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Scott Soames is professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California. His many books include "What Is Meaning?", "Philosophical Essays", "Reference and Description", and "Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century" (all Princeton).

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"This is a masterpiece. Scott Soames's work on these topics defines orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy, and having that work distilled into a single volume is enormously valuable. The first half of the book also contains the best analysis and explication yet written of the past century of work in the philosophy of language. I'm looking forward to teaching the subject again just so I can use this book."--Jeff Speaks, University of Notre Dame

"This is a very fine overview of philosophy of language from the late nineteenth century to the present. It discusses all the important issues with great lucidity. The treatment of technical material so as to make it accessible to the uninitiated is masterful. In short, this is an absolutely first-rate book. I have no doubt that it will be very widely read."--Jeffrey King, Rutgers University

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"This is a masterpiece. Scott Soames's work on these topics defines orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy, and having that work distilled into a single volume is enormously valuable. The first half of the book also contains the best analysis and explication yet written of the past century of work in the philosophy of language. I'm looking forward to teaching the subject again just so I can use this book."--Jeff Speaks, University of Notre Dame

"This is a very fine overview of philosophy of language from the late nineteenth century to the present. It discusses all the important issues with great lucidity. The treatment of technical material so as to make it accessible to the uninitiated is masterful. In short, this is an absolutely first-rate book. I have no doubt that it will be very widely read."--Jeffrey King, Rutgers University

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PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

Acknowledgments................................................................................ixIntroduction...................................................................................1CHAPTER ONE The Logical Study of Language.....................................................7CHAPTER TWO Truth, Interpretation, and Meaning................................................33CHAPTER THREE Meaning, Modality, and Possible Worlds Semantics................................50CHAPTER FOUR Rigid Designation, Direct Reference, and Indexicality............................77CHAPTER FIVE The Metaphysics of Meaning: Propositions and Possible Worlds.....................109CHAPTER SIX Apriority, Aposteriority, and Actuality...........................................131CHAPTER SEVEN The Limits of Meaning...........................................................145References.....................................................................................175Index..........................................................................................187

Chapter One

1.1 Gottlob Frege-Origins of the Modern Enterprise

1.11 Foundations of Philosophical Semantics

Although philosophers have long speculated about language, it wasn't until the late nineteenth century that the philosophy of language emerged as a self-conscious and systematic area of study. Four publications by Gottlob Frege marked this emergence. Two of these-Begriffsschrift (Concept-Script) (1879) and Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (The Basic Laws of Arithmetic) (1893/1903)-focused on logic and the foundations of mathematics. Their aims were (i) to set out a formalized language and proof procedure sufficient for mathematics, and (ii) to derive arithmetic from the axioms of, and definitions available in, this system-and thereby to provide a logical basis for all of mathematics. Although the degree to which Frege achieved (ii) is a matter of continuing debate, the degree to which he achieved (i) is not. His systems were the starting points for the stunning development of mathematical logic in the twentieth century, and for the use of logical ideas and techniques in the study of natural languages.

Two further classics, "Function and Concept" (1891) and "On Sense and Reference" (1892a), made contributions to both. In the former, Frege uses the key notion of a function to develop the semantics of his logical language. He begins by refining the prevailing mathematical conception, clearly distinguishing functions from expressions that designate them. He then extends the notion to include functions designated by predicate expressions (the arguments of which are objects and the values of which are truth and falsity), functions designated by truth-functional connectives (which map truth values onto truth values), and functions designated by the quantifiers 'for all x ...' and 'for some x ...' (which map the functions designated by predicates and formulas onto truth values). In the end, what we have is not just a calculus with a mechanical procedure for proving formulas the antecedent understanding of which is taken for granted, but also a set of concepts interpreting them. With this, Frege laid the groundwork for the systematic study of the relations between syntax and semantics, form and meaning, and proof and truth.

"On Sense and Reference" extends his approach in two ways. First, meaning and reference are distinguished, with compositional principles determining the meanings and referents of sentences, and other compound expressions, from the meanings and referents of their parts. Second, the ideas of logical semantics are applied to natural language. The resulting picture is one in which the central feature of language is how it represents the world. For a declarative sentence S to be meaningful is for it to represent the world as being a certain way, which is to impose conditions the world must satisfy, if it is to be the way S represents it. Since S is true iff (i.e., if and only if) the world is the way S represents it to be, these are the truth conditions of S. To sincerely accept, or assertively utter, S is (roughly) to believe, or assert, that these conditions are met. Thus, the systematic study of meaning requires the specification of the truth conditions of sentences on the basis of their syntactic structure, and the representational contents of their parts. Frege supplied the rudiments of such a specification.

