Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Von der hinteren Coverseite

Fifteen minutes before five o'clock on Good Friday 1998, Senator George Mitchell was informed that his long and difficult quest for an Irish peace effort had succeeded -- the Protestants and Catholics of Northern Ireland, and the governments of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, would sign the agreement. Now Mitchell, who served as independent chairman of the peace talks for the length of the process, tells us the inside story of the grueling road to this momentous accord and the subsequent developments that may threaten, or strengthen, the chance for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Auszug. © Genehmigter Nachdruck. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

Making Peace

University of California Press

Excerpt

Although I didn't realize it at the time, my journey to Northern Ireland beganin December 1982, when I decided that I would limit the time of my service inthe United States Senate. I had been appointed to the Senate in May 1980 tocomplete the unexpired term of Edmund Muskie, who resigned to become secretaryof state. His Senate term continued through 1982, giving me two and a half yearsto demonstrate to the people of Maine that I deserved election in my own rightto a full six-year term. As it turned out, I needed every bit of that time.

Appointed senators rarely win election on their own, and it looked as though Iwould continue that tradition. Throughout 1980 and 1981, Maine's two members ofthe House of Representatives, both Republicans, jockeyed for position in whatwas widely perceived as the sure thing of defeating me. In May 1981 one of them,David Emery, released a public opinion poll which showed him trouncing me by 61percent to 25 percent?a thirty-six-point spread. Not to be outdone, the otherHouse member, Olympia Snowe, announced a poll which had her ahead of me bythirty-three points. Kenneth Curtis, a former governor, then stated that he wasconsidering running against me in the Democratic primary. He cited yet anotherpoll, showing him leading by twenty-two points.

Publication of the polls produced the intended and predictable result: anavalanche of negative news reports and a growing uneasiness among Democratsabout the viability of my candidacy. I had been working hard for a year, but theonly response to my political problems I could devise was to work even harder.

I had been traveling around the state, speaking at service clubs and highschools and going to bean suppers. But these were random appearances, usually inresponse to invitations I received. I now began a systematic effort to visitevery service club, high school, hospital, grange hall, senior citizens center,and manufacturing facility in the state. Instead of eight to ten public eventseach weekend I attended twelve to fifteen. I also increased the time I devotedto researching and studying each issue on which the Senate voted.

It was an extremely difficult year. I was usually tired, often discouraged,always anxious. But I never felt that my situation was hopeless; I never lostfaith in myself or my principles.

Over time, my prospects improved. Curtis decided, for health reasons, not toseek the nomination. Snowe deferred to Emery and withdrew from consideration. Itwas then Emery's bad luck that the incumbent Republican administration, andthose candidates associated with it, were held responsible for the worseningeconomy. Late in the campaign the tide turned decisively in my favor. In theelection I received 61 percent of the votes.

Among the lessons I learned from this experience were the importance of having aplan and sticking to it while retaining the flexibility to make adjustments ascircumstances change; the necessity of total commitment; and the need forpatience and perseverance to overcome the inevitable setbacks. These are notbrilliant insights, but rather the kind of common sense that is oftenoverwhelmed by panic at the first sign of adversity.

Shortly after the election I began to think seriously about my future in theSenate. I had seen many senators become totally consumed by the institution. Inow realized that I had become one of them. I worked seven days a week, twelveto fourteen hours a day. My marriage suffered, my other interests atrophied.Since I had just received a sizeable majority of the vote after serving as anappointed senator for less than a full term, I was confident that with a fullterm I could establish myself so solidly that I could win re-election in thefuture. (My analysis was correct. In 1988 I received 81 percent of the vote, thehighest percentage ever achieved by a candidate in a contested statewideelection in Maine history.) But the more I thought about it, the more deeply Ifelt that I should not try to make the Senate a lifetime career. On ChristmasDay, 1982, I decided to term-limit myself. It was a private decision. I kept itto myself for eleven years.

Just after Christmas in 1993, I decided that the time had come to leave theSenate. In late February 1994 I notified my staff and asked them to makepreparations for a public announcement. March 5 was chosen as the date, Portlandas the place.

On the morning of March 4, I videotaped a five-minute statement to be broadcastthroughout Maine the next day. Although I ordinarily could do tapes on the firsttry, I needed three takes for this one. I found, to my surprise, that it washard to say the words now, when it really counted, as opposed to when I had beenjust thinking about it. The final tape was barely acceptable, definitely not oneof my best efforts.

