words in Montreal which sounded like `pursuivant' (such as the word 'poursuivant'), we did not, in my recollection, have any pursuivants there, and before long I realized that I was, once again, lost. I could not achieve control over Willie Charlton's example.

I left the seminar in a state of apprehension. The big frog from the small pond was at sea, and likely to sink without trace. As I have said, I did not need to excel at Oxford, but I did need to get the B.Phil. degree: for self-esteem, for the sake of making a living, for the old folks at home. And now I was confident that I could not master this difficult thing, Oxford philosophy, in the two years available to me. Or, if that statement is a misremembering overdramatization of the sense I then had of my plight, what is certainly true is that I was not confident that I would be able to pass the B.Phil. examination. Feeling threatened, I sought a risk-reducing strategy, a way of meeting the B.Phil. requirements which was consonant with my unpromising undergraduate preparation.

Those requirements, then as now, were a thesis of thirty thousand words and three written examinations: two on selected branches of philosophy, and one on a great dead philosopher or great superseded school of philosophy, a list of these being provided. With respect to the branches, almost all B.Phil. candidates chose at least one of Epistemology and Metaphysics and Logic and Scientific Method, since those subjects were thought to constitute the center of philosophy, and they were, moreover, ones in which Oxford was preeminent. They were also, and not only as far as I was concerned, the hardest options, and the Wiggins/Woods seminar had convinced me that they were too hard for me. Moral Philosophy and Political Philosophy were also available, and they were less redoubtable, but few chose more...