TRANSFIGURATION

THE Middle East war of June 1967 was a watershed in Soviet-Egyptian relations. In the ensuing months, Moscow assumed commitments far greater than any it had previously undertaken in quest of imperial objectives in the Third World: the arms deal of September 1955 and the building of the Aswan High Dam in the 1960s were by comparison low-risk, uncomplicated initiatives whose dramatic impact overshadowed their actual strategic significance. After the June War, the Soviet Union became Egypt's benefactor, munificent but calculating, supportive but ambitious and sometimes overbearing. This ever-changing relationship acquired global importance, affecting as it did issues of war and peace and the superpower détente.

In the following pages the historical background is presented with the purpose of delineating the relationships and outlooks that serve as the starting point for our study of the Soviet-Egyp- tian influence relationship.

DEFEAT

Shortly after the outbreak of fighting in the early hours of June 5, 1967, the Kremlin activated the "hot line" to Washington for the first time. Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin "expressed Soviet concern over the fighting," called on the United States to make Israel desist from its attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and stated Moscow's intention to seek a cease-fire through the United Nations. Later in the day, the Soviet government denounced the Israeli "aggression" in a statement that criticized the encouragement given by the "covert and overt actions of certain imperialist circles." It affirmed the "resolute support" of the USSR for the Arab governments and peoples, demanded that Israel "stop immediately and unconditionally its military actions ... and pull back its troops beyond the truce line," and ended on the ominous note: "The Soviet Government reserves the right to take all steps that may be necessitated by the situation." In the United Nations, the Soviet delegation proposed a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, condemnation of Israel, and a full Israeli withdrawal. Egypt (and the other Arab states), however, opposed any ceasefire because in Cairo Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir was still being told by his Military Operations Command that an Egyptian counterattack was imminent and that the campaign was far from lost.

On the morning of June 6, Cairo and Damascus broke off diplomatic relations with the United States and Great Britain, accusing them of collusion with Israel, of "taking part in the Israeli military aggression insofar as the air operations are concerned." In Moscow, Egyptian Ambassador Muhammad Murad Ghaleb met with Premier Kosygin and urged prompt Soviet support. Kosygin again exchanged views with President Lyndon B. Johnson via the h