That evening I went to the White House. By coincidence I had been invited toattend a small dinner in the First Family's living quarters, and I sat next toPresident Clinton. Near the end of the dinner I asked if I could speak to himprivately for a few minutes. He suggested I join him in his study, where wetalked for two and a half hours. The president was obviously surprised when Itold him of my plans. He first tried to get me to change my mind. During theconversation he asked me, "If in the future something comes up where I think youcan be of assistance, would you be willing to help? Or are you just turned offof politics?" I told him that I was not turned off, that I loved public service,and that I would be happy to help on anything he thought was important. Hedidn't mention Northern Ireland, and it never crossed my mind. But on thatevening, without realizing it, I took the second step on my journey to NorthernIreland.

On November 1 President Clinton issued a statement on Northern Ireland. It waspart of a continuing process under which, for the first time, the problems therewere given a high priority by an American administration. In the statement heannounced his intention to sponsor a White House Conference on Trade andInvestment in Northern Ireland. It was to be part of a strategy to support theeffort to bring peace to that troubled land by encouraging economic growth andjob creation.

In early December I was asked by a member of the White House staff if I wouldundertake a diplomatic mission on behalf of the president. When I asked what itwould involve, he said it would require all my time. I told him that wasn'tpossible. I was to be married on December 10 and was planning to return toprivate life. I was interested in doing something involving public policy, but Iwasn't interested in anything that was a full-time job.

Later, I was shown the president's November 1 statement on Northern Ireland andwas asked if I had any interest in getting involved there. Although I had neverbeen to Northern Ireland, I was generally aware of the situation. I asked, "Isthe president planning to appoint an envoy to Northern Ireland?" Not an envoy, Iwas told, because that was a sensitive subject with the British government. "Buthe does want someone to put together a trade conference in Washington in thespring. That would take just a few days of your time. Would you do it?" I said Iwould think about it and get back to him. I talked with friends at the StateDepartment and on the National Security Council staff at the White House. I alsodiscussed it with Heather. The task seemed interesting and undemanding, and itwould be over in a few months, so later I called back and said I would take iton. I had taken the third step on my journey to Northern Ireland.

I left the Senate on January 2, 1995. Seven days later I was sworn in as thespecial advisor to the president and the secretary of state on economicinitiatives in Ireland. The title was long and vague enough not to be offensiveto the British government, or to anyone else. My mission was simple: organize aconference in Washington on trade and investment in Northern Ireland and the sixcounties in the Republic of Ireland which border on the north. I was given anoffice in the State Department and the authority to hire a small staff. I askedMartha Pope to join me. She had been a member of my Senate staff since 1981,rising to the position of chief of staff. I had then appointed her Senatesergeant at arms, the first woman to hold that position. She didn't know anymore about Northern Ireland than I did, but I trusted her judgment and herintegrity; in the years to come, both were to prove invaluable, to her, to me,and to the cause of peace in Northern Ireland. The State Department assignedDavid Pozorski to my staff. He was a career foreign service officer, insightfuland methodical. For a brief time he served as acting U.S. consul in Belfast, andhe knows the politicians and the issues there. Later, when the negotiationsbegan, I was joined by Kelly Currie, who had worked for a time on my Senatestaff. He had left to attend law school and now practices with a large firm inNew York. He took a leave of absence to spend two years in Belfast. He isintelligent and gets along very well with people. Pope, Pozorski, and Currieformed a dedicated, able staff, and they deserve a lot of credit for whatevereffect I had on the peace process.

A month later I made my first trip to Northern Ireland. At the time I thought itwould be my last, and I remember it vividly. I had lived in Berlin and wasfamiliar with the Berlin Wall. But I had never heard of the "Peace Line." When Iwent to it for the first time, I was taken aback.

The Peace Line is a wall that stands up to thirty feet high, is topped in someplaces with barbed wire, and goes right through the middle of Belfast?throughurban streets, even through buildings. It is one of the most depressingstructures I've ever seen. To call it the Peace Line is a huge irony. The name,presumably, is born of the notion that peace can be achieved by building a wallbetween two warring communities, in this case unionists, who are predominantlyProtestant, and nationalists, who are predominantly Catholic. Unfortunately, ifpeople are determined enough, they can get around, through, and over a wall, andenough of them did so in Northern Ireland to keep the fires of conflict burning.I hope and pray that I live to see the day when the Peace Line goes the way ofthe Berlin Wall: its destruction will be the symbolic end of an age of conflict.

