Volume 5 of the Official History of Intelligence in the Second World War, Strategic Deception, brings the series to an end. It complements Volume 4 which describes the activities of Nazi agents who had been persuaded to work for the Allies by considering how their work for the Allied side was turned to direct military advantage. Strategic deception depends for its success on the availability of good security and good intelligence. The first three volumes of the series described the intelligence channels that gave the Allies their incomparable insight into enemy capabilities and intentions. The fourth described the high level of security achieved within the United Kingdom. Volume 5 explains how this combination of intelligence and security made it possible to deceive the enemy about the strategic intentions of the Allies, and make them greatly overestimate the resources at their disposal. The authoritative story of such classic deception operations as Operation Mincemeat, which preceded the invasion of Sicily; of the non-existent U.S. Army group that pinned down an entire German Army in the Pas de Calais until Montgomery's forces had achieved a secure foothold in Normandy; and the amazing spoof played on the German intelligence authorities by the great double agent GARBO is at last told from official records.
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Hardcover. Zustand: Very Good. Immediate dispatch from Somerset. Nice book in great condition. Pages in excellent condition. No notes or highlighting. See images. Fantastic book. About the book >.>.> All surprise rests upon concealment, and 'security' is one of the classi- cal 'principles of war'. But few intelligent commanders have been satis- fied simply with concealing their intentions or their strength. The commander who wishes to impose his will on the enemy which is, after all, the object of all military operations will seek also to deceive him; to implant in the adversary's mind an erroneous image which will not only help to conceal his true capabilities and intentions but will lead that adversary to act in such a way as to make his own task easier. If he is weak he will seek to give an appearance of strength that will deter his adversary from attacking. If an attack is clearly inevi- table he may try to manipulate it by giving a false impression of weakness at a particular point well prepared to defend itself, and of strength at one which is not. If he is taking the offensive he will try to weaken the enemy at the point chosen for the attack by feints at other parts of the front. He will, in shor. Artikel-Nr. Batch-FM482-VG-10726
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