Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Alexander Cooley is associate professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University. His books include "Base Politics and Logics of Hierarchy". Hendrik Spruyt is the Norman Dwight Harris Professor of International Relations at Northwestern University. His books include "Ending Empire" and "The Sovereign State and Its Competitors" (Princeton).

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"Contracting States is a brilliant and original book--a long-overdue addition to international relations theory. Extending insights from incomplete contracting theory and conceiving of sovereignty as a bundle of 'tradable' rights, Cooley and Spruyt offer a unified analytical framework that sheds fresh light on seemingly disparate key events, including regional integration, state formation, and territorial fragmentation."--Walter Mattli, St. John's College, University of Oxford

"Contrary to the common image of state sovereignty as unitary and absolute, Cooley and Spruyt examine the many situations in which sovereignty rights are shared or transferred: decolonization, foreign military bases, water rights, ethnic federalism, and more. Their use of the concept of incomplete contracting to shed light on a huge range of historical and contemporary bargaining processes is as timely as today's news stories about Russia's gas pipeline price gouging."--Jack Snyder, Columbia University

"Contracting States is an extraordinary undertaking that challenges us to see the foundations of successful international cooperation in a new light. This is likely to be a seminal work that defines the terms of the debate about sovereignty and governance for years to come."--Philip G. Roeder, University of California, San Diego

"Contracting States adds a great deal to our understanding of mixed forms of sovereignty. It not only poses an interesting puzzle but provides a sophisticated theoretical framework and leaves the reader with useful policy prescriptions for hybrid governance structures. This book makes a significant contribution to the literature. I learned a great deal from Contracting States."--Katja Weber, Georgia Institute of Technology

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CONTRACTING STATES

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

List of Illustrations and Tables..........................................................................ixPreface...................................................................................................xiChapter 1. Incomplete Sovereignty and International Relations.............................................1Chapter 2. A Theory of Incomplete Contracting and State Sovereignty.......................................19Chapter 3. Severing the Ties That Bind: Sovereign Transfers in the Shadow of Empire.......................48Appendix 3.1. Overseas Basing Deployments of France and Britain since 1970................................97Chapter 4. Incomplete Contracting and the Politics of U.S. Overseas Basing Agreements.....................100Chapter 5. Incomplete Contracting and Modalities of Regional Integration..................................142Chapter 6. Further Applications and Conclusions...........................................................186Bibliography..............................................................................................207Index.....................................................................................................225

Chapter One

Introduction

Territorial sovereignty presents us with a paradox. On the one hand, it forms the key constitutive rule in international relations. In strict terms it denotes that the people within recognized territorial borders are masters of their own fate. No higher juridical authority exists above that of the national government. And all states are equal in international law. Sovereignty is thus highly desired. As we have witnessed in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and many other parts of the world, nations vie for their own state, and people fight and die for that cause.

Yet on the other hand, the world is replete with instances where sovereignty appears fragile. Some observers claim that the territorial state is obsolete and in the process of being supplanted by other institutional forms. Others see territorial sovereignty solely as a juridical fiction. Although states are equal from an international legal perspective, they fail to capture the continued relevance of power, domination, and hegemony. Indeed, in the wake of American military action in Iraq and elsewhere, some argue that we are witnessing the resurrection of the study of empire and imperialism. Empire, thought to have become obsolete in the decades after World War II, has returned as an international reality. But many cases of sovereign relations do not comfortably fit these categories.

Consider the following two cases. The first involved the evolution of sovereignty within Iraq itself. On June 28th, 2004, the United States transferred sovereignty to an interim government in Iraq, formally concluding a fifteen-month occupation that followed its military campaign to forcibly disarm the country and enact regime change. Even though the Coalition Provisional Authority led by Paul Bremer formally disbanded, the continued presence of over 120,000 American troops in Iraq led many analysts to question whether this handover was practically significant. Four years after the transfer the exact division of sovereignty between Iraq and the United States still remained ill defined and incomplete. The UN mandate authorizing the presence of the U.S.-led coalition mission in Iraq was extended through 2008. However, in 2007 the United States and Iraq agreed to negotiate a bilateral framework to govern critical future sovereign issues after 2008, including the role of U.S. forces, the legal status of military contractors in Iraq, and the future levels of U.S. economic and military assistance to the country. The politically thorny question of the likelihood of a permanent U.S. military basing presence in the country was also brought to the fore. Iraq had regained much of this sovereignty since the 2003 U.S. invasion, but many of these sovereign transfers happened gradually and remain open-ended.