1.12 Frege's Distinction between Sense and Reference

Sentences represent the world because they are made up of words and phrases that stand for objects, events, concepts, and properties. Since meaning is representational, it may seem that what these expressions stand for (refer to) is what they mean. However, this leads to a problem, known as "Frege's puzzle," which led him to distinguish meaning from reference. The puzzle involves explaining why substitution of coreferential terms in a sentence sometimes changes meaning. For example, Frege took it to be obvious that the (a)/(b) sentences in (1-3) mean different things, even though they differ only in the substitution of coreferential terms.

1a. The author of Life on the Mississippi was the author of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer. b. The author of Life on the Mississippi was the author of Life on the Mississippi.

2a. Mark Twain was the author of Life on the Mississippi.

b. Mark Twain was Mark Twain.

3a. Samuel Clemens was Mark Twain.

b. Samuel Clemens was Samuel Clemens.

His contention is supported by three facts: (i) one can understand both sentences, and so know what they mean, without taking them to mean the same thing (or agree in truth value), (ii) one who assertively utters (a) would typically be deemed to say, or convey, more than one who assertively utters (b), and (iii) one would standardly use the (a) and (b) sentences in ascriptions, [??]A believes that S[??], to report what one took to be different beliefs. If this is sufficient for the sentences to differ in meaning, then T1, T2, and T3 cannot jointly be maintained.

T1. The meaning of a genuine referring expression (singular term) is its referent.

T2. Both singular definite descriptions-i.e., expressions of the form the F-and ordinary proper names are genuine referring expressions.

T3. The meaning of a sentence S (or other compound expression E) is a function of its grammatical structure plus the meanings of its parts; thus, substitution of expressions with the same meaning doesn't change the meaning of S (or E).

Frege rejects T1. For him, the meaning of a name is not its bearer, and the meaning of a definite description is not what it denotes. Instead, meaning determines reference. The meaning, or sense, of 'the largest city in California' is something like the property of being a California city larger than all others. Its referent is whatever has this property-Los Angeles. Although different terms with the same sense must have the same referent, terms with the same referents may have different senses, which explains the meaning difference between (a) and (b) in (1) and (2). The explanation is extended to (3) by Frege's contention that, like descriptions, ordinary proper names have senses that determine, but are distinct from, their referents. In the case of names, it is common for different speakers to use the same name to refer to the same thing, even though they associate it with different senses. Frege's examples suggest that he regards the sense of a name n, as used by a speaker s at a time t, to be a condition or property associated with n by s at t, which could, in principle, be expressed by a description. On this view, n (as used by s at t) refers to o iff o is the unique object that has the property associated with n by s. When there is no such object, n is meaningful, but refers to nothing. The meaning (for s at t) of a sentence containing n is the same as the meaning of the corresponding sentence in which the relevant description is substituted for n. Thus, (3a) and (3b) differ in meaning for any speaker who associates 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' with different descriptive senses.

1.13 The Compositionality of Sense and Reference

In addition to T2 and T3, Frege also accepts T4 and T5, including its corollaries, T5a and T5b.

T4. The referent of a compound term E is a function of its grammatical structure, plus the referents of its parts. Substitution of one coreferential term for another in E (e.g., 'Cicero' for 'Tully' in 'the father of Tully') doesn't' change the referent of E. If one term in E fails to refer, then E does too (e.g., 'the successor of the largest prime').

T5. The truth or falsity of a sentence is a function of its structure, plus the referents of its parts.

T5a. Substitution of one coreferential term for another doesn't change the truth value of a sentence. For example, the sentences in the following pairs are either both true or both false.

The author of Lolita died in 1977. / The author of Pnin died in 1977.

Hesperus is a planet. / Phosphorus is a planet. [2.sup.10] > [6.sup.4]. / 1024 is > 2376.

T5b. If one term in a sentence S fails to refer, S lacks a truth value (is neither true nor false). The present king of France is (isn't) bald. / The largest prime number is (isn't) odd.

For Frege, predicates designate concepts, which he takes to be functions that assign the values truth and falsity to objects. For example, 'is bald' designates a function that assigns truth to bald individuals, and falsity to everything else. Quantifiers, such as 'everyone' and 'someone', are higher-order predicates that designate functions that assign truth values to the functions designated by ordinary predicates (and formulas generally). Thus, 'Everyone is bald' is true iff the function [f.sub.everyone]-which maps a function g onto the value truth just in case g maps every individual onto truth-maps the function designated by 'is bald' onto truth. A similar analysis applies to 'Someone is bald'. The truth value of a sentence S consisting of a predicate P plus a singular term t is the truth value assigned to the referent of t by the function to which P refers. When t fails to refer, there is no argument, so S has no truth value. This is significant for Frege's account of the negation, since when S lacks a truth value, there is no argument for the truth function designated by the negation operator to operate on, and the negation of S is also truth valueless. The analysis generalizes to many-place predicates and truth-functional connectives. In all such cases, reference failure in one argument place results in the whole sentence being truth valueless.

