THE PROTESTANT CHALLENGE

I: Reformation versus Enlightenment

If we are to have a clearer idea of the problems facing rationalism in seventeenth-century England, it is necessary to have a more precise account of the limitations placed upon reason in Protestantism. But simply to pose this task is to walk into a minefield. The problem of the relationship between rationalism and Protestantism has been much disputed ever since the publication in 1904 of Max Weber's Die protestantische Ethik una der Geist des Kapitalismus.

It is not my aim here, however, to reopen Weber's question in all its complexity and depth. I wish to consider only one specific aspect of this wider problem: the relationship between the radical criticism of the Enlightenment and early Protestantism. By 'early Protestantism' I mean primarily the theology of Luther and Calvin. I wish to exclude, however, 'later Protestantism', the theology developed in the seventeenth century by the Puritans and Arminians.

For our purposes, it is especially important to consider early Protestantism, particularly the theology of Luther and Calvin. This is for two reasons. First, as already noted, some of its central tenets were enshrined in the 39 Articles of the Church of England, so that it represents the orthodox and official position of the Church. Second, much of the theological and philosophical foundation for the early Protestant attitude toward reason—even that in spiritualism and biblicism—are especially clear in the theology of Luther and Calvin. It is not advisable, as is sometimes done, to take as our starting point the later Puritan theologians of the seventeenth century. The problem with this approach is that the work of these authors is either derivative or heterodox. In the first case, it is best to return to fundamentals; and in the second case, their heterodoxy constitutes the very problem to be explained. If we examine only later Puritan and Arminian writers, then there is the danger of anachronism, of imposing later rationalist views upon the early doctrines of Luther and Calvin. The student of early English rationalism does well to revive that old humanist battle cry: Ad Fontes!

As soon as we look at the early theology of the Reformation, it becomes clear that it posed a grave challenge to the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Luther and Calvin firmly upheld doctrines that conflict with the principle of the sovereignty of reason. These doctrines include the following:

1. That all human powers have been utterly corrupted by the Fall, so that it is not possible for man to attain salvation through his own efforts, or to know God through his natural reason.

2. That the sphere of reason is possible experience alone, so that it cannot discover, explain, demonstrate, or refute any belief concerning the supernatural and spiritual realm beyond it.

3. That the true meaning of the Bible cannot be understood by reason but by the spirit alone.

4. That God completely transcends the nature of man, and is different from him not only in degree but also in kind, so that to apply rational discourse to him is only to indulge in anthropomorphisms.

If we consider all these points, then it becomes clear that the early theology of the Reformation cannot be regarded as the forerunner, still less as the foundation, of modern rationalism. Rather, it is its antithesis, indeed its nemesis, an attempt to revive the spirit and outlook of medieval Augustinianism. Luther's and Calvin's aim was to restore this Augustinian tradition—its teachings concerning faith, grace, sin, and predestination—by purging it of all its pagan and scholastic accretions. They wanted to reinstate Augustine's strict and severe dualism between the earthly and heavenly cities, which had been obscured by Aquinas's synthesis of Christianity and paganism. Early Reformation theology was essentially de-Platonized or nominalized Augustinianism. It was Augustine as he was appropriated by the strict and severe nominalist schools of the later Middle Ages, especially the Schola Augustiniana Moderna. A greater antithesis to the later rationalism of the Enlightenment can scarcely be imagined.

Luther's and Calvin's theology makes it clear, then, that the Reformation is not simply the anticipation of, or preparation for, the Enlightenment. There are indeed some respects in which this is true: the Enlightenment values of freedom and equality can trace some of their origins back to Luther's ideals of the liberty of a Christian and the priesthood of all believers. But there are also other respects in which this is false: the severe restrictions that Luther and Calvin place upon the critical use of reason. The faith in reason of the early English Enlightenment could emerge after only the most bitter and protracted struggle against these limitations.

It is easy to overlook this source of friction between the Reformation and the Enlightenment. Often it is said that Luther paved the way for Enlightenment rationalism by giving every individual freedom to believe according to the light of conscience. According to this view, there is a continuous development from the freedom of conscience of the Reformation to the freedom of thought of the Enlightenment. Such an interpretation would not seem so plausible if it were not for the fact that it had been endorsed by so many of the English freethinkers and German Aufklärer. As at least nominal Protestants, they were eager to claim Luther as their forefather because his name gave such a powerful sanction to their own thinking. Luther was their guiding light because—so they believed—he freed individuals from the yoke of ecclesiastical authority and allowed them to think for themselves.

This view of the Reformation largely rests upon an anachronistic interpretation of Luther's and Calvin's intentions. The freethinkers and Aufklärer could embrace Luther only by tendentiousiy reading their own principles into him. If we consider some of Luther's early writings, then it is indeed the case that his aim was to free the individual from the authority of the Roman Catholic Church. According to the young Luther, every individual has the right to judge the Church by the light of Scripture since it, and not the popes, Councils, or Fathers, is the ultimate arbiter of the faith. But such freedom is still very far from—and, indeed, in some respects opposed to—the principle of the sovereignty of reason so characteristic of the Enlightenment. This principle demands that we subject all beliefs to criticism, even those contained in Scripture. But the reformers, though they urged the individual to criticize all beliefs according to the Bible, forbade him to criticize the Bible itself, which was their final court of appeal. To be sure, Luther and Calvin had themselves...