Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Fred I. Greenstein

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Praise for Princeton's previous editions: "A wonderful book. . . . For journalists, it is a great checklist as to what we ought to be--but probably are not likely to be--looking for in a presidential candidate."--David Broder

Praise for Princeton's previous editions: "Among the many excellent books on the American presidency, Greenstein's The Presidential Difference will occupy a unique position. . . . . His descriptions and evaluations make it a book that can be read with profit by everyone who cares about American political life."--Robert A. Dahl, author of On Democracy

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The Presidential Difference

Princeton University Press

Contents

1. The Presidential Difference..............................................12. The Virtuosic Leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt........................113. The Uneven Leadership of Harry S. Truman.................................274. The Unexpected Eisenhower................................................435. Coming to Terms with Kennedy.............................................596. Lyndon B. Johnson and the Primacy of Politics............................757. The Paradox of Richard Nixon.............................................918. The Instructive Presidency of Gerald Ford................................1119. Jimmy Carter and the Politics of Rectitude...............................12710. Ronald Reagan: The Innocent as Agent of Change..........................14511. The Highly Tactical Leadership of George H. W. Bush.....................15912. The Undisciplined Bill Clinton..........................................17313. George W. Bush and the Politics of Agenda Control.......................19114. The Presidential Breakthrough of Barack Obama...........................20715. Lessons from the Modern Presidency......................................219Appendix: Background on the Modern Presidency...............................233Notes.......................................................................275Further Reading.............................................................292Acknowledgments.............................................................314Index.......................................................................317

Chapter One

The President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can. —Woodrow Wilson, 1907

But nowadays he can not be as small as he might like. —Richard E. Neustadt, 1960

On April 1, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower convened the National Security Council (NSC) to consider a matter of war or peace. Communist insurgents had encircled key units of the U.S.-backed French forces in Indochina at Dien Bien Phu in northwest Vietnam. Eisenhower's concern was falling dominoes. If Dien Bien Phu fell, French resistance in Indochina was likely to collapse, and other Southeast Asian nations might come under communist control. After the NSC meeting, Eisenhower confided to an associate that he was thinking about ordering an air strike to relieve the French, an action that could have led to a large-scale American military involvement in Indochina. Instead, he decided on a course of diplomatic action that culminated in the partition of Vietnam into a communist North and a noncommunist South.

One member of Eisenhower's administration who disagreed with his decision not to take military action was the official next in the line of presidential succession, Vice President Richard M. Nixon. Would Nixon have committed American military power in Indochina if he had been president? That can never be known with certainty, but it is likely that he would have.

In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson faced a similar choice. The American-backed South Vietnam government was in danger of falling to the Vietnamese communists. On January 27, Johnson's top advisers presented him with two options: seek negotiations and "salvage what little can be preserved with no major addition to our present military risks" or "use our military power in the Far East to force a change of communist policy." Johnson opted for military power, first ordering the bombing of North Vietnam and then committing a mounting U.S. ground force to combat in Vietnam. By 1968, a half-million American soldiers were mired in Southeast Asia, at which point Johnson announced that he would halt the military buildup, seek negotiations with the communists, and remove himself from the running for a second elected term.

Again the vice president did not agree with the president's decision. Shortly after the bombing began, Hubert H. Humphrey sent Johnson a confidential memorandum warning of the risk of becoming embroiled in an unpopular war in Vietnam, and urging Johnson to apply his political skills to finding a diplomatic solution. Johnson reprimanded Humphrey for venturing an opinion on the matter and excluded him from meetings on Vietnam until he fell in line behind the administration's military effort. Would a President Humphrey have taken a different course of action than Johnson? The answer is unknowable, but it is probable that he would have.

The United States is said to have a government of laws and institutions rather than individuals, but as these examples remind us, it is one in which the matter of who occupies the nation's highest office can have profound repercussions. That is not everywhere the case. In Great Britain, with its tradition of collective leadership, for example, the rare Winston Churchill, Margaret Thatcher, or Tony Blair is far outnumbered by the many Stanley Baldwins, Harold Wilsons, and John Majors, whose personal impact on governmental actions is at best limited.

If some higher power had set out to design a democracy in which the individual on top mattered, the result might well resemble the American political system. American chief executives have placed their stamp on the nation's policies since the founding of the Republic, but until the 1930s, Congress typically took the lead in policymaking, and the programs of the federal government were of modest importance for the nation and world.

Then came the emergence of what is commonly called the modern presidency. Under the stimulus of the New Deal, World War 11, and the entrepreneurial leadership of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, there was a vast expansion of the scope and influence of the federal government. Meanwhile, the United States became a world and then a nuclear power, and the presidency underwent fundamental changes that increase the likelihood that the personal attributes distinguishing one White House incumbent from another will shape political outcomes.

The chief executive became the principal source of policy initiative, proposing much of the legislation considered by Congress. Presidents began to make an increasing amount of policy independent of the legislature, drawing on their sweeping administrative powers in an era of activist government and global leadership. The president became the most visible landmark in the political landscape, virtually standing for the federal government in the minds of many Americans. And the Executive Office of the President was created, providing the president with the organizational support needed to carry out his—and someday her—obligations.

The power of modern American presidents manifests itself in its purest form in the global arena, where their actions as commander in chief can determine the fate of the human race. This was most strikingly evident in the extended nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union that followed World War 11. However, the president's latitude for independent action is even greater in the unstructured post-cold war world than it was during the cold war, when the threat of mutual destruction concentrated minds and constrained actions.

Presidential power is less potentially apocalyptic at home than abroad, but the occupant of the Oval Office is also of critical domestic importance. The power to nullify legislation gives the chief executive the...