On my first day in Belfast I met with two groups of local officials, businessmenand -women, and the leaders of community and development organizations. Onegroup was nationalist, on their side of the Peace Line. The other was unionist,on their side. I was told that the groups had little or no contact orcommunication with each other. Yet, to my surprise, they both conveyedessentially the same message. With charts, graphs, and slides, in persuasivepresentations, they told me that in Belfast there is a high correlation betweenunemployment and violence; that unless jobs become available to the young men ofthe inner city, there cannot be a durable peace. As I sat and listened, Ithought I could just as well be in New York, Detroit, Johannesburg, Manila, orany other big city in the world.

The aspirations of people the world over are the same. To satisfy thoseaspirations they need work. Jobs. Good jobs. Good-paying jobs. Fathers andmothers must be able to satisfy the economic needs of their families: housing,food, health care, education, recreation. They also have to be able to satisfytheir own emotional need for productive work, for self-respect, for meaning intheir lives.

The dispute in Northern Ireland is not purely or even primarily economic inorigin or nature. There are many other strands to this complex conflict. It is,of course, in part religious. It is also very much about national identity:Protestants overwhelmingly want Northern Ireland to remain part of the UnitedKingdom, in union with England, Scotland, and Wales; thus they are calledunionists. Catholics generally want Northern Ireland to become part of a unitedIreland; they are called nationalists. But economic deprivation is acontributing factor in the problems in Northern Ireland. Along the Falls Road inBelfast, where the working-class Catholic families congregate, and the ShankillRoad, where their Protestant counterparts live, some estimates suggest that asmany as a third of the men are born, live out their lives, and die without everhaving held a job. For some of these men, I was told, membership in aparamilitary organization offers steady pay and a status that they cannototherwise achieve. For others, patriotism or idealism or revenge may besufficient motivation. It is possible, of course, that some are driven by all ofthese factors and others as well.

On this first trip I gained a sense of the importance attached to Americaninvolvement in Northern Ireland. Although my role was minor, there was extensivemedia coverage of every meeting; my discussions with the community groups werecarried live on the radio. I met for the first time many of the men I would cometo know well in the coming years: the political leaders of Northern Ireland. Iwas impressed by their involvement in economic issues, by their candor, and bythe extent of their mistrust of "the other side." Most of them were blunt intheir negative assessments of the other politicians in Northern Ireland. Ididn't know at the time how mild these comments were in comparison to what Iwould hear later in the negotiations.

I spent nearly a week in Northern Ireland. I was favorably impressed by theenergy and intelligence of the people. As I was later to confirm in much moredetail, Northern Ireland is an advanced, modern society. Its people areproductive, literate, articulate. But for all its modernity and literacy,Northern Ireland has been divided, by a deep and ancient hatred, into twohostile communities, their enmity burnished by centuries of conflict. They haveoften inflicted hurt, physical and psychological, on members of the othercommunity, and they have been quick to take offense at real or perceivedslights. They have a highly developed sense of grievance. As one of theparticipants in the talks later said to me: "To understand us, Senator, you mustrealize that we in Northern Ireland will drive 100 miles out of our way toreceive an insult." Each is a minority: Catholics in Northern Ireland,Protestants on the island of Ireland. Each sees itself as a victim community,constantly under siege, the recipient of a long litany of violent blows from theother.

As I flew back to the U.S., I thought about how the harsher side of the NorthernIrish personality had so dominated the recent past. For a quarter century,violence, and the threat of violence, hung over Northern Ireland like a heavy,unyielding fog. Thousands of people were killed, tens of thousands injured. Fearand anxiety were as much a part of daily life as work and school. But the realdamage being done was to people's hearts and minds, where, with each newatrocity, the hostility grew more and more intense. A bombed-out building can bequickly rebuilt, a burned-out car replaced. But as one generation, then another,grew into adulthood knowing so much hate and fear, the prospects forreconciliation receded.

The events of recent years can be understood only in the context of the longhistory of British domination of Ireland. In the early seventeenth century, atabout the time the British began the colonization of North America, theyundertook the settlement of Ireland; it was called "the plantation." The policyencouraged settlers from England and Scotland to go to Ireland, the lure beinggrants of land. As in North America, the settlers landed on the east coast andgradually advanced westward, pushing the native inhabitants ahead of them.

