A study of the theory of bargaining and voting power and how it applies to real decision-making contexts.
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Annick Laruelle is Associated Professor at the University of Caen Basse-Normandie. Federico Valenciano is Professor of Mathematics and Game Theory at the University of the Basque Country, Bilbao.
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Zustand: New. A study of the theory of bargaining and voting power and how it applies to real decision-making contexts. Num Pages: 204 pages, 5 figures 5 graphs. BIC Classification: GPQ. Category: (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 13. Weight in Grams: 440. . 2008. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Artikel-Nr. V9780521873871
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Zustand: Hervorragend. Zustand: Hervorragend | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | A study of the theory of bargaining and voting power and how it applies to real decision-making contexts. Artikel-Nr. 4359064/1
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Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Every day thousands of decisions are made by all kinds of committees, parliaments, councils and boards by a 'yes-no' voting process. Sometimes a committee can only accept or reject the proposals submitted to it for a decision. On other occasions, committee members have the possibility of modifying the proposal and bargaining an agreement prior to the vote. In either case, what rule should be used if each member acts on behalf of a different-sized group It seems intuitively clear that if the groups are of different sizes then a symmetric rule (e.g. the simple majority or unanimity) is not suitable. The question then arises of what voting rule should be used. Voting and Collective Decision-Making addresses this and other issues through a study of the theory of bargaining and voting power, showing how it applies to real decision-making contexts. Artikel-Nr. 9780521873871
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