Just one week before the 2004 formal transfer of sovereignty in Iraq, leaders of the (then) twenty-five members of the European Union (EU) agreed to adopt a common constitution that would consolidate previous agreements, clarify voting procedures, expand the role of the European parliament, and unify the foreign policy preferences and decision-making procedures of the member countries. Although leaders were relieved to have actually agreed upon a text for the accord, thereby avoiding the public embarrassment that followed the collapse of negotiations six months earlier, immediate concerns arose as to its future political viability. According to one observer, the accord was the product of "arm-twisting, obfuscation and opt-outs" that had papered over substantive disagreements over the future of the EU. One year later, the rejection of the constitution by the French and Dutch publics in national referenda indicated that the European Commission had not been able to guarantee to these skeptical publics that its authority would be restrained and accountable. It took three more years to allay the resistance among the French and Dutch citizens-at least for a majority-as many of the same provisions were included in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, but even this accord was rejected by Irish voters in a June 2008 referendum. These rejections show how Europeans remain concerned about the exact future contours of the European project and the scope and momentum of ongoing European integration.

Despite their obviously contrasting regional settings and political processes-the disengagement of Iraq from American control and the continued integration of the EU countries-both of these cases highlight a number of common features and dilemmas surrounding the institution of state sovereignty in contemporary international politics. First, in both cases, the exact apportioning of sovereignty after these agreements, despite weeks of prior speculation and analysis, was unclear. Could Iraq truly claim to be a meaningfully sovereign country-despite the fact that it controlled the functions of twenty-six ministries-if American troops operating under their own command and control remained in the country for an indefinite period of time? Would the position of an EU foreign minister have any credibility or authority when individual member countries dissented from the external policy positions of the EU? In both cases, sovereignty had been reapportioned across political actors, but the exact nature and boundaries of this sovereign authority was difficult to specify.

A second common feature of these agreements was the uncertainty surrounding their exact downstream distributional consequences. How would these accords affect the future relative bargaining power of these states? Would the handover of sovereignty give the Iraqi government real authority or even veto power over the United States and its military decisions? How would the new voting procedures affect the ability of the European "big three" to shape the European Community's policy agenda? After the failed referenda, would the Commission try to "smuggle" in these constitutional changes through other established procedures and European agencies? Thus, not only were the particular contours of sovereign authority unclear, but the future consequences of these particular sovereign arrangements were also uncertain. Yet, even without being able to anticipate future power dynamics and distributional consequences, the various states involved in concluding these agreements had agreed, at least initially, to reapportion and transfer their sovereignty.

Finally, both of these agreements ignited renewed domestic political debates about the acceptability of altering the existing institutional scope of sovereignty. Would the Iraqi public be able to accept the continued presence of so many foreign troops now that they had regained their nominal sovereignty? Would U.S. policymakers call for the withdrawal of U.S. forces now that a major political disengagement had taken place? In the European case, the very ability of a member country to secure public acquiescence to greater integration was thrown into question. Thus, in both cases, new agreements over the scope of sovereign authority exacted a fresh set of domestic political costs and constraints.

These cases are but two examples of a much larger set of instances in which states negotiate about, bundle, or surrender their sovereign prerogatives. To be sure, territorial sovereignty remains a critically important institution in international relations. If it were merely organized hypocrisy, pace Stephen Krasner, how should we understand the desperate pursuit of that goal by so many nations?

But sovereignty is rarely absolute. Rather, sovereignty consists of a bundle of rights and obligations that are dynamically exchanged and transferred between states. For example, decolonization and territorial partition do not always mean that the newly independent states acquire full sovereignty. Instead, nationalist leaders might be content to obtain partial sovereignty if it accelerates the process of imperial withdrawal. In other instances, elites might grant some sovereign rights to another state or international organization because of perceived gains from the transaction. Such forms of hybrid sovereign relations represent mixed forms of organizational governance that are neither purely "anarchical" nor "hierarchical."

In agreeing to such hybrid sovereign relations, leaders are rarely sure about the long-term consequences of the agreements they sign. Few European statesmen foresaw the expansion of the EU and the depth of integration of the Community today. When Algerian nationalists and the French government agreed that France could maintain military bases and oil facilities after Algerian independence, they had no clear view of the durability of that agreement and the credibility of both parties to follow through. Who knows whether American-Iraqi agreements that authorize the presence of American troops in Iraq will stand the test of time?

What is noteworthy from our perspective is that states frequently contract with other international actors in both the economic and security spheres, despite the uncertainty and distributional pressures that the anarchic international system generates. As we shall see across the areas of international security and economy, states regularly and voluntarily divide and cede their sovereignty in both bilateral and multilateral settings.

Our book has two key aims. First, we wish to delineate how a particular sovereign governance structure emerges. Second, we will show how choices made at a given point in time have important downstream consequences that may not be readily apparent to the contracting parties at the time of the initial agreement.