The native Irish were needed to work the land, so their movement to the west wasnot as complete as in America. Nonetheless, to this day, the western part ofNorthern Ireland is largely Catholic, the eastern part largely Protestant.Belfast, in the middle of the Protestant heartland, is the capital. The secondbiggest city is Londonderry (called Derry by Catholics); it is in the west andhas a Catholic majority. In 1922, after centuries of British rule and years ofbitter conflict, Ireland obtained its independence. But as a result the islandof Ireland was partitioned. The twenty-six counties of the south and west,largely Catholic, became the Irish Free State, and eventually the modernRepublic of Ireland. The six counties of the north, with a Protestant majority,remained part of the union.

The government of the newly created Northern Ireland established itself, in thelater, memorable words of a unionist leader, as "a Protestant Parliament for aProtestant people." Discrimination against Catholics was widespread. InLondonderry, although Protestants comprised less than half of the population,they controlled the local government through gerrymandering, and they used thatpower to maintain their dominance.

So it was not surprising that the Catholic civil rights movement found its voicein Londonderry, in the 1960s and 1970s, in the person of John Hume. Young,articulate, a natural leader, he grew up resenting the injustices he felt werebeing suffered by Catholics. But he could not support the response of thosenationalists who support or condone the use of force to expel the British fromNorthern Ireland.1 He advocated peaceful protest. He didn't want to throw theunionists out; he wanted to live with them?as equals. Over time, his SocialDemocratic and Labour Party (SDLP) became the largest nationalist party, and heemerged as the dominant nationalist political leader, gaining election to theEuropean Parliament in 1979 and to the British Parliament in 1983. As the civilrights movement spread across Northern Ireland, violence flared. The inabilityof the Northern Ireland government to deal with the crisis led to itsdissolution in 1972. The British government took direct control of the province,administering its affairs through a Northern Ireland Office.

In the early 1980s, in a series of speeches and articles, Hume argued that theproblems of Northern Ireland could not be solved in isolation. He advocatedbroadly based negotiations to consider simultaneously three relationships:unionists and nationalists within Northern Ireland; the Republic of Ireland andNorthern Ireland; and Britain and the Republic of Ireland. Despite the effortsof some of their leaders, relations between the governments of Britain andIreland had been poor for a long time after the partition of Ireland. Itgradually became evident that if there was to be an end to the periodicoutbreaks of violence in Northern Ireland, there had to be cooperation betweenBritain and the Republic.

The politics of modern Ireland derive from the conflict of the early part ofthis century. Disagreement over the treaty with Britain2 led to a brief butbitter civil war in the new Irish Free State. The pro-treaty forces, led byMichael Collins, prevailed, and eventually became the modern Fine Gael party.The anti-treaty forces, led by Eamon de Valera, constituted the Fianna Failparty. Thus, Fianna Fail has always been regarded by unionists as the morenationalist (or "green") of the two major Irish parties, and therefore the mostsuspect.

In 1982, in an effort to return home rule to Northern Ireland, the Britishgovernment proposed the creation of a new assembly in which there would be alimited form of power-sharing. Nationalists opposed the proposal, demanding thefull sharing of power. In the campaign leading up to an election in October ofthat year, Hume and the SDLP called for the creation of a Council for a NewIreland, to include the main political parties in the Republic of Ireland andthe SDLP. It was an attempt to forge a consensus among nationalists as analternative to the assembly proposed by the British. The assembly was createdbut nationalists never participated, and it was eventually dissolved in 1986.

In 1983 a Fine Gael Taoiseach,3 Dr. Garrett Fitzgerald, took up the SDLPproposal and established the New Ireland Forum. It brought together the mainparties in the Republic with the SDLP to discuss the shape of what wasambitiously called a "New Ireland." Its report in 1984 set out severalprinciples and requirements for a political settlement in Northern Ireland. Itincluded the statement that Irish unity would come about only "with the consentof the people of the North and of the South of Ireland." This was the mostflexible position then possible, since the Fianna Fail platform insisted thatthe only valid unit for self-determination was the whole island. The report setout three possible models for a New Ireland: a unified Irish state; a federalIreland; or joint British-Irish sovereignty over Northern Ireland. At Hume'sinsistence, the report also indicated that the members of the Forum were open toother suggestions. The three models were famously dismissed by then BritishPrime Minister Margaret Thatcher, as "out, out, out." But they were very much inthe minds of unionists when the Anglo-Irish Agreement was reached the followingyear.

