Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Zoltan Barany is the Frank C. Erwin, Jr., Centennial Professor of Government at the University of Texas and the author of Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military (Princeton).

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"The Soldier and the Changing State is the single most ambitious and complete analysis on civil-military relations in democratizing states. Barany examines a variety of country case studies, ranging from transition experiences after dictatorships and communist regimes to postwar and postcolonial nations. This is an extremely important contribution to the understanding of the relationship between the role of the military and the government in diverse transition situations."--Narcís Serra, chairman of the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals and former Spanish Minister of Defense

"We know that the fate of political regimes ultimately rests with people who bear arms. But why would the military be willing to respect civilian rule? Barany shows that removing politics from the military presents a problem different from extracting the military from politics. The analysis is incisive and subtle, attentive to historical details, and the wealth of historical material has no equal. This is a book for which I have been waiting a long time."--Adam Przeworski, New York University

"A remarkable book--theoretically circumspect and empirically ambitious, and a very important contribution to the field. Barany applies insights from existing theory to an exceptionally diverse range of post-World War II cases. This will be the new standard reference for anyone interested in how military institutions can be coaxed to fit under democratic rule."--Peter Feaver, Duke University

"Destined to become the standard book on civil-military relations and a key work in democratization studies, The Soldier and the Changing State shows what makes democracy work. Barany takes a bold stance by saying that without solving the civil-military problem in new democracies, it is virtually impossible to solve any other issues. This is the most important book written on this subject in forty years."--Thomas Nichols, United States Naval War College

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The Soldier and the Changing State

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

Acknowledgments......................................................................................ixIntroduction.........................................................................................1Chapter 1 What Does a Democratic Army Look Like?.....................................................14Chapter 2 After World War II: Germany, Japan, and Hungary............................................47Chapter 3 After Civil War: Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, and Lebanon..........................78Chapter 4 After Military Rule in Europe: Spain, Portugal, and Greece.................................113Chapter 5 After Military Rule in Latin America: Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala......................143Chapter 6 After Military Rule in Asia: South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia..........................178Chapter 7 After State-Socialism in Europe: Slovenia, Russia, and Romania.............................212Chapter 8 After Colonial Rule in Asia: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh...............................245Chapter 9 After Colonial Rule in Africa: Ghana, Tanzania, and Botswana...............................275Chapter 10 After (Re)Unification and Apartheid: Germany, South Africa, and Yemen.....................303Conclusion...........................................................................................339Notes................................................................................................359Bibliography.........................................................................................409Index................................................................................................443

Chapter One

* * *

The principal foundations on which the power of all governments is based (whether they be new, long-established or mixed) are good laws and good armies. —Machiavelli, The Prince

There is no organization more important for the survival of the state than its armed forces. For millennia, communities have relied on armies for protection, for conquest, and for less obvious functions, such as conveying their strength and commitment to defend and advance their interests. Yet, many people, even those interested in politics and governance, have little understanding of the military as an institution charged with a country's defense. Where does the army fit in the organizational structure of the state? What are politicians' expectations of the armed forces? What are the military's responsibilities to the state and to society? What does a democratic army look like and how can we tell it from a nondemocratic one?

This chapter invites the reader to think seriously about the armed forces as an institution of the modern state, as a part of society, and about the relationships between them. I begin with a brief inquiry into how major thinkers in times past viewed the army and how key elements of military politics have changed through modern history. In the following part I briefly discuss some of the useful theoretical contributions that inform the study of civil-military relations and democratization in different political environments. In the rest of the book I tell the stories of how different countries went about democratizing military politics, so it is going to be helpful to have a gauge against which their records can be measured. To that end, in the third section I outline the indispensable components of democratic military politics in terms of institutional arrangements and relationships, and present the major aspects of the societal side of civil-military relations. In doing so, I explain the functions and obligations of society, the state, and the armed forces.

Armies, States, Societies: Looking Back

What is the fundamental difference that sets apart sovereign states like Brazil from provinces like British Columbia and cities like Bangkok? All three entities feature political systems complete with separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches, they all tax their residents and, in return, provide services for them. What makes them so different is Brazil's right, indeed obligation, to protect its citizens with a military force whose function is to fight foreign enemies. For Max Weber, "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force" (Gewaltmonopol des Staates) is part of the very definition of the modern state. I agree with Adam Przeworski who contends that the state actually possesses only the monopoly to license different bureaucracies—the armed forces, various police agencies, intelligence services, border guards, etc.—to bear arms. This is an important distinction because establishing effective civilian control signifies different challenges depending on the armed organization in question. (In this book, however, we are only concerned with the regular military—including its branch services, the army, navy, and the air force.)

In the formative period of ancient Greek and Italian city-states and, much later, in the medieval towns of Italy, the early centralization of state administration and the organization of those economically competent to bear arms, equip, and train themselves allowed those states to rise and prosper. Affluence, in turn, enabled ancient and medieval cities to bolster their military force that could be used to defeat the private armies of wealthy enemies and thereby further increase state power. The state's strength—projected through its military force—then might be put to good use not only as a protective device against external enemies but also to expand its territories and influence. Most of the principal dilemmas of civil-military relations were articulated by philosophers and political thinkers as early as in ancient Greece, because the fundamental problem of military politics is as logical as it is eternal: the state needs the armed forces for its own protection, but the same forces, owing to their monopoly of the tools of large-scale violence, also present a potential threat to the state's very existence.

The question "who will guard the guardians?" (Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?) was first posed by the 1st–2nd century AD Roman satirist Juvenal—to show the impossibility of imposing a moral code on women when the enforcers themselves are corruptible—and has been frequently invoked to acknowledge an age-old political dilemma. The crucial challenge for politicians is to ensure the unconditional obedience of the military while at the same time allowing it sufficient autonomy to successfully discharge its functions and execute its missions. The army must be strong enough to prevail in war but conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy the society it is intended to protect. Moreover, the military should use society's resources only to the extent justified by the threat confronting the state and must not extract state assets merely to increase its own strength.

The armed forces may be considered the quintessential Weberian rational organization that is bound by rules that unambiguously lay out standard operating procedures, rewards for compliance, and punishment for disobedience. As Samuel Huntington pointed out, the military as a state institution is shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to society's...