Sentences that are neither true nor false are not epistemically neutral. Since the norms governing belief and assertion require truth, asserting or believing something that isn't true is incorrect no matter whether the thing asserted or believed is false or truth valueless. Thus, for Frege, there is something wrong about asserting or believing that the present king of France is, or isn't, bald, or that the largest prime number is, or isn't, odd. Though this analysis of negative claims is debatable, it is defensible. By contrast, the claim that (4a) and (4b) are neither true nor false is not.

4a. Either there is no king of France, or the king of France is in hiding.

b. There is a king of France, and the king of France is in hiding.

Frege regarded it to be a defect of natural languages-to be rectified in a logically perfect language suitable for science and mathematics-that they contain non-denoting singular terms. Although it is not obvious that this really is a defect, there is no denying that such terms complicate formal proof procedures of the kind that interested Frege. Still, no descriptive analysis of natural language can be correct if it claims that (4a,b) are truth valueless. Thus, something in his semantic analysis must be modified, if it is to be applied to English.

Noticing that the truth value of a sentence (typically) depends on the referents of its parts, Frege subsumed T5 under T4 by holding that sentences refer to truth values. On this picture, the referent (truth value) of a sentence is determined by the referents of its parts, while its meaning (the thought it expresses) is composed of the meanings of its parts. Just as the sentence

5. The author of the Begriffsschrift was German.

consists of a subject phrase and a predicate, so (ignoring tense) the thought it expresses consists of the sense of the subject (which determines o as referent iff o, and only o, wrote the Begriffsschrift), and the sense of the predicate (which determines as referent the function that assigns truth to an individual iff that individual was German, and otherwise assigns falsity).

Being a Platonic realist about senses, Frege accepted the commonplace observations that there is such a thing as the meaning of 'is German', and that different speakers who understand this predicate know that it has that meaning. For him, senses, including the thoughts expressed by sentences, are public objects available to different thinkers. There is, for example, one thought-that the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the remaining sides-that is believed by all who believe the Pythagorean theorem. It is this that is preserved in translation, and this that is believed or asserted by agents who sincerely accept, or assertively utter, a sentence synonymous with the one just used to state the theorem. For Frege, thoughts, and their constituents, are abstract objects, imperceptible to the senses, but graspable by the intellect. It is only in relation to these things that our use of language is to be understood.

1.14 Frege's Hierarchy of Indirect Senses and Referents

Frege recognized that, given T4, he had to qualify the view that sentences refer to truth values. While correctly applying to many of their occurrences, it doesn't apply to the occurrences of sentences in attitude ascriptions [??]A asserted/believed/ ... that S[??]. Suppose that (6a) is true, and so refers to truth.

6a. John believes that 2 + 3 = 5.

Since '2 + 3 = 5' is true, substituting any other true sentence-e.g., 'Frege was German'-for it ought, by T4, to give us another true statement, (6b), of what John believes.

6b. John believes that Frege was German.

But this is absurd. An agent can believe one truth (falsehood) without believing every truth (falsehood). Thus, if the truth values of attitude ascriptions are functions of their grammatical structure, plus the referents of their parts, then the complement clauses of such ascriptions must refer to something other than the truth values of the sentences occurring there.

Frege's solution to this problem is illustrated by (7), in which the putative object of belief is indicated by the italicized noun phrase.

7. John believes the claim expressed at the top of page 76.

Since the phrase is not a sentence, its sense is not a thought. Thus, what is said to be believed in (7) must be its referent, rather than its sense. This result is generalized in T6.

T6. The thing said to be believed in an attitude ascription [??]A believes E[??] (or similar indirect discourse report) is what the occurrence of E in the ascription (or report) refers to.

Possible values of 'E' include S, [??]that S[??], and [??]the thought/ proposition/claim that S[??]. In these cases what is said to be believed is the thought that S expresses. If T6 is correct, this thought is the referent of occurrences of S, [??]that S[??], and [??]the thought/proposition/ claim that S[??] in attitude ascriptions (or other indirect discourse reports). Thus, in order to preserve his basic tenets-that meaning is always distinct from reference, and that the referent of a compound is always compositionally determined from the referents of its parts, Frege was led to T7.

T7. An occurrence of S embedded in an attitude ascription (indirect discourse report) refers not to its truth value, but to the thought S expresses when it isn't embedded. In these cases, an occurrence of S refers to S's ordinary sense. Unembedded occurrences of S refer to the ordinary referent of S-i.e., its truth value.

Here, Frege takes, not expressions, but their occurrences, to be semantically fundamental. Unembedded occurrences express "ordinary senses," which determine "ordinary referents." Singly embedded occurrences, like those in (6), express the "indirect senses" of expressions, which determine their ordinary senses as "indirect referents." The process is repeated in (8).

(Continues...)

Excerpted from PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGEby Scott Soames Copyright © 2010 by Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission.
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