That agreement, reached on November 15, 1985, was a turning point in the historyof Northern Ireland. Article One acknowledged that there would be no change inthe constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majorityof the people of Northern Ireland. Thereafter, the British government undertookto discharge its responsibilities in Northern Ireland in consultation with theIrish government (but without any loss of sovereignty). A standingIntergovernmental Conference, co-chaired by the Irish minister for foreignaffairs and the British secretary of state for Northern Ireland, was establishedfor this purpose, supported by a permanent joint Secretariat of British andIrish officials based at Maryfield, outside Belfast. Dublin was given the rightto be consulted about British policy in relation to Northern Ireland, and thetwo governments committed themselves to making "determined efforts" to resolveany disagreements.

The unionist community was totally opposed to the Anglo-Irish Agreement,primarily because the role given to the Irish government was interpreted as astep in the direction of "joint sovereignty." The agreement's focus on theNorthern Ireland aspects of the intergovernmental relationship also unsettledunionists, because it set Northern Ireland apart from the rest of the UnitedKingdom, appearing to undermine its constitutional status as an integral part ofthe U.K. A campaign was organized to reject the agreement. Huge rallies wereheld, and a petition drive was organized. Assembly and District Council businesswas disrupted by an "Ulster says No" campaign; normal contact with ministers wasbroken off. All of the unionist members of Parliament resigned their seats,forcing simultaneous by-elections which were viewed as a referendum on theagreement and which delivered a predictably negative overall result. A "day ofaction" was organized in March 1986 in an attempt to demonstrate the campaign'sability to bring the agreement down by direct action.

The security forces, led by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, were able to containthe day of action and the other disturbances associated with the "Ulster saysNo" campaign. Ultimately a Joint Unionist Task Force report, "An End to Drift,"acknowledged that the only way forward was to negotiate an alternative to theAnglo-Irish Agreement, and unionist leaders approached the British government inAugust 1987 to initiate discussions to that end. The subsequent "talks abouttalks" led ultimately to negotiations in 1991 and 1992, which ended withoutagreement.

In 1988, Hume received a telephone call from a Belfast solicitor. Would he bewilling to meet with Sinn Fein officials to talk about some of the issues he hadbeen publicly discussing? It was a risk for Hume. Sinn Fein is a political partywith close ties to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the paramilitaryorganization committed to the use of force to achieve a united Ireland. The SDLPand Sinn Fein compete for nationalist votes; anything that might strengthen SinnFein politically could weaken the SDLP. But Hume agreed. He met Gerry Adams, theleader of Sinn Fein, for the first time, and they began a dialogue whichstretched across six years. It was, for part of that time, a complex set offour-way discussions, involving the SDLP, Sinn Fein, and the Irish and Britishgovernments.

The acceptance by Dublin of Article One of the Anglo-Irish Agreement was framedin terms which allowed it to be defended as an acceptance of political realitiesrather than a commitment to a principle. The effect of the article wassubsequently challenged in a case taken to the Irish Supreme Court by twoleading unionists. The Court's decision confirmed unionists' worst fears byasserting that the achievement of Irish unity was a "constitutional imperative"on every Irish government and that signature of the Anglo-Irish Agreement hadnot implied any acceptance that Northern Ireland was constitutionally a part ofthe United Kingdom.

The agreement had been signed by Garrett Fitzgerald, whose government wassucceeded in 1987 by one led by Fianna Fail. In 1992, Albert Reynolds becameTaoiseach. Reynolds moved Fianna Fail and the government toward accommodationover Northern Ireland. He entered into two parallel dialogues: with the Britishprime minister, John Major; and with Hume and Adams, as the three men sought toestablish a common nationalist position.

On December 15, 1993, Reynolds and Major announced the Downing StreetDeclaration. It was another significant step toward peace in Northern Ireland.The Declaration arose primarily from the desire of the British and Irishgovernments to set out the terms on which parties associated with paramilitaryorganizations in Northern Ireland could enter negotiations. It also sought totackle one of the major obstacles to agreement in the 1991-92 talks: thedifference of view between the two governments over the constitutional status ofNorthern Ireland. The Declaration reiterated or expressed a number of keyprinciples which the two governments hoped would provide "the starting point ofa peace process designed to culminate in a political settlement." On the mainconstitutional issue the Declaration provided a resolution of the twogovernments' conflicting views by upholding the "constitutional guarantee" tounionists that Northern Ireland would not cease to be a part of the UnitedKingdom without the consent of a majority of its people, while presenting thatas part of a new doctrine of Irish national self-determination in which theconsent of both parts of Ireland, freely and concurrently given, would berequired to bring about Irish unity.