We argue that incomplete contracting theory can clarify how and why states choose to bundle and unbundle their sovereignty, what the dynamics will likely be of future renegotiation, why some agreements are more readily achieved than others, and why some of these incomplete contracts might unravel. Incomplete contracting theory can shed light on many diverse governance structures, and we will highlight the relevance of our theory by looking in depth at imperial and postcolonial relations, overseas military basing agreements, and regional integration.

The Importance of Incomplete Contracting in International Politics

Agreements such as the end of formal U.S. occupation of Iraq or the European Union's draft constitution are incomplete contracts. Although both agreements transfer significant elements of sovereignty among international actors, many clauses of these treaties and accords remain initially unspecified or are deferred for future negotiation.

Theories of incomplete contracting are particularly instructive for explaining the organizational boundaries of the international system. Kenneth Waltz's seminal work on international politics draws on the concept of market competition as an analogy for state competition, but the international system more closely resembles an imperfect market than a perfect market. In international relations, anarchy generates a tremendous degree of uncertainty and informational asymmetries about the actions and intentions of political actors. The lack of a central governing authority ensures that states must be wary of the long-term distributional consequences of their actions and be hesitant to commit to long-term agreements. 15 Moreover, states cannot take for granted that other international actors will honor agreements, especially when they lack well-established domestic institutions such as constitutions or electoral systems that help establish this credibility. As David Lake notes, "opportunism is ubiquitous in international relations." This imposes significant costs on the actions of political actors. Even when ceding authority to an international institution, states consciously design rules and procedures for international institutions so that they can adapt to changing circumstances.

In such an environment, incomplete contracts offer two important advantages for states. First, incomplete contracts delineate general principles and broad goals to which states can aspire. Given that actors cannot foresee, anticipate, or describe every possible contingency that may arise, general framing agreements are more likely to be initially accepted than a complete contract, and states will be willing to defer the negotiation of more intricate details to a later stage. Second, contractual renegotiation acts as an important institutional check on the future behavior of actors. As has been argued elsewhere in reference to international regimes, renegotiation increases the iteration among actors and ensures that problems of information and verification that pertain to the initial contract can be identified and resolved and/or redefined. Incomplete contracts also offer states added flexibility to correct for distributional asymmetries that may arise as the result of the initial agreement.

In short, incomplete contracts between states are framework agreements that do not fully apportion sovereignty. Instead, such agreements make the distribution and allocation of sovereign rights a matter of ongoing negotiation between the contracting parties or between those parties and a third party, such as a supranational organization.

Hypocritical Agreements?

Existing theories of international relations are not particularly concerned with explaining the dynamics of such mixed forms of sovereignty and the political uncertainty generated by "incomplete" agreements. The prevailing view among international relations scholars is that such modified forms of sovereignty are largely insignificant and do not alter the fundamental capacities and preferences of states. Stephen Krasner perhaps best summarizes this consensus by arguing that the institution of sovereignty is given lip service by the international community but is consistently violated by powerful political actors. From this perspective, the nominal sovereignty of Iraq is of little practical consequence, as the United States is still able to exert its power and impose its preferences on the country. Similarly, the EU Constitution is relatively insignificant given that it still allows countries to opt out or veto EU decisions, especially in the realm of security policy. For skeptics of international institutions, contractual arrangements are secondary to the national interest and capabilities of the powerful actors entering these arrangements.

But while sovereignty, at times, may seem like "organized hypocrisy," its mere violation, erosion, or compromise does not necessarily diminish its causal significance. By thinking in the strict binary terms of "full sovereignty" or "violations of sovereignty"-or "autonomy" and "hierarchy"-scholars have neglected the many mixed forms of sovereignty, split property rights, and hybrid governance arrangements that have historically proliferated through the international system. While we agree with the aim of prevailing attempts to explain the dynamics of nonsovereign forms of governance such as supranationalism and empire with organizational theory, especially transaction costs theory and relational contracting, we regard the strict anarchy/hierarchy distinction as unable to capture many of the nuanced forms of sovereignty that are critical for understanding many forms of international organization and governance.

From a practical perspective, understanding the various ways in which sovereignty can be bundled and unbundled underscores how states can potentially develop creative and new non-conflictual institutional solutions to problems that surround their sovereignty such as territorial partition. Often the sovereignty-related underlying sources of conflicts among states-contested assets, territory, borders, and functions-can all be split, shared, and reapportioned in a mutually beneficial manner. States can agree to lease or use an asset or piece of territory for a specified duration or during a transitional period before exclusive sovereignty arrangements are finalized. Delegation of a certain state function to a third-party organization can bind both parties to a common set of principles and procedures. The malleability of sovereignty and partial sovereign arrangements may thus help foster stability and orderly arrangements in international politics. Forms of hybrid sovereignty may provide additional institutional solutions for competing states to avert the high costs of conflict.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from CONTRACTING STATESby Alexander Cooley Hendrik Spruyt Copyright © 2009 by Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission.
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