Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry - Hardcover

Gupta's book is a philosophical supernova, throwing bright new light on a number of important problems. It proposes a novel answer to the age-old question of how conscious experience contributes to the rationality of empirical beliefs. Vast in scope, breathtakingly original, outstandingly rigorous, and infused with a relentless intelligence, this book will be welcomed by epistemologists, metaphysicians, and philosophers of language, logic, mind, and perception.--Christopher Hill, Brown University This is a wonderful book. Anil Gupta offers a brilliant logical reconstruction of empirical reasoning that highlights the interdependence between the contributions of perceptual experience and of the subject's antecedent world view, and elucidates precisely his novel conceptions of experiential presentation and perceptual appearance. His own original and compelling account is clearly located in relation to important alternative approaches, to the great illumination and benefit of anyone working in the area.--Bill Brewer, King's College London

A distinguished philosopher offers a novel account of experience and reason, and develops our understanding of conscious experience and its relationship to thought: a new reformed empiricism. The role of experience in cognition is a central and ancient philosophical concern. How, theorists ask, can our private experiences guide us to knowledge of a mind-independent reality? Exploring topics in logic, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, Conscious Experience proposes a new answer to this age-old question, explaining how conscious experience contributes to the rationality and content of empirical beliefs. According to Anil Gupta, this contribution cannot be determined independently of an agent's conceptual scheme and prior beliefs, but that doesn't mean it is entirely mind-dependent. While the rational contribution of an experience is not propositional-it does not, for example, provide direct knowledge of the world-it does authorize certain transitions from prior views to new views. In short, the rational contribution of an experience yields a rule for revising views. Gupta shows that this account provides theoretical freedom: it allows the observer to radically reconceive the world in light of empirical findings. Simultaneously, it grants empirical reason significant power to constrain, forcing particular conceptions of self and world on the rational inquirer. These seemingly contrary virtues are reconciled through novel treatments of presentation, appearances, and ostensive definitions. Collectively, Gupta's arguments support an original theory: reformed empiricism. He abandons the idea that experience is a source of knowledge and justification. He also abandons the idea that concepts are derived from experience. But reformed empiricism preserves empiricism's central insight: experience is the supreme epistemic authority. In the resolution of factual disagreements, experience trumps all.