For its part, the British government reiterated that its policy regarding thefuture constitutional status was based on upholding the democratic wish of thepeople of Northern Ireland, and that it had "no selfish strategic or economicinterest in Northern Ireland," a phrase originally used by the British secretaryof state for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, in November 1991. It went on toacknowledge that "it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, byagreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right ofself-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, Northand South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish," andundertook to introduce legislation to give effect to this or any other measureof agreement on future relationships which might be reached.

The Irish government formally acknowledged that "it would be wrong to attempt toimpose a united Ireland, in the absence of the freely given consent of amajority of the people of Northern Ireland," and accepted that "the democraticright of self-determination by the people of Ireland as a whole must be achievedand exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of thepeople of Northern Ireland. . . ." The Taoiseach also said that "in the event ofan overall settlement the Irish government will, as part of a balancedconstitutional accommodation, put forward and support proposals for change inthe Irish Constitution which would fully reflect the principle of consent inNorthern Ireland." On the participation of parties associated with paramilitaryorganizations, the governments said that in the circumstances of a permanent endto the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence . . . democraticallymandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methodsand which have shown they abide by the democratic process are free toparticipate fully in democratic politics and to join in dialogue in due coursebetween the governments and the political parties on the way ahead.

Hume now argued that the Downing Street Declaration removed the basis for theuse of force by the republican movement. Their "military campaign" was based onthe conviction that the British government was the enemy?that it had selfishstrategic interests in Northern Ireland which it would fight to maintain, andthat only "physical force" could evict it and create a united Ireland. But, Humeargued, now that London said that it had no such interests in Northern Ireland,that its people could decide their own future, then the rationale for thecampaign of violence no longer existed.

British-Irish cooperation was accompanied by a growing war-weariness in NorthernIreland. Families began to long for a more normal life, one not dominated byfear and hatred. The governments and the politicians responded. In 1991 and 1992negotiations had taken place involving the governments and the fourconstitutional political parties.4 Those negotiations failed, in part, thegovernments believed, because they did not include the political partiesassociated with the paramilitary organizations; as a result, the negotiationswere not accompanied by a cessation of violence. But the Downing StreetDeclaration had addressed that issue, and those who favored dialogue persisted.By the summer of 1994 anticipation was high. On August 30, the IRA declared "acomplete cessation of all military activity." On October 6, the CombinedLoyalist Military Command (CLMC), the umbrella group for the Protestantparamilitary counterparts to the IRA, declared a cease-fire.

The effect was immediate. Like spring flowers blooming suddenly, hope andoptimism surged, displacing the despair and pessimism that had seemed permanent.The Christmas season of 1994 was the brightest and busiest Belfast had seen indecades. The borders were flung open, and people moved freely between north andsouth, creating commerce and goodwill. By February 1995, when I arrived, hopeswere high. But it was a hope tinged with fear and fatalism. Northern Ireland hadbeen through earlier peace efforts, in 1974 and again in 1991-92, and each timethere had been the failure, the letdown, the continuation of sectarian conflict.

Later, when I became well known in Northern Ireland, I was often stopped bystrangers, on the street, in the airport, in restaurants. They almost alwaysoffered words of gratitude and encouragement: "Thank you, Senator." "God blessyou." "We appreciate what you're doing." And then, always, the fear: "But you'rewasting your time. We've been killing each other for centuries and we're doomedto go on killing each other forever."

This uneasy mixture of hope and fear was tangible in February 1995. I hoped thatsomehow the conference on trade and investment could be of benefit. I'llprobably never be back, I thought, but it would be nice to be of help. Theconference was a success. Hundreds of American businessmen and businesswomenattended, as did a large contingent from Northern Ireland. Most of NorthernIreland's political leaders attended as well. I had to struggle to keep thefocus on business and not let it become a political convention. The participantswere invited to the White House for a reception in a tent on the south lawn.Despite a driving rain, it went well. Spirits were high as men and women whowere bitter opponents gathered in one room and heard urgent pleas for peace,from me, from Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, and from President Clinton.

The day before the conference began, the president told me he was lookingforward to coming to the event, and we reviewed his proposed remarks. In them hewould make a number of announcements. Then he said, "There's one moreannouncement I'd like to make. Everyone would like you to stay on. I know youwere originally told it would just be for six months. But we want this thing tohave staying power. We want you to help with a trade mission and some otherfollow-up this fall. I'd like to say tomorrow that you've agreed to stay onuntil the end of the year."

I didn't hesitate. "I really like the people I've met, and I want to help themif I can. Yes, you can announce it."

Continues...

Excerpted from Making Peaceby George J. Mitchell Copyright © 2000 by George J. Mitchell. Excerpted by permission.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.