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Elisabeth R. Gerber, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, studies the consequences of U.S. election laws on interest representation. She is currently working on a major study of primary election laws in the American states.

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"Gerber's key finding--that citizen interest groups are more effective in using the initiative to alter the status quo, and that economic groups are more effective at preserving it--is an important amendment to the popular perception that interest groups now control the initiative process."--Bruce E. Cain, University of California, Berkeley

"The questions raised in The Populist Paradox are fundamental to our understanding of elections and representation and to the roles of citizens, organized interests, and elected officials. The book is well written and extremely well organized."--Frank R. Baumgartner, Pennsylvania State University

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THE POPULIST PARADOX

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

List of Figures...................................................ixList of Tables....................................................xiAcknowledgments...................................................xiii1. What Is the Populist Paradox?..................................32. Interest Group Choice..........................................213. Direct Legislation Hurdles.....................................374. Group Characteristics and Resources............................595. Motivations and Strategies.....................................766. Direct Policy Consequences.....................................1017. Indirect Policy Consequences...................................1218. The Populist Paradox: Reality or Illusion?.....................137Appendixes........................................................147A. Direct Legislation Institutions................................147B. Survey of Organizations........................................152References........................................................159Index.............................................................165

Chapter One

Among the difficulties encountered by the [Constitutional] convention, a very important one must have lain in combining the requisite stability and energy in government with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican form. —James Madison, The Federalist Papers

All democracies face a fundamental problem in deciding how much political participation to allow and by whom. As Madison noted, perhaps the most fundamental trade-off in designing democratic government rests between limiting participation to ensure "stability and energy in government" and expanding participation to promote liberty. Disagreement over the proper balance between limiting and expanding participation was at the root of some of the most famous debates of the constitutional period. It continues to this day.

To Madison, the greatest threat to a democracy was the destabilizing potential of broad participation in government. He argued that "measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority" (James Madison in Hamilton et al. 1961, p. 77). To mitigate the destabilizing potential of mass participation, and to protect minority interests, Madison advocated checks, balances, and a representative form of government.

All across America, and at all levels of government, the institutionalization of Madisonian ideals limited the power of the majority. In fact, these limits were so effective that over the past two hundred years, citizens have periodically felt it necessary to counteract excessive minority control. Perhaps the most important such attempt occurred at the dawn of the twentieth century. At that time, activists in many American states advocated direct legislation as a way to dilute the increasing power of narrow industry-based interest groups.

Direct legislation is policy making at the ballot box. The two types of direct legislation are initiatives (laws initiated by citizens and then put to a popular vote) and referendums (laws initiated by the legislature and then ratified or rejected by voters). Direct legislation's early advocates argued that allowing citizens to make policy would shift the balance of power from narrow economic interests to broader-based concerns. These early advocates emerged from and embodied several different reform movements.

In the late nineteenth century, the Populists mobilized in reaction to rapid industrialization and consequent economic dislocation. The Populists argued for a simpler, nonindustrial way of life, promoting laws that benefited agrarian and nonindustrial interests such as public ownership of the railroads and a graduated income tax. The Populists claimed that because the major political parties were beholden to corporate interests, they would block any attempt to reverse the effects of industrialization. To circumvent the parties, the Populists advocated direct legislation as a way to empower "plain people" to pass these policies.

A decade or so later, the Progressive movement emerged in the American West and Midwest. Like the Populists, the Progressives were concerned about the increasing political power of concentrated wealth. They claimed that corporate money in politics corrupted politicians, parties, and the political process. They advocated direct legislation as a way to neutralize corruption and to pass laws that promoted middle-class values.

Although the Progressive goal of reducing corruption differed significantly from the Populist goal of returning to a simpler way of life, reformers from both movements were motivated by a common belief that narrow economic interests made state legislatures unresponsive to broader interests. Both saw the promise of direct legislation as providing citizens with a means for regaining control of the legislative process. Since its inception, however, many observers have questioned whether this promise has been met. Contemporary observers argue that just as wealthy interests manipulated state legislatures early in this century, their modern counterparts manipulate direct legislation today (see, e.g., California Commission on Campaign Financing 1992).

The evidence most often offered in support of these claims is the enormous level of spending in direct legislation campaigns. In the 1988 California general election, for example, supporters and opponents of the twenty-nine statewide ballot propositions spent over $129 million to promote their causes (California Fair Political Practices Commission 1988b). Critics were outraged, calling the level of spending "obscene" and "scandalous." But the 1988 election was no anomaly. Viewed from a longer time perspective, we see that 1988 reflected the continuation of a spending trend that began in the late 1970s. In 1976, proponents and opponents spent approximately $9 million on statewide initiative campaigns in California (California Commission on Campaign Financing 1992). By 1986, this figure grew to $34 million. Spending peaked in 1988 and 1990, with $127 million and $110 million spent, respectively. Although spending on initiative campaigns has dropped off to some extent since 1990, it continues well above its pre-1988 levels. Spending in other states has reached staggering levels as well. Proponents and opponents spent more than $15 million in the campaigns for and against Washington's twelve initiatives between 1990 and 1994 (Washington Secretary of State 1990–1994). Average per-measure spending on Michigan's four statewide initiatives in 1992 was more than $5 million (Michigan Secretary of State 1992).

These expensive campaigns have led some critics to suspect that wealthy interests are using direct legislation to buy favorable policy at the ballot box. They fear that, despite the efforts of the Populist and Progressive reformers, the balance between citizen and economic interests has shifted too far in the direction of the economic interests. According to this view, direct legislation has paradoxically become a powerful instrument of wealthy interest groups rather than a popular balance against these groups. As Larry Berg and...