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Inhaltsangabe
In this volume, Michael Jensen and his collaborators present the foundations of an integrated theory of organizations. The theory assumes: that organizations are equilibrium systems that, like markets, can be influenced but cannot be told what to do; that human beings are rational and self-interested for the most part; and that information is costly to produce and transfer among agents. The theory also treats business organizations as entities existing in a system of markets (including financial, product, labour, and materials markets) that must be considered in the formulation of organizational strategy. Jensen argues that the cost of transferring information makes it necessary to decentralize some decision rights in organizations and in the economy. This decentralization in turn requires organizations to solve the control problem that results when self-interested persons do not behave as perfect agents. Capitalist economies solve these control problems through the institution of alienable decision rights. But because organizations must suppress the alienability of decision rights, they must devise substitute mechanisms that perform its functions. Jensen argues that three critical systems, which he calls the organizational rules of the game, are necessary to substitute for alienability in organizations: a system for allocating decision rights among agents in the firm; a system for measuring and evaluating performance in the firm; and a system for rewarding and punishing individuals for their performance. These concepts should offer a major competitive advantage for organizations.
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Críticas
This is the first time we have had a virtually complete exposition of Jensen's approach to what has become known as 'positivist agency theory' between one set of hard covers. It should thus be extremely welcome to every scholar who wishes to incorporate an agency perspective in his or her work...Jensen's book is a powerful tool in understanding the implications of this. -- Arthur Francis "Times Higher Education Supplement" A lively collection of a dozen essays spanning over twenty years of original thinking and outstanding scholarship by one of Harvard's foremost professors. Jensen attacks such diverse issues as the nature of man, the theory of the firm, residual claims and organizational form, agency costs, executive compensation, and organizational performance measurement... This book is a collection of insightful concepts drawn from years of teaching and research. It is a coherent, orderly, economic explanation of how and why firms organize and the challenges inherent in small and large businesses. In "Foundations of Organizational Strategy," Jensen opens the 'black box' of the organization and provides a coherent and logical framework for understanding how and why organizations develop and operate in the market. His attempt succeeds admirably and will reward the reader with not only concepts and models of theoretical organizational behavior but also keen insight applicable in day-to-day organizational endeavors. -- Edward J. Smith "Business Economics"
Reseña del editor
In this volume, Michael Jensen and his collaborators present the foundations of an integrated theory of organizations. The theory assumes: that organizations are equilibrium systems that, like markets, can be influenced but cannot be told what to do; that human beings are rational and self-interested for the most part; and that information is costly to produce and transfer among agents. The theory also treats business organizations as entities existing in a system of markets (including financial, product, labour, and materials markets) that must be considered in the formulation of organizational strategy. Jensen argues that the cost of transferring information makes it necessary to decentralize some decision rights in organizations and in the economy. This decentralization in turn requires organizations to solve the control problem that results when self-interested persons do not behave as perfect agents. Capitalist economies solve these control problems through the institution of alienable decision rights. But because organizations must suppress the alienability of decision rights, they must devise substitute mechanisms that perform its functions. Jensen argues that three critical systems, which he calls the organizational rules of the game, are necessary to substitute for alienability in organizations: a system for allocating decision rights among agents in the firm; a system for measuring and evaluating performance in the firm; and a system for rewarding and punishing individuals for their performance. These concepts should offer a major competitive advantage for organizations.
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Foundations of Organizational Strategy
Verlag:
Harvard University Press, 1998
ISBN 10: 0674643429
ISBN 13: 9780674643420
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Hardcover. Zustand: As New. No Jacket. Pages are clean and are not marred by notes or folds of any kind. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 1.75. Artikel-Nr. G0674643429I2N00
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Foundations of Organizational Strategy
Verlag:
Harvard University Press, 1998
ISBN 10: 0674643429
ISBN 13: 9780674643420
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Hardcover
Anbieter: ThriftBooks-Atlanta, AUSTELL, GA, USA
Verkäuferbewertung 5 von 5 Sternen
Hardcover. Zustand: Very Good. No Jacket. Former library book; Missing dust jacket; May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 1.75. Artikel-Nr. G0674643429I4N11
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Foundations of Organizational Strategy.
Verlag:
Harvard University Press, 1998
ISBN 10: 0674643429
ISBN 13: 9780674643420
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Hardcover
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Verkäuferbewertung 4 von 5 Sternen
Zustand: as new. Cambridge, MA. : Harvard University Press, 1998. Hardcover. Dustjacket. 422 pp. In this volume, Michael Jensen and his collaborators present the foundations of an integrated theory of organizations. The theory assumes: that organizations are equilibrium systems that, like markets, can be influenced but cannot be told what to do; that human beings are rational and self-interested for the most part; and that information is costly to produce and transfer among agents. The theory also treats business organizations as entities existing in a system of markets (including financial, product, labour, and materials markets) that must be considered in the formulation of organizational strategy. Jensen argues that the cost of transferring information makes it necessary to decentralize some decision rights in organizations and in the economy. This decentralization in turn requires organizations to solve the control problem that results when self-interested persons do not behave as perfect agents. Capitalist economies solve these control problems through the institution of alienable decision rights. But because organizations must suppress the alienability of decision rights, they must devise substitute mechanisms that perform its functions. Jensen argues that three critical systems, which he calls the organizational rules of the game, are necessary to substitute for alienability in organizations: a system for allocating decision rights among agents in the firm; a system for measuring and evaluating performance in the firm; and a system for rewarding and punishing individuals for their performance. These concepts should offer a major competitive advantage for organizations. Condition : as new copy. ISBN 9780674643420. Keywords : ECONOMICS, Organizational behavior. Artikel-Nr. 280967
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